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Abstract 
In questa tesi ho utilizzato un modello di allocazione innovativo, il Risk Budgeting, per co-
struire dei portafogli diversificati a livello internazionale, con un’esposizione variabile sui 
Mercati di Frontiera. Negli ultimi anni, i Mercati di Frontiera si sono imposti come asset class 
alternativa, grazie alla loro bassa correlazione ed integrazione con i mercati sviluppati ed 
emergenti. Tuttavia, sono mercati relativamente illiquidi e molto rischiosi. Il primo obiettivo 
di questa tesi è la costruzione dell’Indicatore di Rischio Paese, uno strumento quantitativo in 
grado di supportare il gestore nella scelta dei budget di rischio per i singoli Mercati di Frontie-
ra. In secondo luogo, utilizzando 35 indici azionari forniti da Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional, ho creato diversi portafogli utilizzando la metodologia del Risk Budgeting, con esposi-
zione verso i mercati di frontiera al 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 e 40.00 per cento. Tali portafogli sono 
stati infine confrontati con dei portafogli generati implementando il modello di Markowitz e 
con un portafoglio di mercati sviluppati. La metodologia del Risk Budgeting, combinata 
all’Indicatore di Rischio Paese, permette la generazione di portafogli con un rischio sensibil-
mente inferiore rispetto ai portafogli generati attraverso il modello di Markowitz. In aggiunta, 
i Mercati di Frontiera si confermano un’ottima asset class alternativa, capace di apportare sen-
sibili benefici attraverso la diversificazione del rischio. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last 18 months, stock markets reached their maximum historical quotations, 
closing a “bullish” period started with the recovery from the 2008 Financial Crisis. The Euro-
pean Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2011 dampened this positive trend for a few months, but it was 
not enough deep and widespread to revert it. Despite these last years of good positive returns 
and low volatility on stock markets, certainly eased by expansive monetary policy of the ma-
jor Central Banks, the long-term effects on financial culture and financial industry of the sub-
prime crisis are still remaining actual.  
In their introductory considerations, Brurder and Roncalli (2012) highlighted the investors’ 
lower risk tolerance. Investors turned to asset managers able to manage the crisis in a robust 
way, changing the core character of asset manager job. Nowadays, a good fund manager has 
to be able to manage risk. The central role of risk management in asset allocation, and more 
generally in financial and banking sector, is not only driven by financial culture considera-
tions. After the financial crisis, legislators focused on risk control, introducing a framework 
that should limit the effect of future systemic financial crisis
1
. 
Another topic emerged between 2008 and 2009 is the renewed interest on integration and 
correlation between stock markets. Higher integration and positive correlation increase conta-
gion risk, making a standalone country crisis a potential threat to the whole system. The Asian 
Crisis in 1997 clearly showed this aspect, highlighted again by the Subprime Crisis and, even 
more, by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. There is huge literature on stock markets inte-
gration and the benefits of international diversification, starting from Levy and Sarnat (1970) 
and Solnik (1974). In particular, Solnik (1974) shows the beneficial effect of cross-market 
correlations achieved through international diversification (other important contributions are 
for example the ones of Jorion [1985] and Odier and Solnik [1993]
2
). 
In this thesis I want to combine these two considerations on risk management in asset allo-
cation and the benefits from international diversification. In particular, I want to apply Risk 
Budgeting Approach to construct an internationally diversified portfolio including Developed, 
Emerging and Frontier Markets. As stated by Brurder and Roncalli (2012), Risk Budgeting is 
a widely used allocation method, with an increasing diffusion after the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
                                                          
1
 The most important example is the Basel framework, with Basel II (after the Subprime Crisis) and Basel III (af-
ter the European Sovereign Debt Crisis). 
2
 Jorion (1985) shows that potential benefits of international diversification are more likely to accrue from a re-
duction in risk, rather than an improvement in returns. Finally, Odier and Solnik (1993) show that international 
diversification is still beneficial, even considering increasing informational integration and greater correlation 
during volatile periods, since overall international correlations remain low. 
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In the last years, Risk Budgeting properties were widely studied and there is a consistent liter-
ature on this topic (see for example the books of Rahl [2000], Meucci [2005], Scherer [2007] 
or Roncalli [2013] and the works of Sharpe [2002], Qian [2006], Maillard, Roncalli and 
Teiletche [2010], Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen [2012], Brurder and Roncalli [2012]). Even 
in the classic theory of portfolio allocation, risk considerations have their significance, gener-
ally simplified by the concept of volatility minimization given a certain return level. One of 
the main drawbacks of classic allocation theory is the construction of poorly diversified port-
folio, especially in terms of risk diversification. Risk Budgeting Approach puts risk diversifi-
cation as the core characteristic of the investment process, trying to solve the drawbacks of 
classic portfolio theory. About the second aspect, diversification benefits are widely admitted, 
especially in terms of risk reduction. In this work I want to focus on international diversifica-
tion within the equity asset class. To achieve this goal, the investment universe includes the 
Frontier Markets, stock markets smaller, less accessible and less liquid than Developed and 
Emerging Markets. Recently, the interest over this markets increased, in order to exploit their 
growth opportunities and diversification benefits. In fact, forecasting the Emerging Markets of 
the future hides extremely high potential benefits and asset managers are seeking for non-
conventional investment opportunities able to boost their performances. The literature on this 
topic is quite limited. Diversification benefits of Frontier Markets are studied in the work of 
Berger, Pukthuanthong and Yang (2011), where they found that these markets present low in-
tegration with the world market, increasing the potential benefits of international diversifica-
tion (other works focused on a subset of Frontier Markets are the ones of Speidell and Krohne 
[2007], Jayasuriya and Shambora [2009], and Cheng, Jahan-Parvar, and Rothman [2010]). 
The first aim of the thesis is to construct a tool, the Country Risk Indicator, useful to de-
sign the risk budgets on Frontier Markets. Secondly, I want to evaluate the performances of 
the portfolios obtained using Risk Budgeting against portfolios obtained using Markowitz 
model and a GDP-weighted portfolio of Developed Markets. I constructed the Country Risk 
Indicator using a simplified procedure of Country Risk Assessment. This is a necessary step 
when evaluating the opportunity to invest in a foreign market. I created four different portfo-
lios on the basis of Risk Budgeting Approach, with an increasing risk contribution associated 
to the Frontier Market asset class (5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent). I analyzed these 
portfolios over a variable period between February 2005 and January 2015
3
. The investment 
universe varied across the investment period, since I added new Frontier Markets as soon as 
                                                          
3
 The four portfolios have different inception date, based on the number of Frontier Markets available. To ensure 
diversification, portfolios with 20.00% and 40.00% are launched when the number of Frontier Markets is ac-
ceptable. Given the relative illiquidity of this stock market asset class, I tried to avoid large bet on a single Fron-
tier Market, reducing the potential liquidity risk. 
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they became available.  In fact, I tried to simulate an asset manager activity, using only the in-
formation available at the time of the investment decision process. This simulation gives to 
my work an ex-ante perspective. I was not interested in testing ex-post, with the information 
available today, what an asset manager should have done ten years ago, since it was not pos-
sible for him to reason and to act as I could with a larger set of information. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the classic model of asset allocation, 
the Markowitz Model, and its main drawbacks. Then, I present the Risk Budgeting Approach, 
showing its properties. In Section 3, I present the investment universe, focusing on the defini-
tion of Frontier Market provided by the different financial institutions. The second part in-
cludes some basic characteristics of the assets belonging to the investment universe. In Sec-
tion 4, I illustrate the Country Risk Assessment procedure and the Country Risk Indicator. In 
particular, I define what country risk is and its main determinants. Then, I move to show the 
detailed computation of the Country Risk Indicator. Portfolio construction and evaluation are 
the heart of Section 5. I show how to shift from the Country Risk Indicator to risk budgets, 
adopting an automatic procedure. I present the different portfolios, highlighting basic charac-
teristics, weights and risk contributions composition, turnovers, performance measures and 
tracking error analysis. Finally, I show the Value-at-Risk of my portfolios, comparing it with 
the Developed Market portfolio. Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
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2 Portfolio Theory 
In the last decades, technological progress, financial innovation and globalization substan-
tially increased the number of financial instruments and products and improved financial 
markets’ diffusion and accessibility. The number of retail investors without or with a limited 
financial knowledge approaching financial markets increased, due to these new investment 
opportunities. However, we observed an increase in the complexity of investment choices, 
given to professional asset managers a central role in the new financial world. 
Asset managers are responsible for asset allocation, which is the set of strategies and pro-
cesses implemented to allocate investor’s wealth over different markets or sectors (i.e., inter-
national or sectorial diversification) and asset classes (e.g., liquidity, fixed income, equity, 
commodities, real estate, private equity)
4
. Asset allocation includes the ex-ante analysis of in-
vestor’s financial situation (current wealth and fiscal situation), risk aversion and investment 
objectives (e.g., time horizon, financial goals, etc.). The aim is to find the most suitable asset 
mix for the investor. It can be divided in three different steps. Given investor’s risk aversion 
and investment objectives, the strategic asset allocation is the activity that determines the 
most suitable asset allocation over the medium-long term
5
. With the tactical asset allocation, 
the asset manager implements a periodical revision of the strategic portfolio composition in 
order to catch significant variations in risk-return trade-offs between and within the asset clas-
ses over the short and medium term (e.g., the adjustment of portfolio composition to the busi-
ness cycle or to financial markets situation). Finally, with the operative asset allocation the as-
set manager moves from asset class to individual financial instruments, with the selection of 
the direct or indirect instruments (e.g., stocks, bonds, funds, ETFs, etc.) to build up the strate-
gic and the tactical portfolio. 
Asset allocation is a complicated process. It includes challenging aspects during the pre-
liminary phase (definition of investor’s risk aversion and objectives), the intermediary phase 
(returns forecast, risk assessment, strategic and tactical asset allocation) and the final phase 
(portfolio construction and evaluation). The problem of portfolio composition is complex and 
requires specific financial, mathematical and statistical skills, in order to ensure continuous 
long-term returns. 
                                                          
4
 An asset class is a macro-category including all the instruments with similar technical characteristics, returns 
and risks. 
5
 An interesting paper on strategic asset allocation is the one of Eychenne, Martinetti and Roncalli (2011), in 
which he proposes a quantitative and systematical methodology to optimize portfolios using long-run fundamen-
tal pillars to forecast returns and assess risk for the different asset-classes. 
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The problem of portfolio selection is well developed in academic literature since the ‘50s. 
The first model was proposed in Markowitz (1952) and it is also known as the Mean-Variance 
model. Markowitz model played a central role in the future development of the Portfolio theo-
ry. Several works tried to improve or to test its findings, while other papers focused on the es-
timation of the inputs (expected returns and variance-covariance matrix) of the Mean-
Variance optimizer. Moreover, the drawbacks of this model were the base for the develop-
ment of alternative models for portfolio construction (see for example Michaud [1989], Black 
and Litterman [1991], Chow et al. [1999] and Tütüncü and Koenig [2004]) and for the Risk 
Budgeting Approach. Another important contribution to the Portfolio theory was the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), presented in Sharpe (1964). This model is more focused on the 
evaluation of the financial activities. It is a single-factor model on the relation between risk 
and return. There are several works that tried to test the validity of the CAPM and to improve 
the model (see for example Black, Jensen and Scholes [1972], Fama and MacBeth [1973], 
Roll [1977], Jagannathan and Wang [1996] and Lettau and Ludvigson [2001]). Different ver-
sions of CAPM were developed in the following years, as the ICAPM (see Merton [1973]) 
and the CCAPM. A criticism to the CAPM presented in Fama and French (1993) was the base 
for the development of the recent multiple-factor models, such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theo-
ry (APT). 
CAPM and Markowitz model are still the most diffused models, especially in their correct-
ed formulations. In the first part of this chapter, I present the Markowitz model and its main 
drawbacks. Except for its relevance in the Portfolio theory, it is the model against which I test 
the results of the Risk Budgeting Approach. In the second part, I present the Risk Budgeting 
Approach, which is the core methodology of portfolio construction adopted in this thesis. 
2.1 Classic Portfolio Theory 
2.1.1 The Markowitz Model 
Markowitz (1952) introduced the idea that investment opportunities should be evaluated on 
the basis of their risk-return trade-offs and not only on the basis of their expected returns. 
Moreover, the model put the focus on diversification. Investing in multiple assets, investors 
can achieve diversification benefits through the reduction of risk given a certain level of re-
turn, exploiting assets that are negatively correlated. 
The aim of Markowitz model is the selection of the efficient portfolios from a set of admis-
sible portfolios (i.e., the portfolios that can be reached by an investor given its wealth and a 
particular set of assets). The efficient portfolios are those that maximize the return given a 
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certain level of risk or, in other words, that minimize the risk given a certain level of return. 
This is known as the Mean-Variance Optimization Criterion. The set of efficient portfolios 
composed the efficient frontier. The Markowitz Model is based on strong assumptions
6
: 
 Portfolio risk is characterized by the variability of the returns; 
 Investors are rational and risk averse, with their utility function concave and in-
creasing; 
 Returns distributions are characterized by the first two moments7. 
The last assumption implies that the Mean-Variance Optimizer requires three different in-
puts in order to be implemented: 
 The expected returns 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) of the different n assets (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛). This quantity is 
the mean of the distribution of the random variable Ri (asset returns); 
 The variance 𝜎𝑖
2 of the random variable Ri; 
 The linear correlation coefficient ρik for each couple of random variables (Ri,Rk), 
that is a standardized measure of the covariance between two different assets. This 
quantity is fundamental in diversification process, since diversification benefits 
strictly depends on the fact that assets are positive or negative correlated. 
Given a vector of weights w it is possible to compute the portfolio expected return and 
portfolio variance, respectively in Eq.(2.1) and Eq.(2.2): 
𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 =∑𝑤𝑗𝜇𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                                 (2.1) 
𝜎𝑝
2 = 𝑤′𝛴𝑤 =∑(𝑤𝑗
2𝜎𝑗
2)
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 2∑∑(𝑤𝑗𝑤𝑘𝜎𝑗𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
            𝑗 ≠ 𝑘                     (2.2) 
From Eq.(2.2) it can be seen the importance of the covariance between two assets included 
in the portfolio. If two assets are negatively correlated, diversification is beneficial through 
the reduction of portfolio variance. Markowitz (1952) was one of the first contribution that 
                                                          
6
 Several papers demonstrated that these assumption are not true. For example, on the investors rationality there 
is a growing literature on Behavioral finance, started from the criticism to Efficient Market Hypothesis made in 
Shiller (1981). On the side of returns distribution, there are several empirical studies that proved that these distri-
bution are not normal or jointly elliptical (see for example Fama [1965] and Bouchaud and Chicheportiche 
[2012]). 
7
 In the first formulation, the assumption was that asset returns are jointly normally distributed. However, Cham-
berlain (1983) and Owen and Rabinovitch (1983) release this assumption. They proved that it’s sufficient that 
asset returns are jointly elliptically distributed. Thus, the distribution is still characterized by the first two mo-
ments, as for the normal distribution. 
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formalized the concept of diversification benefits of risk reduction through the investment 
in negatively correlated assets. 
The set of efficient portfolios is determined by solving the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤                                                                 (2.3) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 
        𝑤′𝟏 = 1 
 w is the (1 × 𝑛) vector of weights of the n assets; 
 r  is the (1 × 𝑛) vector of assets expected returns; 
 Σ is the (𝑛 × 𝑛) variance-covariance matrix of the assets included in the portfolio; 
In words, the solution of the model selects those portfolios that minimize the variance 
(w’Σw is portfolio return variance) for a certain level of portfolio expected return (first con-
straint), between the set of all admissible portfolios (second constraint). The analytical solu-
tions of the model are presented in Eq.(2.5) and Eq.(2.6) and they come from the FOC on the 
minimization of the Lagrangian function in Eq.(2.4): 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤    𝐿(𝑤) =
1
2
𝑤′𝛴𝑤 − 𝜆1(𝑤
′𝟏 − 1) − 𝜆1(𝑤
′𝒓 − 𝜇𝑝)                             (2.4) 
𝜎𝑝
2 =
𝐶
∆
𝜇𝑝
2 −
2𝐵
∆
𝜇𝑝 +
𝐴
∆
                                                          (2.5) 
?̂? = 𝑫 + 𝑬𝜇𝑝                                                           (2.6) 
𝐴 = 𝒓′𝛴−1𝒓            𝐵 = 𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓            𝐶 = 𝟏′𝛴−1𝟏            ∆= 𝐴𝐶 − 𝐵2      
𝑫 =
𝐴𝛴−1𝟏 − 𝐵𝛴−1𝒓
∆
          𝑬 =
𝐴𝛴−1𝒓 − 𝐵𝛴−1𝟏
∆
 
As above-mentioned, the efficient frontier is the set of efficient portfolios obtained with the 
Mean-Variance optimization criterion. Graphically, it is represented by the concave function 
on the plane (σ,μ) that delimited the region of the admissible portfolios. In Figure 1, I provide 
a graphical example of the efficient frontier, using a set of fifteen MSCI European stock indi-
ces. Between the different efficient portfolios, the most relevant portfolios are the Global 
Minimum Variance (GMV) and the Maximum Sharpe (MS). The GMV portfolio is the port-
folio with the lowest risk, and consequently the lowest return, between the efficient portfolios. 
It represents the lower bound of the efficient frontier. The MS portfolio is the portfolio with 
the highest trade-off between risk and return. 
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Figure 1 – Efficient Frontier Example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last important thing about the efficient frontier is that amplifying the investment uni-
verse, it will shift always to the left. In fact, adding new assets to the initial set, we amplify 
the investment opportunities and we can reach higher returns given the same level of risk. 
From the point of view of a rational investor, the optimal portfolio is the portfolio situated 
on the tangency point between his Mean-Variance utility function indifference curves and the 
efficient frontier. Risk averse investor utility function has the following form: 
𝑈 = 𝜇𝑝 −
𝛾
2
𝜎𝑝
2                                                                     (2.7) 
The indifference curves become flatter the lower the risk aversion coefficient. The optimal 
problem that the investor has to solve, given its utility function with a coefficient of risk aver-
sion γ, is presented in Eq.(2.8) and the solution is presented in Eq.(2.9): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤   𝑈 = 𝑤
′𝒓 −
𝛾
2
𝑤′𝛴𝑤                                                        (2.8) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜        𝑤′𝟏 = 1                            
?̂? =
1
𝛾
𝛴−1𝒓 −
𝐵 − 𝛾
𝐶
1
𝛾
𝛴−1𝟏 =
𝐵
𝛾
𝑤𝑀𝑆̂ −
𝐵 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝑤𝐺𝑀?̂?                               (2.9) 
The optimal portfolio of the risk averse agent can be written as a combination of the 
weights of the MS and the GMV portfolios
8
. For extremely high risk aversion coefficient 
(𝛾 → ∞), the solution converges to the GMV portfolio. On the contrary, for extremely low 
                                                          
8
 See Appendix A for the demonstration.  
 9 
 
4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Volatility (in %)
M
ea
n
 (
in
 %
)
Risk Averse
4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Volatility (in %)
M
ea
n
 (
in
 %
)
Risk Lover
risk aversion coefficient (𝛾 → 0), the solution is composed by extreme long position in MS 
portfolio and extreme short position on GMV portfolio. Figure 2 provides a graphical exam-
ple of investor choice, with a comparison between two investors with a different risk aversion 
coefficient. As above-mentioned, the optimal choice will move to the right on the efficient 
frontier the lower the risk aversion. 
Figure 2 – Optimal investor choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An important development of the Markowitz model is the possibility to invest in a risk-free 
asset (i.e., the return is known) in addition to the n risky assets. Tobin (1958) added the notion 
of leverage incorporating this risk-free asset. Combining a risk-free asset with a portfolio on 
the efficient frontier, it is possible to construct portfolios with better risk–return trade-offs 
than portfolios on the efficient frontier. Given the return of the risk-free asset (rf) the problem 
can be written as: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤                                                                 (2.10) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 + (1 − 𝑤′𝟏)𝑟𝑓                                                              
The admissibility constraint is implicit in the target return constraint. One thing that is im-
portant to note is that the sum of the weights of the risky assets (w) is not equal to 1 as in the 
previous optimal problem. In fact, it’s the sum between the weights of the risky assets and the 
weight of the risk-free asset that is equal to 1. The solution of the problem is presented in 
Eq.(2.11), while the variance of the efficient portfolios and the efficient frontier equation are 
presented in Eq.(2.12) and Eq.(2.13) respectively: 
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?̂? =
𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)
𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2 (𝜇𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓)                                              (2.11) 
𝜎𝑝
2 =
(𝜇𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓)
2
𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2                                                        (2.12) 
𝜇𝑝 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜎𝑝√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2                                              (2.13) 
First of all, the solution of the problem is given by the weights of the risky assets, while the 
weight of the risk-free asset is given as a complement to 1. Secondly, as can be seen in 
Eq.(2.13), the efficient frontier is a straight line in the plane (σ,μ) representing the risk-return 
combinations obtained combining the risk-free asset and the risky assets. If the portfolio re-
turn is equal to the risk-free rate, the entire portfolio is invested in the risk-free asset. Moving 
to the right on the efficient frontier, we start to invest in the risky assets (i.e.,  𝑤′𝟏 > 0 and 
1 − 𝑤′𝟏 < 1). Figure 3 provides an example of efficient frontier with risk-free asset. 
Figure 3 – Efficient Frontier with Risk Free Asset Example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The line representing the efficient frontier with the risk-free investment is known as Capi-
tal Market Line (CML). By moving on the new efficient frontier, from the portfolio composed 
by the risk-free asset, we will move to a portfolio composed only by risky assets (i.e., 
𝑤′𝟏 = 1). This portfolio is located both on the efficient frontier and on the CML and its 
weights are: 
?̂? =
𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)
𝟏′𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)
= 𝑤𝑀𝑆̂                                                 (2.14) 
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This portfolio is known as Tangency portfolio or Maximum Sharpe portfolio, with return 
and risk presented in Eq.(2.15) and Eq.(2.16) respectively: 
𝜇𝑀𝑆 =
𝐴 − 𝐵𝑟𝑓
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
                                                              (2.15) 
𝜎𝑀𝑆
2 =
(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)𝛴
−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)
(𝟏′𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓))
2 =
𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
(𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)
2                                 (2.16) 
The tangency portfolio between the efficient frontier and the CML is the portfolio that pro-
vides the highest Sharpe ratio. In particular, the intercept of the CML is equal to the risk-free 
rate and its slope is equal to the Sharpe ratio of the Tangency portfolio
9
: 
𝜇𝑀𝑆 − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑀𝑆
= 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2                                    (2.17) 
Focusing on investor choice, we start again from the mean-variance utility function in 
Eq.(2.7), with γ that represent the risk aversion coefficient. The optimal choice of the agent 
will be the portfolio located on the tangency between the indifference curves and the CML, 
which is the new efficient frontier. Eq.(2.18) formalizes the problem and Eq.(2.19) presents 
the solution: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤   𝑈 = (1 − 𝑤′𝟏)𝑟𝑓 + 𝑤
′𝒓 −
𝛾
2
𝑤′𝛴𝑤                                      (2.18) 
?̂? =
1
𝛾
𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓) =
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
𝛾
𝛴−1(𝒓 − 𝟏𝑟𝑓)
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
=
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
𝛾
𝑤𝑀𝑆̂                      (2.19) 
The solution is expressed in terms of the weights of the risky assets (i.e., 𝑤′𝟏 ≠ 1), while 
the weight on the risk-free asset is given as a complement to 1. An important thing to note is 
the fraction of the portfolio invested in the risky assets is proportional to the MS portfolio in 
this case
10
. The optimal portfolio is thus a combination of the risk-free asset and of the MS 
portfolio. For extremely high risk aversion coefficient (𝛾 → ∞), the solution converges to a 
portfolio composed only by the risk-free asset (i.e., 𝑤′𝟏 = 0). On the contrary, for extremely 
low risk aversion coefficient (𝛾 → 0), the solution is composed by an infinitely long position 
in MS portfolio, financed by borrowing (i.e., shorting) at the risk-free rate. This is the concept 
of leverage introduced by Tobin. Using the risk-free asset, investors may leverage their posi-
                                                          
9
 See Appendix A for the demonstration. 
10
 Note that the Global Minimum Variance portfolio find in the case without risk-free asset does not belong to 
the CML. In fact, the new GMV portfolio is represented by the risk-free asset. 
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tion (shorting the risk-free asset) to increase the portion invested in the risky assets or de-
leverage their position (selling part of the holdings in the risky assets) to invest the proceeds 
in the risk-free asset. Figure 4 shows an example of investor choice, comparing two different 
degrees of risk aversion. The tangency point between the CML and the indifference curve will 
move to the right, reducing the portion invested in the risk-free asset, the lower the risk aver-
sion of the investor. 
Figure 4: Optimal investor choice with risk-free asset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tobin concluded that portfolio construction can be divided in two different steps. In the 
first step, investors should determine the risky portion of their portfolio. In the second step, 
they should leverage or de-leverage this portfolio to achieve their desired level of risk. The 
important thing is that the composition of the risky portfolio is independent of the investor’s 
risk aversion and the two choices are independent of one another. This is known in literature 
as Tobin’s separation theorem11. 
2.1.2 The Drawbacks of the Markowitz Model 
As above-mentioned, the Markowitz model is one of the most studied and tested model in 
literature. Several papers found important drawbacks of this model and proposed important 
development. In this paragraph I present the main limitations of the Markowitz model, briefly 
discussing three important approaches proposed in Michaud (1989), Black and Litterman 
(1991) and Tütüncü and Koenig (2004). 
                                                          
11
 Sharpe (1964) with the CAPM showed that, given strong assumptions (e.g. Market Efficiency Hypothesis), the 
risky portfolio is the market portfolio. Thus, each investor should hold the market portfolio leveraged or de-
leveraged in order to achieve their optimal level of risk. 
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The first important limit of the Markowitz model is the assumption that asset returns are 
jointly normally distributed. This assumption is crucial for the majority of the models of fi-
nancial theory. However, asset returns distribution, especially for daily and weekly returns, 
are characterized by significant higher kurtosis (i.e., fat tails) and significant asymmetry with 
respect to the normal distribution. This characteristic of asset returns was widely investigated 
in empirical research (see for example Fama [1965], Kon [1984], Richardson and Smith 
[1993], Andersen et al. [2001] and Bouchaud and Chicheportiche [2012]). The result is co-
herent with empirical observations on the data that I used in this work. In fact, most of the in-
dices failed the normality test even considering monthly returns
12
. However, this assumption 
was released by Chamberlain (1983) and Owen and Rabinovitch (1983). In particular, they 
proved that it’s sufficient that asset returns are jointly elliptically distributed. In fact, joint el-
liptical distributions are still symmetrical and characterized by the first two moments, even if 
asset returns are not. This conclusion leaves the results of the Markowitz model unchanged. 
However, Bouchaud and Chicheportiche (2012) empirically reject this hypothesis. 
The second concern is over the characteristics of the investor set behind the Markowitz 
model. In particular, the model assumes that investors are rational and risk averse, with a con-
cave and increasing mean-variance utility function, initially proxied by a quadratic function. 
Investors’ rationality is also the base of Market Efficient Hypothesis (MEH), but the growing 
literature in Behavioral economics and Behavioral finance argued that this assumption is too 
restrictive and doesn’t hold in the real world. The first criticisms to investor rationality and 
MEH comes from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Shiller (1981). In particular, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) introduced the Prospect Theory, characterized by the asymmetry between 
gains and losses impact on investors’ utility (i.e., loss aversion). This is one of the first criti-
cism to rational behavior. Moreover, Shiller (1981) observed that stock market volatility is 
too high to be justified only by new information on dividends as predicted by the MEH. In the 
following years several studies proved the irrationality of investors, with the introduction of 
noise traders (see for example De Long et al. [1990]), investors’ over- and under-reactions to 
news and the concept of overconfidence and biased self-attribution
13
. A lot of papers showed 
that investors’ overconfidence is an important irrational component of investors’ behavior 
(see for example Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam [1998]). Moreover, Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), quoting Campbell and Cochrane (1994), state that is neces-
                                                          
12
 See Table 4 in Subparagraph 3.2.1. 
13
 Investors’ overconfidence is generally defined as the overestimation of the precision of a private information 
signal, that usually results in over-reaction. Biased self-attribution comes from attribution theory proposed by 
Bem (1965), for which individuals tend to attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to high abil-
ity, while the events that disconfirm the action are attributed to external noise or sabotage (see Daniel, Hirshleif-
er and Subrahmanyam [1998]). 
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sary a utility function with extreme habit persistence in order to explain predictable variations 
in market returns. Quoting Griffin and Tversky (1992), they showed that experienced inves-
tors tend to be more overconfident than inexperienced investors. Odean (1998) shows that 
overconfidence about a private signal leads to investors’ over-reaction, resulting in excess 
volatility. Finally, an interesting work is the one presented in Baker and Wurgler (2007), 
where they showed that stocks with low capitalization, low profitability, high volatility, low 
dividend payout, low growth or stocks of firms in financial distress, are more likely to be 
highly sensitive to waves generated by investors’ sentiment. About the second investor’s 
characteristic, several studies showed that quadratic preferences can generate implausible re-
sults, exhibiting increasing absolute risk aversion and displaying negative marginal utility af-
ter some finite wealth level (see for example the recent book of Levy [2011]). Thus, the as-
sumptions behind the Markowitz model on investors’ characteristics generally don’t hold in 
real world. 
Another important drawback of the Markowitz model is related to its outcomes, making its 
use in the pure form infeasible in practice. Markowitz’ optimizers tend to create portfolios 
characterized by the presence of extreme positions, resulting in some cases in poorly diversi-
fied allocation. This is particularly evident in presence of short selling constraints. As men-
tioned in Section 1, this portfolios are poorly diversified especially in terms of risk. In reality, 
asset managers cannot take too large long and/or short positions, due to practical and legal 
limitations. In particular, institutional investors, with the exception of speculative portfolios 
(i.e., hedge funds), cannot create or they have strong limitations on short positions. This fea-
ture of the Markowitz model is well recognized in academic literature and some works tried to 
propose new models able to overcome this limit (see for example Michaud [1989], Black and 
Litterman [1991] and Tütüncü and Koenig [2004]). Michaud (1989) and Black and Litterman 
(1991) showed that Markowitz’ optimizers tends to maximize errors. In particular, Michaud 
(1989) claimed that the habit of using historical data to produce a sample mean used as ex-
pected return contributes largely to the error maximization. In addition to that, according to 
Michaud (1989) and Scherer (2007), Markowitz model tends to select the securities that are 
the most prone to be subject to large estimation errors, maximizing the impact of estimation 
error on portfolio weights. These assets are those with the best (i.e. high return and low risk 
and/or correlation) and the worst features, resulting in too large long and short positions re-
spectively. This is strictly related with another limit of the Markowitz model. This limit is the 
absence of assets’ market capitalization weights considerations. Assets with a low level of 
capitalization usually present high expected returns and negative correlation with the other as-
set class, suggesting high portfolio weights. However, these assets are characterized by lower 
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liquidity compared to mid- and large-cap securities. The overweight could lead to risk con-
centration on the small-cap asset class, consequently increasing dramatically the liquidity risk. 
Moreover, the quadratic programming optimization algorithm uses point estimates as inputs, 
treating them as if they were  known with certainty, without differencing over different level 
of uncertainty. Finally, the mean-variance models are often unstable, in the sense that small 
changes in input might dramatically change the portfolio. The model is especially unstable in 
relation to the expected return input, since a small change in expected returns might generate 
a radically different allocation. This instability could dramatically increase transaction costs. 
One of the first solution proposed to overcome the limit of the outcomes of the Markowitz 
model is to add constraints to the minimization problems presented in Eq.(2.3) and Eq.(2.10). 
These constraints can be imposed directly on the weights or indirectly through functions of 
the weights. The most simple and common constraint is the no short selling constraint. How-
ever, this constraint alone might lead to poorly diversified portfolios. To the pure model or to 
the no short selling constraint we can add lower and/or upper bound constraints to single asset 
to limit the minimum (including the maximum short position) and the maximum weight of 
this asset. Another common set of constraints are the group constraints, consisting in lower 
and/or upper bounds posed on a group of assets or an asset class (e.g., bonds, small-cap, 
emerging and frontier markets, etc.), instead of a single asset. Finally, an example of con-
straint not directly set on weights is the turnover constraint, that imposes a cap on the trading 
activity or on the portfolio rotation. This constraint helps to contain the impact of transaction 
costs on portfolio performance. In Appendix A, I provide some mathematical example of this 
solution. 
Michaud (1989) proposed another solution, with the introduction of the concept of 
Resampled Efficiency. Portfolios on the resampled frontier are composed by assets weight 
vectors which are the average of the Mean-Variance efficient portfolios weight vectors given 
a certain level of portfolio return
14
. Unfortunately it has no economic justification and the 
resampled efficient portfolio is not Mean-Variance efficient. The process is divided in differ-
ent steps. First of all, we start from a standard Mean-Variance optimization, dividing the port-
folios of the efficient frontier into ranks. Secondly, we need to compute the resampled 
weights for a particular rank, starting from the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix and 
the mean vector of the historical returns.. We need to generate simulated returns, resampling 
the historical inputs taking a number of draws from the inputs distribution that should reflect 
the uncertainty in the inputs. The most common approach to generate simulated returns are 
                                                          
14
 This procedure ensures that after averaging the portfolio weights still sum up to 1. 
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Monte Carlo and Bootstrap simulation. Using the sample series we can compute a new vari-
ance-covariance matrix, used to produce a new efficient frontier that we have to divide in the 
same number of ranks used in the first step. We have to repeat the second step many times, in 
order to obtain many efficient frontiers with different weights for a certain rank of return. Fi-
nally, we have to compute the resampled frontier, that is composed by the portfolios obtained 
averaging the weights of the simulated efficient frontiers for a particular rank of return. The 
main advantage of resampled efficiency is the production of more intuitive portfolio alloca-
tions, less sensitive to input perturbations. This is because the resampled efficient portfolio is 
more diversified and less risky than simple Mean-Variance efficient portfolios. Moreover, as 
resampled efficiency is an averaging process, it is stable and small changes in the inputs are 
generally associated with small changes in the optimized portfolios. The biggest disadvantage 
of resampling comes from the fact that it does not have a sound theoretical foundation. First 
of all, the process creates statistically equivalent portfolios. Moreover, it cannot be argued 
theoretically that the resampled portfolio outperforms the mean-variance efficient portfolio. 
The problem is that a wide range of portfolios are statistically equivalent to the efficient fron-
tier, and a straightforward revision of the managed portfolio could induce an exceptional in-
crement in the transaction costs. Thus, we need a statistical inference procedure to transform 
the statistical equivalence region into a sample acceptance region to control for the type I er-
ror. By assumption, resampled frontier will represent the portfolio efficiency. In fact, a 
resampled efficient portfolio is a sample mean vector, with the useful statistical properties of 
the sample mean vector. Second, when compared to mean-variance efficiency, resampled ef-
ficiency has more practical investment value. The judgement over the efficiency of a portfolio 
is based on its proximity to the target resampled efficient portfolio. 
Black and Litterman (1991) proposed another important solution. The Black-Litterman as-
set allocation model is a sophisticated method used to overcome the problem of unintuitive, 
highly-concentrated and input-sensitive portfolios. This model uses a Bayesian approach to 
combine the subjective views of the asset managers over the expected returns of one or more 
assets with the market equilibrium expected returns (i.e., the prior distribution). The resulting 
expected returns (i.e., the posterior distribution) is a complex weighted average of the inves-
tor’s views and the market equilibrium. The basic and innovative idea is to combine the equi-
librium with investor-specific views with different level of confidence set by the asset manag-
er. In particular, the model allows both absolute and relative views (e.g., performance of an 
asset compared to another). In traditional Mean-Variance portfolio optimization, relative 
views cannot be expressed. The level of confidence on the view is expressed as the standard 
deviation around the expected return of the view, that is decreasing the higher the confidence 
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of the manager. The confidence level affects the influence of a particular view in the portfolio 
construction. In fact, the lower the confidence on a view and the less this view affects the 
portfolio weights. This is a very an attractive feature, given the fact that the views are often 
incorrect. However, views indicate on which assets investors want to take a bet and in which 
direction this bet ought to be taken. As above-mentioned, the views are combined with the 
equilibrium returns, generally computed using the CAPM model. The positions are taken on 
the assets to which investors have expressed views in relation to the benchmark portfolio. The 
Black-Litterman model proposes a measure of neutral expected returns that is much less sen-
sitive to extreme observations, thanks to the equilibrium return component.  
The last important solution is the robust asset allocation proposed by Tütüncü and Koenig 
(2004). They start from a finite set of possible scenarios for expected returns and the variance-
covariance matrix, using a box type uncertainty sets that may be obtained from confidence in-
tervals on the elements of the expected return vector and variance-covariance matrix. The 
methods used to generate this set are different, like for example rolling method, EWMA and 
bootstrapping of historical data. Alternative method would use a statistical procedure (e.g. 
confidence intervals) built on top of the particular alpha and risk model. Given a choice for 
the decision variables, we are concerned about the worst-case realization of the data from the 
uncertainty set. The worst-case oriented robust optimization formulations seek to find the so-
lution with the best worst-case guarantees (i.e., expected returns maximization between the 
worst framework). Robust efficient portfolios have significantly better worst-case behavior 
and are slightly inefficient with average inputs. Moreover, they remain relevant for long peri-
ods. Thus, they are suitable for buy-and-hold investors and present low turnover, and conse-
quently lower transaction costs. However, the worst-case oriented model are conservative 
models. Thus they are not suitable for aggressive investors. Robust optimization models offer 
intuitive and useful approaches to interpret and manage uncertainty in parameters of optimiza-
tion problems. Black-Litterman model and robust asset allocation help to introduce the uncer-
tainty over the Mean-Variance optimization inputs (i.e., expected returns and variance-
covariance matrix), solving a serious limit of the Markowitz model. 
2.2 Risk Budgeting Approach 
In this paragraph I present the risk budgeting approach. Risk budgeting is the core method-
ology adopted in this thesis to construct portfolios with Frontier Market asset class. It was de-
signed to solve the drawbacks of the Markowitz model, in particular the tendency to produce 
poorly diversified portfolios, especially in terms of risk rather than in terms of weights. In the 
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previous subparagraph I present some models that try to tackle the same problem. However, 
they continued to maintain the same framework of the Markowitz model, that is volatility 
minimization given a target expected return. Risk Budgeting Approach is completely different 
from those presented above, since it completely avoids any consideration on returns. In fact, 
the investors have to choose only the risk repartition between the assets included in the in-
vestment universe. 
Risk Budgeting belongs to the family of the new risk-based investment style. These meth-
odologies put risk diversification as their core feature and they don’t use any performance 
forecast as input of the model. Thus, Risk Budgeting Approach helps to avoid the impact of 
return estimation error and return uncertainty on the construction of optimal portfolios. This 
aspect is not a secondary one. As above-mentioned, Michaud (1989) showed the importance 
of the estimation of the expected returns, given the high sensitivity of the outcomes of the op-
timization process (i.e., portfolio weights, asset allocation) to the changes in expected returns. 
Moreover, there is a broad consensus in literature that variance-covariance matrix is easier to 
estimate from historical data than expected returns, producing smaller estimation errors (see 
for example Merton [1980] and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok [1999]). Thus, the implemen-
tation of Risk Budgeting methodology, with the consequent absence of expected return con-
siderations, can help to solve serious limits of the Markowitz model, such as the lack of risk 
diversification, the tendency to maximize errors in expected return estimation and the produc-
tion of unstable portfolios highly sensitive to changes in expected returns, potentially reduc-
ing transaction costs. 
 As mentioned in Section 1, despite its recent diffusion in asset managers’ practice, Risk 
Budgeting Approach can count on a consistent literature. In this thesis, I use Bruder and Ron-
calli (2012) and Roncalli (2013) to develop the theoretical part on Risk Budgeting. In particu-
lar, I present a General Risk Budgeting Approach, where the risk budgets are set by the asset 
manager with a certain freedom. I’m not going to present the Equal Risk Contribution (ERC) 
portfolio, extensively studied by Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche (2010)
15
. In this portfolio, 
the risk contribution for each asset are equal.  However, the ERC portfolio is not suitable for 
investors that don’t want to manage risk exposures in a uniform way16. This is precisely the 
situation in which I develop this thesis. Given their higher risk and relative illiquidity, Fron-
                                                          
15
 In this paper they presented the main properties of the ERC portfolio. In particular, they showed that this port-
folio is located between the Global Minimum Variance and the Equally Weighted portfolio. 
16
 A classic example is the strategic asset allocation, where the asset manager has to allocate between different 
asset classes. In some cases these asset classes represent alternative or illiquid investment (e.g., small-cap in eq-
uity portfolios, high yield bonds in fixed income portfolios, commodities and real estate) where the asset manag-
er needs to limit the risk exposure in a different way with respect to the other asset classes. 
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tier Markets cannot contribute to portfolio risk as Developed and Emerging Markets. Within 
the equity asset class, they represent an alternative investment and their weights should be 
constrained to a small portion of the portfolio. Given the illiquidity of the single Frontier 
Market, an ERC allocation will increase dramatically the liquidity risk. 
2.2.1 The Theoretical Framework 
As mentioned in Subparagraph 2.1.2, a way to solve the drawbacks of the Markowitz mod-
el is to add constraints to the pure optimization problem, ending up with the so called con-
strained efficient frontier. Within the various form of constraints, investors can impose a 
weight budgeting (e.g., upper and lower bounds), directly limiting the overall weight of asset 
classes or of a single asset. However, asset managers might constrain other aspects associated 
with asset classes, as for example their contribution to the portfolio return or to a performance 
measure, thus ending up with Performance Budgeting. With Risk Budgeting, investors impose 
constraints on the risk contribution of the asset classes or of a specific asset to the portfolio 
total risk. 
I start from a portfolio of n assets, with wi that define the exposure (i.e. the weight) of the 
i
th
 asset (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛). We denote R(w1,w2,…,wn) as the risk measure for the portfolio com-
posed by the n assets with weights (w1,w2,…,wn). If the risk measure is coherent and convex 
we have the following Euler decomposition (see Artzner et al. [1999]): 
𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) =∑𝑤𝑖 ∙
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                           (2.20) 
Following Eq.(2.20), the portfolio risk measure is the sum of the product between the ex-
posure and its marginal risk. The risk contribution of the i
th
 asset is defined as: 
𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) = 𝑤𝑖 ∙
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
                                       (2.21) 
Risk contributions can be analyzed considering the marginal contributions to the overall 
portfolio risk. In particular, we observe that the marginal risk contribution of the i
th
 asset is 
defined as: 
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
= lim
ℎ→∞
𝑅(𝑤 + ℎ𝒆𝒊) − 𝑅(𝑤)
ℎ
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The vector ei is a vector of zeros apart for the element i. Then, assuming that h is small, we 
can obtain: 
𝑅(𝑤 + ℎ𝒆𝒊) = 𝑅(𝑤) + ℎ
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
     →      𝑀𝑅𝑖 =
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
                           
The marginal risk contributions are part of the risk contributions. Risk Budgeting methods 
are based on the increase in the portfolio risk subsequent to a change in one of the assets risk. 
Given a set of risk budgets bi for the n assets, the Risk Budgeting portfolio is generally de-
fined as the portfolio such that the risk contributions match their respective risk budgets: 
{
 
 
 
 
 𝑅𝐶1(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) = 𝑏1
⋮
 𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) = 𝑏𝑖
⋮
 𝑅𝐶𝑛(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) = 𝑏𝑛
                                                      (2.22) 
The system presented in Eq.(2.22) is completely different from a Weight Budgeting portfo-
lio (i.e., 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖), since it is composed by a set of nonlinear equations. The solution of this 
system represents the Risk Budgeting portfolio. 
About the risk measures that can be used in Risk Budgeting Approach, we have several op-
tions. The most common risk measure is the volatility, used also in this thesis when I apply 
this approach to portfolio construction. Focusing on volatility risk measure, we obtain portfo-
lio risk, marginal risk contribution and risk contribution in Eq.(2.23), in Eq.(2.24) and in 
Eq.(2.24) respectively
17
: 
𝑅(𝑤) = 𝜎(𝑤) = √𝑤′𝛴𝑤                                                (2.23) 
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
=
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
                                                    (2.24) 
𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑤) = 𝑤𝑖
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
                                                 (2.25) 
A above-mentioned, volatility is not the only risk measure that can be used. Under the as-
sumption of normally distributed returns, managing risk exposures with value at risk (VaR) 
and expected shortfall (ES) is equivalent to manage risk exposures with volatility (for VaR 
risk measure see for example Jorion [2007]) . In general, in a Gaussian world every risk 
                                                          
17
 In Appendix A, I provide the check using the Euler decomposition. 
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measure that doesn’t depend on the mean of the distribution can be used. Of this class of risk 
measures, VaR and ES are the most common in financial markets practice. 
Bruder and Roncalli (2012) proposed another formulation of the system in Eq.(2.22), 
where they define the portfolio in terms of weights, while the risk budgets are defined in rela-
tive terms. Moreover, they decided to obtain a long-only portfolio. However, risk budgets 
may be negative, with the concentration of risk on the other assets, depending on investors’ 
objectives. Following Bruder and Roncalli (2012), the new system used to define the Risk 
Budget (RB) portfolio is presented in Eq.(2.26): 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑤𝑖 ∙ (𝛴𝑤)𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖(𝑤
′𝛴𝑤)
𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0
∑ 𝑏𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                (2.26) 
Given the new formulation, we add two positivity constraints on risk budgets and weights 
and the usual constraints that risk budgets and weights have to sum up to 1. A problem con-
nected to this specification of the problem may appear if the asset manager want to set some 
risk budgets equal to zero. Given σi the volatility of the asset i and ρij the cross-correlation be-
tween asset i and j, we have that: 
(𝛴)𝑖𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑗      ⇒      
𝜕 𝜎(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
=
𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖
2 + 𝜎𝑖 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑖𝑗𝜎𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝜎(𝑤)
                             
Eq.(2.27) represents the situation in which the risk budget for the asset k (i.e., bk) is fixed 
equal to zero and Eq.(2.28) and Eq.(2.29) are the solutions of this constraint: 
𝑤𝑘 (𝑤𝑘𝜎𝑘
2 + 𝜎𝑘∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑘𝑗𝜎𝑗
𝑘≠𝑗
) = 0                                           (2.27) 
𝑤′𝑘 = 0                                                                        (2.28) 
𝑤′′𝑘 = −
∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜌𝑘𝑗𝜎𝑗𝑘≠𝑗
𝜎𝑘
                                                          (2.29) 
If the cross-correlation is positive, given the positivity constraint on wk, the only possible 
solution is the one presented in Eq.(2.28), thus the weight has to be equal to zero. However, if 
the cross-correlation is negative, the weight on the asset k might be positive as presented in 
Eq.(2.29). The second solution may not satisfy the asset manager, in particular if he expects 
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that the asset associated to a zero risk budget will not be included in the portfolio. If we want 
to set some risk budgets to zero with the objective to don’t include some assets in the portfo-
lio, it’s better to impose strictly positive constraint on risk budgets (i.e., 𝑏𝑖 > 0) and to elimi-
nate ex-ante from the investment universe the assets associated to the zero risk contributions. 
In the case with n assets it is not possible to find an explicit solution. It can be found for 
the case with two assets or, in the general case, introducing some strict restrictions, such as 
constant correlation
18
. Even from a computational point of view, the problem is not trivial and 
we can use Sequential Quadratic Programming algorithm to find the RB portfolio. There are 
two main formulations of the problem, presented respectively in Eq.(2.30) and Eq.(2.31): 
𝑤∗ = argmin∑(
𝑤𝑖(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
∑ 𝑤𝑗(𝛴𝑤)𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 𝑏𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
                                      (2.30) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜     𝟏′𝑤 = 1                                                                                                   
𝟎 ≤ 𝑤 =≤ 𝟏                                                                                          
or 
𝑦∗ = argmin√𝑦′𝛴𝑦                                                        (2.31) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜     {
  ∑ 𝑏𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑐 
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑦 ≥ 𝟎
                                                           
The formulation presented in Eq.(2.31) is similar to a constrained variance minimization 
problem. The optimal weights is not constrained to sum at 1, but we can satisfy the constraint 
by normalization of the optimal weights resulting from the solution of Eq.(2.31). Moreover, 
the constant c could be adjusted to obtain the same result and the weights will be expressed in 
relative terms: 
∑𝑦𝑖
∗
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1     →      𝑤𝑖
∗ =
𝑦𝑖
∗
∑ 𝑦𝑖∗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The formulation presented in Eq.(2.31) demonstrates that the RB portfolio, when the risk 
budgets are strictly positive, exists and is unique if the variance-covariance matrix is positive-
definite. In fact, it corresponds to a minimization of a quadratic convex function with convex 
constraint. If there are some risk budgets that are null, there could be several solutions. More-
                                                          
18
 In Appendix A, I provide the explicit solution for the case with two assets and constant correlation. However, 
even with constant correlation in some cases it  is not possible to find an explicit solution. 
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over, it can be shown that previous results are valid for general convex risk measures R (e.g., 
VaR and ES), by replacing the marginal volatility by the marginal risk in the mathematical 
proofs. The optimization problem with a general risk measure can be written as:  
𝑦∗ = argmin  𝑅(𝑦)                                                          (2.31) 
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜     {
  ∑ 𝑏𝑖 ln 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑐 
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑦 ≥ 𝟎
                                                        
Again, if the risk budgets bi are strictly positive, the RB portfolio exists and is unique, 
while with some zero risk budgets there may be several solutions. 
Figure 5 shows a comparison between two Mean-Variance Optimized portfolios (Global 
Minimum Variance and Maximum Sharpe) and a Risk Budgeting portfolio, in terms of 
weights and risk contributions. I constructed the portfolios with the same indices used to draw 
the examples of the efficient frontiers in Subparagraph 2.1.1. 
Figure 5 – Weights and Risk Contributions Comparison (GMV vs MS vs RB) 
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The first panel of Figure 5 shows one of the limit of the Markowitz model, with the pres-
ence of extreme positions. The GMV and the MS portfolios are not realistic from a practical 
point of view. For the GMV, this feature is due to the low diversification in the long part and 
the aggregate size of the short part. For the MS, the problems arise especially from the short 
part, with very large positions and a consistent aggregate size. However, also the long part has 
some extreme positions
19
. From the second panel, we can notice that RB portfolio presents a 
higher degree of diversification, while the MVO portfolios, in particular the GMV, present a 
lower degree of diversification in terms of risk. In general, the figure shows clearly the prop-
erties of Risk Budgeting Approach, with the construction of realistic and well diversified port-
folios in terms of weights and risk. Moreover, fixing the risk budgets, we can partially choose 
the degree of diversification of the RB portfolio. This choice is not possible with the MVO 
portfolios. 
In conclusion, I want to present briefly other two important properties of Risk Budgeting 
showed by Bruder and Roncalli (2012). First of all, as the Equal Risk Contribution portfolio is 
located between the Global Minimum Variance and the Equally Weighted portfolios, the Risk 
Budgeting portfolio is located between the Global Minimum Variance portfolio and the 
Weight Budgeting portfolio (i.e., 𝜎𝐺𝑀𝑉 < 𝜎𝑅𝐵 < 𝜎𝑊𝐵), where the Weight Budgeting is the 
portfolio such that the weights are set equal to the budgets (i.e., 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖). Secondly, as the 
Equal Risk Contribution portfolio, the Risk Budgeting Approach is an heuristic asset alloca-
tion method. Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche (2010) showed that the ERC portfolio corre-
sponds to the tangency portfolio when the correlation is the same and when the assets present 
the same Sharpe ratio. For the RB portfolio is more difficult to find such properties. However, 
considering a quadratic utility function with risk aversion in the form of the one presented in 
Eq.(2.7), the portfolio w is optimal if the expected returns satisfy: 
𝜇 =
2
𝛾
𝛴𝑤   ⇒   𝑃𝐶𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜇𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖
2
𝛾
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖  ∝  𝑏𝑖                            (2.32) 
If the Risk Budgeting portfolio is optimal, the performance contribution of the i
th
 asset is 
proportional to its risk budget, as shown by Eq. (2.32). Thus, specifying the risk budgets, the 
investor can decide both the amount of risk and the amount of expected performance to assign 
to a particular asset. 
                                                          
19
 In the GMV portfolio almost 80.00 per cent is invested in MSCI UK, while the short part has a global weight 
in absolute value higher than 50.00 per cent. For the long part of the MS portfolio, MSCI CH and MSCI DK 
have weights close or above 100.00 per cent. The problem is particularly serious for MSCI DK, that is a relative-
ly illiquid market. For the short part, we have weights in absolute value above 40.00 per cent and the size of the 
short part is above 200.00 per cent in absolute value. 
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3 Investment Universe 
In this section, I present my investment universe, which included thirty-five stock market 
indices provided by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), covering Developed, 
Emerging and Frontier Markets. In the first part, I define what Frontier Markets are, present-
ing the main definitions given by different financial institutions, and stating the reason why I 
chose to use the MSCI indices. In the second part, I illustrate in detail my investment uni-
verse, including an analysis of its basic characteristics
20
. 
3.1 Frontier Markets 
Frontier Market definition is not unique in financial world. Usually they represent small, 
relative illiquid, but investable, stock markets, mainly located in developing world
21
. When 
their market capitalization, accessibility condition and liquidity improve, Frontier Markets 
may be reclassified as Emerging Markets. The origin of this classification can be attributed to 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) in the 1990s. It gained importance when, in 2007, S&P launched 
the Select and Extended Frontier Indexes. In the same year, MSCI launched its Frontier Mar-
kets Index, followed in the next years by FTSE and Russell Investments. In the last years, mu-
tual funds and ETFs on Frontier Markets were launched by the major investment companies 
and banks
22
. 
S&P Dow Jones provides a set of thirteen Frontier Markets indices
23
. Country composition 
varies according to the objective of the specific index and countries are chosen from a list of  
thirty-six Frontier Markets. The most representative index is the Frontier Markets Broad Mar-
ket Index (BMI), which includes thirty-four countries. To be considered as Frontier Market, a 
stock market must meet at least two of the following requirements
24
: 
 Full domestic market capitalization of over US$ 2.5 billion; 
 Annual turnover value of over US$ 1 billion; 
 A market development ratio of over 5 per cent25. 
                                                          
20
 In particular I show basic characteristics of monthly returns (mean, volatility, skewness, kurtosis, etc.), cross-
markets correlations (divided in sub-periods) and foreign currency movements. 
21
 There are some exceptions, such as Estonia, Lithuania and some Arabic Gulf countries. 
22
 One of the first fund was launched by Barclays Global Investors (BGI), with its BGI Frontier Fund in 2008. It 
was followed by Templeton, HSBC, Schroder International. ETFs were launched by Deutsche Bank, followed 
by Guggenheim Investments and RBS. 
23
 For a complete list, see the S&P Dow Jones Frontier Indices Methodology note available at: us.spindices.com. 
24
 See the S&P Dow Jones Indices’ Country Classification Methodology available at: us.spindices.com. 
25
 Market development ratio is defined as the ratio between the full domestic market capitalization of the ex-
change by the country’s nominal GDP. 
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These constraints are the initial requirements for country inclusion in the S&P Dow Jones 
Indices’ Global Equity Index (GBI). They can be considered as Frontier Markets constraints, 
since S&P Dow Jones requires more tight additional requirements for Emerging and Devel-
oped Markets. In addition to these quantitative constraints, the evaluation process includes 
other considerations about investor interest and market accessibility (e.g. turnover, number of 
listings, foreign investor interest) and market’s development prospects about market breadth 
(i.e., listings), depth (i.e., market capitalization and turnover), and infrastructure (i.e., regula-
tory structure, custody, clearance and settlement). Finally, there are also some qualitative con-
siderations about macroeconomic conditions, political stability, legal property rights, legal 
procedures, trading and settlement processes and conditions, opinions and experiences of in-
stitutional investors. In the construction of standalone country indices, S&P Dow Jones fixes 
some constraints on individual stock selection. The main variables observed are market capi-
talization, liquidity, days traded, public shares availability to foreign investors, investability 
(e.g. foreign investment restrictions), domicile, type of instrument. These requirements are 
variable, depending on the Frontier Market index considered
26
. 
FTSE provides two main indices, the FTSE Frontier Index Series and the FTSE Frontier 
50, including twenty-six countries. The evaluation process followed to classify a country as 
Frontier, Emerging or Developed includes many steps and it’s described in FTSE Country 
Classification Process paper
27
. It is based on the Quality of Markets Matrix, composed by dif-
ferent constraints divided in five groups: 
 World Bank GNI Per Capita Rating; 
 Market and Regulatory Environment (seven constraints); 
 Custody and Settlement (six constraints); 
 Dealing Landscape (seven constraints); 
 Derivatives (one constraint). 
Frontier Markets have to meet two constraints in Market and Regulatory Environment sec-
tion (“Formal stock market regulatory authorities actively monitor market” and “No objection 
to or significant restrictions or penalties applied to the investment of capital or the repatriation 
of capital and income”), two constraints on Custody and Settlement section (“Settlement – 
Rare incidence of failed trades” and “Clearing and settlement – T + 3, T + 5 for Frontier”) and 
one in Dealing Landscape section (“Transparency – market depth information / visibility and 
timely trade reporting process”). The process is mainly qualitative, with no specific quantita-
                                                          
26
 For more details, see the S&P Dow Jones Frontier Indices Methodology note available at: us.spindices.com. 
27
 All the documentation is available in FTSE website: www.ftse.com. 
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tive limits declared. Annually, FTSE revised country classification, publishing in March and 
in September a Watch List containing the countries monitored for promotion or demotion. In 
order to be included in the FTSE Frontier Markets Index Series, a country classified as Fron-
tier must have at least three companies able to meet individual stock eligibility criteria
28
. 
Russell Investments provides a set of six Frontier Markets Indices, including thirty-six 
Frontier Markets. The most representative index is the Russell Frontier Index. In order to cat-
egorize countries between Frontier, Emerging and Developed, Russell Investments combines 
a set of macroeconomic and market-based criteria
29
. The first step is the definition of the 
Emerging/Frontier Market category, based on: 
 Economic Criteria: 
o Relative Income, based on World Bank Income Category: “Less than high 
income”; 
o Development Status, based on IMF classification: “Advancing”; 
o Country Risk, based on Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Score: “Score 
greater than 40”; 
 Market (operational) criteria: Presence of FX Restrictions; Presence of Registration 
Restrictions; Stock transfer restrictions within fund complex not allowed; Relative 
Liquidity below the median; Foreign Ownership Limits moderate or restrictive; 
Segregate allowable accounts structure. 
Then, Russell Investments defines Frontier Markets as “those that do not meet the estab-
lished criteria for membership in Russell’s Emerging Markets Indexes”. Alongside the mac-
roeconomic and country risk criteria, Russell Investment considers the following constraints 
on trading risks and challenges: 
 Incomplete Regulatory Infrastructure; 
 Absence of segregation in Trading and Custody accounts; 
 Broader restrictions on Foreign Ownership Limits; 
 Absence of Trade Confidentiality; 
 Settlement Periods longer than T + 3; 
 Market Liquidity lower than Emerging Markets; 
 Presence of pre-deposit of shares requirements. 
                                                          
28
 For further information, see the Ground Rules for the FTSE Frontier Index Series note, available in FTSE 
website: www.ftse.com. 
29
 For detailed information, see the Russell Global Indexes Construction and Methodology paper available in the 
Russell Investment website: www.russell.com. In particular, for Frontier Markets look at Section 9. 
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The country classification is revised annually, during the first quarter. As for S&P Dow 
Jones and FTSE, Russell Investments considers individual stocks eligibility criteria (e.g. indi-
vidual market capitalization higher than US$ 1 million), in order to guarantee minimum li-
quidity standards. 
The last provider of Frontier Markets indices is Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI), with a coverage of thirty-eight countries. Alongside the Frontier Markets Index, ac-
tually covering twenty-four countries, MSCI provides standalone country indices. To classify 
a country as Frontier Market, MSCI considers the equity markets not included in the MSCI 
Emerging Markets Index that respect the following principles
30
: 
 Relative Openness to and Accessibility for foreign investors;  
 Exclusion from Developed Market universe31;  
 Countries that are not experimenting a period of extreme economic instability (e.g. 
hyperinflation) or political instability (e.g. civil war); 
 A minimum of two companies with securities eligible for the Standard Index. 
In addition to these principles, MSCI considered the following qualitative and quantitative 
constraints: 
 Economic Development: 
o Sustainability of economic development: no requirements32; 
 Size and Liquidity Requirements: 
o Number of the companies meeting this section requirements: 2; 
o Company size (full market capitalization): US$ 598 million; 
o Security size (float market capitalization): US$ 52 million; 
o Security liquidity: 2.5% Annual Traded Value Ratio (ATVR); 
 Market Accessibility Criteria: 
o At least some Openness to foreign ownership; 
o At least partial ease of capital inflows/outflows; 
o Modest Efficiency of the operational framework; 
o Modest Stability of the institutional framework. 
                                                          
30
 For detailed information, refer to MSCI Global Investable Market Indexes Methodology paper, available in 
MSCI website: www.msci.com. 
31
 For example Luxembourg, Iceland or Cyprus, despite their small size, are included in the Developed Markets 
universe. 
32
 For Frontier and Emerging Markets, MSCI doesn’t require specific economic development level, given the 
wide heterogeneity between the countries belonging to these broad categories.  For Development Markets the 
constraint is defined as “Country GNI per capita 25% above the World Bank high income threshold for 3 con-
secutive years”. 
 29 
 
The revision of country classification is semi-annual, in May and November. Frontier 
Markets are divided in sub-categories, based on more specific size and liquidity constraints. In 
addition to that, MSCI requires also individual stock eligibility criteria
33
. 
Table B.1 in Appendix B contains the whole list of Frontier Markets available, divided by 
the four providers (S&P Dow Jones, FTSE, Russell Investment and MSCI). As above-
mentioned, I decided to use MSCI Indices, because MSCI provides standalone country indi-
ces with daily quotations available in Datastream
34
. 
3.2 Investment Universe Basic Characteristics 
The investment universe is composed by thirty-five stock market indices provided by Mor-
gan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), covering Developed, Emerging and Frontier Mar-
kets: 
 Developed Markets: three indices by geographical area (North America, Europe 
and Middle East, Pacific), covering twenty-three developed countries; 
 Emerging Markets: single index, not divided by geographical area, covering twen-
ty-three countries; 
 Frontier Markets: thirty-one standalone country indices. 
There are two main reasons that explain the choice to use geographical area or standalone 
country indices. First of all, they provide the representation of entire stock markets, covering 
different sectors (IT, Energy, Materials, Utilities, Consumer Staples and Discretionary, Indus-
trials, Health Care, Communications), and they are characterized by a lower propensity to 
large movements typical of individual stocks. Thus, they represent real investment opportuni-
ties in a strategic and tactical asset allocation perspective. Secondly, given the illiquidity of 
Frontier Markets and the presence of capital controls, stock picking would amplify liquidity 
risk, constraining the possibility to close the position in the presence of serious downturn
35
. 
Asset managers practice is to enter in these markets through ETFs on stock market indices. 
Another important feature of the investment universe is the composition of Frontier Mar-
kets asset class, based on standalone country indices instead of geographical area indices. As 
mentioned in Section 1, the aim of the thesis is to construct an individual Country Risk Indi-
                                                          
33
 See note 30. 
34
 Also S&P Dow Jones provides standalone country indices, but quotations on Datastream were not availbale 
for the major part of the countries. 
35
 Frontier Markets are prone to large movements and are characterized by higher volatility compared to Devel-
oped and Emerging Markets. Moreover, their performances are strictly connected to international liquidity envi-
ronment. The timing of investment is crucial, making the liquidity risk one of the most important threat to in-
vestment performance. Finally, stock picking in these Markets requires a daily or a weekly analysis, the imple-
mentation of technical analysis and operational allocation methodology, while in this thesis I used monthly data. 
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cator useful to compute the risk budgets, focusing on Frontier Markets and on their capacity 
to improve portfolio allocation through international diversification. 
Table 1 – Investment Universe 
MSCI INDICES START END CURRENCY ISO 4217 
MSCI North America 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 US Dollar USD 
MSCI  Europe & Middle East 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 US Dollar USD 
MSCI Pacific 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 US Dollar USD 
MSCI Emerging Markets 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 US Dollar USD 
MSCI Argentina 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 Argentina Peso ARS 
MSCI Jamaica 25/11/2008 10/02/2015 Jamaica Dollar JMD 
MSCI Trinidad & Tobago 25/11/2008 10/02/2015 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar TTD 
MSCI Bosnia Herzegovina 26/05/2010 10/02/2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina Marka BAM 
MSCI Bulgaria 31/05/2005 10/02/2015 Bulgaria Lev BGN 
MSCI Croatia 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Croatia Kuna HRK 
MSCI Estonia 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Euro EUR 
MSCI Kazakhstan 30/11/2005 10/02/2015 Kazakhstan Tenge KZT 
MSCI Lithuania 30/05/2008 10/02/2015 Euro EUR 
MSCI Romania 30/11/2005 10/02/2015 Romania New Leu RON 
MSCI Serbia 30/05/2008 10/02/2015 Serbia Dinar RSD 
MSCI Slovenia 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Slovenian Tolar SIT 
MSCI Ukraine 31/05/2006 10/02/2015 Ukraine Hryvnia UAH 
MSCI Botswana 25/11/2008 10/02/2015 Botswana Pula BWP 
MSCI Ghana 25/11/2008 10/02/2015 Ghana Cedi GHS 
MSCI Kenya 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Kenya Shilling KES 
MSCI Mauritius 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Mauritius Rupee MUR 
MSCI Morocco 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 Morocco Dirham MAD 
MSCI Nigeria 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Nigeria Naira NGN 
MSCI Tunisia 31/05/2004 10/02/2015 Tunisia Dinar TND 
MSCI Zimbabwe 30/11/2010 10/02/2015 Zimbabwe Dollar ZWD 
MSCI Bahrain 31/05/2005 10/02/2015 Bahrain Dinar BHD 
MSCI Jordan 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 Jordan Dinar JOD 
MSCI Kuwait 31/05/2005 10/02/2015 Kuwait Dinar KWD 
MSCI Lebanon 31/05/2002 10/02/2015 Lebanon Pound LBP 
MSCI Oman 31/05/2005 10/02/2015 Oman Rial OMR 
MSCI Saudi Arabia 31/05/2005 10/02/2015 Saudi Arabia Riyal SAR 
MSCI Bangladesh 30/11/2009 10/02/2015 Bangladesh Taka BDT 
MSCI Pakistan 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 Pakistan Rupee PKR 
MSCI Sri Lanka 31/12/1999 10/02/2015 Sri Lanka Rupee LKR 
MSCI Vietnam 30/11/2006 10/02/2015 Viet Nam Dong VND 
 
Table 1 presents the investment universe dataset, with the MSCI indices, starting and end-
ing dates and currency denominations. Quotations were downloaded from Dastastream with 
daily frequency. Table B.2 in Appendix B presents the whole set of MSCI indices, with de-
tailed country coverage for MSCI North America, MSCI Europe and Middle East, MSCI Pa-
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cific and MSCI Emerging Markets. Given the fact that the countries composing Developed 
and Emerging Markets indices have different legal tenders, the data are denominated in US 
Dollar. From the dataset, I excluded MSCI Western African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) and MSCI Palestine indices. For MSCI WAEMU, I was not able to retrieve quo-
tations from Datastream. In addition to that, it would be problematic to compute the Country 
Risk Indicator given the heterogeneity of countries belonging to WAEMU
36
. For MSCI Pales-
tine, the inception date is 31/05/2013, too close to the ending date. Moreover, there are some 
concerns connected to the availability of macroeconomic data necessary to compute the 
Country Risk Indicator
37
. 
In portfolio construction process, I took a European investor perspective. Thus, I converted 
MSCI Price Series to monthly frequency and in Euro. The conversion in domestic currency 
was performed to replicate asset managers’ practice on equity investment. Through the con-
version in domestic currency, currency risk and performance are internalized by monthly re-
turns. In this way, asset managers can profit from favorable exchange rate movements, taking 
specific bets on the currencies alongside the considerations on stock returns. For this reason, 
the Country Risk Indicator has a section dedicated to currency risk management.  In the next 
subparagraphs, I’m going to present monthly return characteristics (in Local currency and in 
Euro), exchange rates and cross-country correlations. The graphs on MSCI indices monthly 
price and return time series, alongside exchange rate time series, are included in Appendix B. 
3.2.1 Monthly Returns Descriptive Characteristics 
For each MSCI index belonging to the investment universe, I computed some basics char-
acteristics of monthly returns on the full sample period, both in Local currency and in Euro. 
Table 2 provides average, median, volatility, minimum and maximum, skewness and kurtosis 
of monthly returns in Local currency. Table 3 presents the same features of the distribution 
for monthly returns in Euro. As above-mentioned, I used monthly returns in Euro in the allo-
cation process. Figure 6 and Figure 7 provide a scatter plot representation of the relation be-
tween average return and volatility for each index, divided by geographical area. In Table 4, I 
present the results of Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box test on normality and autocorrelations of re-
turn distribution, for data in Local currency and in Euro. 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Standalone country indices for WAEMU were added during the May 2014 Semi-Annual Index Review and 
their quotations are not available. 
37
 The major data-provider on Palestine is the World Bank. However, most of the time series start from 2013 on-
ly. 
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Table 2 – Monthly Returns Descriptive Characteristics (LOC) 
MSCI INDEX MEAN MEDIAN VOL MIN MAX SKEW KURT 
North America 0.53 1.07 4.34 -18.07 10.78 -0.88 5.32 
Europe And Middle East 0.26 0.49 5.83 -21.94 13.40 -0.68 4.45 
Pacific 0.27 0.86 4.75 -17.92 11.03 -0.74 4.54 
Emerging Markets 0.65 0.65 6.83 -27.50 16.66 -0.60 4.84 
Argentina 1.23 2.11 11.09 -37.05 53.29 -0.53 3.75 
Jamaica (6) 0.31 0.66 6.36 -16.96 19.57 0.24 4.21 
Trinidad And Tobago (6) 0.45 0.17 2.96 -10.43 8.57 -0.23 5.87 
Bosnia And Herzegovina (8) -0.20 0.02 4.72 -9.40 13.00 0.40 3.67 
Bulgaria (1) -0.74 -0.76 9.14 -41.19 32.53 -0.52 8.07 
Croatia 0.23 0.05 6.95 -23.90 27.82 0.24 7.23 
Estonia 0.15 -0.14 9.55 -31.58 54.06 1.26 11.31 
Kazakhstan (2) 0.42 0.22 11.73 -29.53 103.34 1.52 11.49 
Lithuania (5) 0.47 0.14 7.93 -22.64 46.48 2.32 16.90 
Romania (2) 0.55 1.46 9.76 -41.43 30.01 -0.79 6.82 
Serbia (5) -0.52 0.07 12.05 -42.27 42.65 -0.20 6.43 
Slovenia 0.04 -0.12 6.03 -15.74 18.36 0.13 4.19 
Ukraine (3) -0.71 -1.11 12.19 -32.68 36.64 0.18 3.78 
Botswana (6) 0.37 0.35 5.07 -18.55 15.86 0.06 4.38 
Ghana (6) 1.55 0.96 7.20 -22.04 33.13 0.74 8.01 
Kenya 1.34 1.91 6.65 -23.75 27.90 -0.62 5.71 
Mauritius 1.24 1.09 5.95 -24.29 21.37 -0.27 7.47 
Morocco 0.53 0.45 5.25 -16.84 20.66 0.52 4.53 
Nigeria 0.90 0.70 9.37 -37.54 46.63 0.38 9.43 
Tunisia 0.97 0.39 5.03 -12.01 23.85 0.58 6.31 
Zimbabwe (9) 1.08 0.14 8.24 -27.01 25.61 -0.12 5.59 
Bahrain (1) -1.90 -1.46 6.88 -28.35 17.48 -0.64 5.89 
Jordan -0.57 -0.71 6.07 -23.19 19.89 -0.08 5.30 
Kuwait (1) -0.08 0.51 6.36 -17.84 21.06 -0.07 3.89 
Lebanon 0.76 -0.39 9.23 -22.60 47.69 1.51 9.42 
Oman (1) -0.18 0.65 5.84 -29.86 13.44 -1.25 7.91 
Saudi Arabia (1) 0.01 1.20 8.24 -25.64 20.50 -0.48 3.94 
Bangladesh (7) 0.55 0.61 8.09 -28.96 16.75 -0.72 4.94 
Pakistan 0.99 1.07 8.42 -50.35 31.72 -1.84 13.83 
Sri Lanka 1.20 0.18 9.22 -23.44 53.12 1.71 11.20 
Vietnam (4) 0.17 -0.48 11.08 -23.80 48.51 0.78 6.00 
(1) From May 2005 ;  (2) From November 2005 ;  (3) From May 2006 ;  (4) From November 2006 ;  (5) From May 2008 ;  
(6) From November 2008 ;  (7) From November 2009;  (8) From May 2010;  (9) From November 2010 
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Table 3 – Monthly Returns Descriptive Characteristics (EUR) 
MSCI INDEX MEAN MEDIAN VOL MIN MAX SKEW KURT 
North America 0.64 0.80 3.77 -12.66 10.51 -0.49 3.41 
Europe And Middle East 0.32 0.82 4.28 -13.76 13.62 -0.63 4.58 
Pacific 0.37 0.06 3.98 -11.01 11.57 -0.21 3.79 
Emerging Markets 0.71 0.80 5.65 -19.69 16.50 -0.51 4.28 
Argentina 0.45 0.49 10.90 -36.77 53.77 -0.72 4.21 
Jamaica (6) 0.11 -0.40 6.74 -20.28 21.72 0.11 4.33 
Trinidad And Tobago (6) 0.78 0.74 4.60 -12.21 12.46 0.02 3.49 
Bosnia And Herzegovina (8) -0.20 0.02 4.72 -9.40 13.00 0.40 3.67 
Bulgaria (1) -0.74 -0.76 9.14 -41.37 32.53 -0.53 8.09 
Croatia 0.21 -0.10 6.96 -23.34 27.29 0.34 7.11 
Estonia 0.15 -0.14 9.55 -31.58 54.06 1.26 11.31 
Kazakhstan (2) 0.10 -0.98 11.35 -26.25 103.87 2.24 16.33 
Lithuania (5) 0.47 0.14 7.93 -22.64 46.48 2.32 16.90 
Romania (2) 0.47 1.03 10.54 -45.00 31.98 -0.76 6.63 
Serbia (5) -0.99 -0.01 12.57 -47.58 42.45 -0.35 6.40 
Slovenia 0.04 -0.12 6.03 -15.74 18.34 0.13 4.18 
Ukraine (3) -1.68 -3.68 12.35 -35.05 27.64 0.12 3.04 
Botswana (6) 0.31 0.45 4.83 -21.37 16.05 -0.11 3.92 
Ghana (6) 0.64 -0.27 9.06 -28.00 37.05 0.49 6.48 
Kenya 1.37 1.79 7.39 -23.07 27.33 -0.43 5.03 
Mauritius 1.28 1.77 6.13 -26.72 22.32 -0.85 7.58 
Morocco 0.55 0.36 5.24 -17.21 20.38 0.51 4.47 
Nigeria 0.76 0.57 9.55 -36.38 37.27 -0.01 6.04 
Tunisia 0.73 0.29 5.37 -12.58 24.41 0.56 5.67 
Zimbabwe (9) 1.41 1.91 7.88 -26.50 22.00 -0.42 5.36 
Bahrain (1) -1.85 -2.11 6.80 -24.55 17.68 -0.33 4.92 
Jordan -0.43 -0.59 6.11 -23.21 20.74 0.19 5.07 
Kuwait (1) -0.03 0.67 6.38 -25.83 23.26 -0.26 5.79 
Lebanon 0.89 -0.24 9.14 -21.48 43.56 1.37 8.13 
Oman (1) -0.13 -0.26 5.76 -22.30 13.64 -0.56 5.09 
Saudi Arabia (1) 0.07 0.97 8.30 -24.45 19.91 -0.42 3.64 
Bangladesh (7) 0.84 2.12 9.11 -29.61 21.37 -0.53 4.43 
Pakistan 0.75 1.65 8.96 -54.82 38.80 -2.03 14.42 
Sri Lanka 1.12 0.37 9.46 -27.53 50.07 1.37 9.15 
Vietnam (4) 0.07 0.10 11.37 -25.49 50.86 0.90 6.65 
(1) From May 2005 ;  (2) From November 2005 ;  (3) From May 2006 ;  (4) From November 2006 ;  (5) From May 2008 ;  
(6) From November 2008 ;  (7) From November 2009;  (8) From May 2010;  (9) From November 2010 
 
 34 
 
Looking at the descriptive characteristics in Local currency, we can see that average return 
on Core indices (Developed and Emerging Markets) is 0.43 per cent, higher than Frontier in-
dices’ average at 0.34 per cent. In both subsets, there are important differences. MSCI North 
America and MSCI Emerging Markets exhibit average monthly returns two times larger than 
the other two. In Frontier subset, eight countries exhibit negative average monthly returns and 
three countries present average monthly returns below 0.20 per cent. With the exception of 
Vietnam, these countries are located in Europe and Middle East region. Alongside these poor 
performances, eight countries have average monthly returns close or above 1.00 per cent, be-
tween 25 and 90 bps above Emerging Markets. Six of these countries belong to Africa region. 
As expected, Frontier indices’ volatility is higher than Core indices’ volatility (7.83 vs 5.44 
per cent). However, thirteen Frontier Markets present a volatility lower or very close to the 
one of Emerging Markets, while five of them exhibit very large volatility above 10.00 per 
cent
38
. Except for few indices, the skewness is sensibly different from 0, implying asimmetry 
in distribution. Core indices exhibit negative skewness, while sixteen Frontier indices present 
positive skewness. Finally, kurtosis is higher, on average, in Frontier indices (7.02 vs 4.79), 
suggesting heavier tails of the returns distribution compared  to Core indices. Analyzing 
monthly returns in Euro, we can see that average return on Core indices increases to 0.51 per 
cent, suggesting a positive currency contribution. All of them are denominated in US Dollar, 
leaving the differences within the group unchanged. On the contrary, average return on Fron-
tier indices declines to 0.24 per cent. In particular, fourteen countries present a negative cur-
rency contribution, with a difference close or above 50 bps for Argentina, Serbia, Ukraine and 
Ghana. For Middle East countries, the returns associated to exchange rate fluctuations help to 
reduce negative returns on stock indices. However, four of these countries and four European 
countries still exhibit negative average returns. For five countries, there is no variation in av-
erage return, due to the fact that they belong to the European Monetary Union or their curren-
cies are pegged to Euro
39
. About volatility, we have a decrease in Core indices from 5.44 to 
4.42 per cent and an increase in Frontier indices from 7.83 to 8.07 per cent. Skewness analysis 
didn’t change between Local currency and Euro. Core indices still present negative skewness, 
while the Frontier indices that exhibit positive skewness increased from sixteen to seventeen. 
About kurtosis, it decreases for Core and Frontier indices, from 4.79 to 4.02 and from 7.02 to 
6.69 respectively. 
                                                          
38
 Despite the Frontier Market status, Trinidad and Tobago presents the lowest volatility in the investment uni-
verse at 2.96, 138 bps below the North American one. 
39
 Countries with indices denominated in Euro are Estonia and Lithuania. Slovenia belongs to the EMU, but the 
index is denominated in Slovenian Tolar. However, there is no currency contribution given the fact that, as coun-
try belonging to the EMU, the exchange rate between the old currency and the Euro is fixed. Finally, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria have currencies pegged to Euro. 
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Figure 6 – Monthly Returns Mean and Volatility (LOC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Monthly Returns Mean and Volatility (EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reasoning by geographical area, the two figures show that Europe and Middle East gener-
ally provide the worst risk-return trade-off, while Africa seems to provide the best one. Given 
the same volatility, Asia and Latin America usually exhibit higher returns than European and 
Middle-East countries. As expected, Developed Markets present the lowest volatility, when 
considering monthly returns in Euro
40
. 
The following table presents the results of the Jarque-Bera test on normality of monthly re-
turn distribution and the Ljung-Box test on the autocorrelations. In this specific case, accept-
ing the null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test means that monthly returns are normally dis-
tributed. For the Ljung-Box test, the acceptance of the null hypothesis implies to accept the 
evidence of no autocorrelation in the series of the residuals. The tests are conducted on each 
return series, both in Local currency and in Euro. The significance level is set at 5% for both. 
In Ljung-Box test, the number of lags considered is 20, which is the default value provided by 
Matlab function lbqtest. 
                                                          
40
 If we consider monthly returns in Local currency, there is the case of Trinidad and Tobago that exhibit the 
lowest volatility. Moreover, even considering only the countries with positive average returns, there are three Af-
rican countries that present lower volatility and higher returns than MSCI Europe and Middle East. 
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Table 4 – Jarque-Bera and Ljung-Box Tests 
MSCI INDICES 
LOCAL CURRENCY EURO 
JB TEST LB TEST JB TEST LB TEST 
North America X 
 
X X 
Europe And Middle East X 
 
X 
 
Pacific X 
 
X 
 
Emerging Markets X 
 
X 
 
Argentina X 
 
X 
 
Jamaica X 
   
Trinidad And Tobago X 
   
Bosnia And Herzegovina X 
   
Bulgaria X 
 
X 
 
Croatia X 
 
X 
 
Estonia X 
 
X 
 
Kazakhstan X 
 
X 
 
Lithuania X 
 
X 
 
Romania X 
 
X 
 
Serbia X 
 
X 
 
Slovenia X 
 
X 
 
Ukraine 
    
Botswana X 
 
X 
 
Ghana X 
 
X 
 
Kenya X 
 
X 
 
Mauritius X 
 
X 
 
Morocco X 
 
X 
 
Nigeria X 
 
X 
 
Tunisia X 
 
X 
 
Zimbabwe X 
 
X 
 
Bahrain X 
 
X 
 
Jordan X X X 
 
Kuwait 
  
X 
 
Lebanon X 
 
X 
 
Oman X 
 
X 
 
Saudi Arabia X 
   
Bangladesh X 
 
X 
 
Pakistan X X X 
 
Sri Lanka X 
 
X 
 
Vietnam X 
 
X 
 
X = Rejection of the null hypothesis 
 
As expected from the analysis of skewness and kurtosis, in most of the cases I reject the 
null hypothesis of normality. The exceptions are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Ku-
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wait for data in Local currency and Pacific, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia for data in Euro. Evidences of autocorrelation are present 
for Jordan and Pakistan (Local currency) and in North America (Euro). 
3.2.2 Currencies 
In this subparagraph, I present in details the currency breakdown of the investment uni-
verse. Table 5 presents the different currencies, the exchange regime, their average monthly 
return and volatility over my investment period from February 2005 till January 2015. As 
above-mentioned, in Appendix B, I included the graphs on Spot Exchange Rate time series. 
The exchange rate regime is based on “De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes 
and Monetary Policy Frameworks” provided by the International Monetary Fund41. 
Table 5 – Currency Characteristics 
ISO 4217 REGIME MEAN VOL ISO 4217 REGIME MEAN VOL 
USD G - 1 0.07 3.10 MUR A - 2 -0.02 2.34 
ARS A/E - 4 -0.85 3.70 MAD C - 4 0.02 0.58 
JMD  E - 2 -0.46 3.13 NGN E - 2 -0.24 3.91 
TTD A - 4 0.06 3.18 TND C - 4 -0.26 1.21 
BAM B - 5 0.00 0.00 ZWD A - 4 0.25 2.70 
BGN B - 5 0.00 0.08 BHD A - 4 0.07 3.10 
HRK B - 4 -0.02 0.71 JOD A - 4 0.07 3.10 
KZT A - 4 -0.25 4.20 KWD C - 4 0.08 2.65 
RON F - 2 -0.16 1.91 LBP A - 4 0.07 3.10 
RSD F - 2 -0.38 2.14 OMR A - 4 0.07 3.10 
SIT (a) B - 5 0.00 0.03 SAR A - 4 0.07 3.10 
UAH A - 2 -0.92 4.76 BDT A - 4 -0.11 3.26 
BWP C - 3 -0.57 2.93 PKR G - 2 -0.37 3.07 
GHS F - 2 -1.37 4.80 LKR A - 4 -0.17 3.23 
KES E - 2 -0.08 3.35 VND A - 4 -0.19 3.35 
Exchange Rate Anchor USD A Independently Floating 1 
Exchange Rate Anchor EUR B Managed Floating with no pre-
determined path for the exchange rate 
2 
Exchange Rate Anchor Composite C 
Exchange Rate Anchor Other D Crawling Peg 3 
Monetary Aggregate Target E Other conventional fixed peg arrange-
ments 
4 
Inflation Targeting Framework F 
Other G Currency Board Arrangements 5 
 (a) Slovenia adopted EUR on 1st January 2007. Until EUR adoption the currency was Slovenian Tolar (SIT). 
 
                                                          
41
 For further information, the “De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frame-
works” is freely available in the International Monetary fund website www.imf.org in the section “Data and Sta-
tistics”. 
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As above-mentioned, MSCI North America, MSCI Europe and Middle East, MSCI Emerg-
ing Markets are denominated in USD, while MSCI Estonia and MSCI Lithuania are denomi-
nated in Euro
42
. On the thirty currencies, only US Dollar is independently floating. As ex-
pected, the majority of Frontier countries’ currencies are pegged or in a Currency Board Ar-
rangements (fourteen against USD, four against EUR and four against a composite basket). 
The other currencies are managed floating, following Monetary Aggregate or Inflation Tar-
geting.  The peg or the Currency Board Arrangements against the Euro explains why some 
currencies have return and volatility at or very close to 0.00 per cent. About currencies with 
positive contribution to returns, I highlighted in the previous paragraph the case of US Dollar 
and the currencies of the Middle East countries. In particular, Middle East countries are for 
the major part oil exporters and they benefit from their high current account surpluses. 
An interesting aspect to notice is that some currencies exhibit large negative returns, in 
particular Argentina Peso, Jamaican Dollar, Ukraine Hryvnia, Botswana Pula, Ghana Cedi 
and Pakistan Rupee. Currency crises are not an extraordinary event in Developing countries 
and the topic is well developed in the literature (see for example Frankel and Rose [1996], 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart [1998], Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin [2003], and Laeven 
and Valencia [2008]). Argentina and Jamaica paid the consequences of currency crisis con-
nected to Sovereign Debt Default
43
. Ukraine suffered the consequences of the civil war of 
2014, with an exchange rate depreciation close to 65.00 per cent in the last year, while Paki-
stan Rupee mainly paid the economic and political instability of the last decades, alongside to 
civil conflicts that worsen the situation. Botswana experimented two main upward shifts of 
the EUR/BWP exchange rate. The first one occurred during the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 
second one occurred between 2013 and the first semester of 2014, where Botswana Pula de-
preciated against the Euro of about 14.00 per cent. However, during the last semester of 2014, 
the EUR/BWP exchange rate went back below 11.00, with an appreciation higher than 10.00 
per cent. Finally, Ghana suffered the consequences of a deep currency crisis, due to wide cur-
rent account and government balance deficits. Between 2013 and August 2014, Ghana Cedi 
moved from 2.62 GHS per EUR to 5.07 GHS per EUR, a depreciation of 93.00 per cent. In 
August 2014, Ghana government asked the intervention of the International Monetary Fund 
                                                          
42
 Estonia adopted EUR on 1st January 2011. Until EUR adoption the currency was Estonian Kroon (EEK), ini-
tially pegged to Deutsche Mark (DEM) (DEM/EEK = 8) and then to Euro (EUR/EEK = 15.6466. Lithuania 
adopted EUR on 1st January 2015. Until EUR adoption the currency was Lithuanian Litas (LTL) initially pegged 
to US Dollar (USD) (USD/LTL = 4) and from 2002 to Euro (EUR/LTL = 3.4528). 
43
 For Argentina, the default occurred in 2001, but the effects were prolonged and leaded to Debt Restructuring 
in 2005. Moreover, in 2014 there was a second Selective Default. Jamaica default and Debt Restructuring hap-
pened in 2010. 
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and the exchange rate went back below 4.00 at 3.80 GHS per EUR, with an appreciation of 
25.00 per cent. 
3.2.3 Cross-country Correlations 
As mentioned in Section 1, Berger, Pukthuanthong and Yang (2011) show that Frontier 
Markets present low integration with the world markets. In this subparagraph, I analyze the 
cross-country correlations between the MSCI indices included in the investment universe, in 
order to understand if international diversification can be beneficial. As presented in Table 1, 
Frontier Markets have different inception dates. Thus, the complete set of Frontier Markets 
were not available at the start of the investment period in February 2005. For this reason I 
computed the correlations over three non-overlapping subset, from May 2005 till October 
2008, from November 2008 till October 2010 and from November 2010 till January 2015. In 
each period, I added the new Frontier Markets available. Figure 8, 9 and 10 present Correla-
tion Heat-Maps for the three different subsets, based on Pearson's linear correlation coeffi-
cient. 
Figure 8 – Cross-country Correlations Heat Map 05/2005-10/2008 
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Figure 9 – Cross-country Correlations Heat Map 11/2008-10/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Cross-country Correlations Heat Map 11/2010-01/2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Heat-Maps are in line with expectations. The correlation between Frontier 
Markets and Core indices are generally low or negative in all the subsets. Within the group, 
Frontier Markets are less correlated, when they are not negatively correlated, than Developed 
and Emerging Markets. Analyzing the differences between the three periods, it can be noticed 
that correlations generally increased between November 2008 and October 2010. Frontier 
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Markets that showed very low or negative correlation during this period were not included in 
the previous subset, making impossible a comparison. This result is in line with literature 
findings of increasing correlation during stock markets turbulence (see for example Longin 
and Solnik [1995] and Boyer, Gibson and Loretan [1997]). Moreover, the 2008 Financial Cri-
sis was particularly widespread and the contagion effect hit all equity markets around the 
world.  
In the first period, the correlations between Developed and Emerging Markets were gener-
ally close or above 0.80, with the MSCI Pacific that appeared to be the less correlated within 
the group. Frontier Markets exhibited correlations generally around or below 0.50, with some 
special cases of negative correlation. Correlations above 0.50 are mainly exhibited by Euro-
pean countries, both with Core indices and within them. Despite their relative illiquidity and 
small size, this can be an evidence that these markets are more integrated or more accessible 
than other Frontier Markets. The countries with the lowest correlation were Tunisia and Paki-
stan. As above-mentioned, during the second period the correlations generally increased. In 
fact, the correlations between the Core indices were generally close or above 0.90. For Fron-
tier Markets they generally remained between 0.00 and 0.50, but they increased especially for 
Middle East countries, where they reached value between 0.60 and 0.70, with the only excep-
tion of Lebanon
44
. African countries exhibited the lowest correlation, especially for Ghana (a 
new-added country), Morocco and Tunisia. Finally, in the last period correlations generally 
decreased. Between the Core indices they are close or above 0.70 and never above 0.90. For 
Frontier Markets, correlations are generally below 0.40, with a growth of negative correlation 
cases. Jamaica (a new-added country), Tunisia and Bangladesh exhibits the lowest correla-
tions. 
The analysis of cross-country correlations confirmed the initial hypothesis. Frontier Mar-
kets are generally less correlated within the group and with Developed and Emerging Mar-
kets. This is a fundamental aspect in order to benefit from international diversification. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Lebanon is a particular case, since the country was recovering from the huge crisis generated by the war 
against Israel in 2006. 
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4 The Country Risk Indicator 
Country Risk Assessment is the set of processes implemented to evaluate the risk associat-
ed to an investment (e.g., foreign direct investment, portfolio investment in equity, portfolio 
investment in the bond market, loans to a private or public counterparty) in a foreign country. 
Especially for Emerging and Frontier Markets, a serious procedure of Country Risk Assess-
ment is necessary in order to evaluate the potential threats to investment profitability. For 
these countries the number of potential threats are generally higher compared to the ones pre-
sent in Developed Markets. Moreover, these countries are more prone to serious downturn in 
presence of systemic crisis (e.g., currency crisis, banking crisis, debt restructuring, etc.)
45
. 
These characteristics, combined with their relative illiquidity and the problems behind the exit 
process (i.e., disinvestment) in presence of capital controls, are the economic and financial 
reasons behind the necessity of a correct country risk evaluation, in order to prevent the po-
tential drop of the investment value, that can be severe in these markets
46
. Alongside the eco-
nomic and financial reasons, there are also legal requirements connected to country risk eval-
uation, that became tighter after the application of Basel II and Basel III frameworks and after 
the European Sovereign Debt crisis. 
One of the aim of this thesis is the construction of the Country Risk Indicator, a numerical 
rating to quantify qualitative information about country risk in investment. As mentioned in 
Section 1, the Country Risk Indicator is a tool useful to design the risk budgets on the Frontier 
Markets. With the Country Risk Indicator, I tried to move from the qualitative information 
coming from the Country Risk Assessment process to a quantitative tool able to quantify how 
much risk I can bear from investing in a particular Frontier Market. As I will explain in the 
dedicated paragraph, I tried to construct a rating based on free available information, without 
any access to professional not-free database. In this way, everybody can compute the Country 
Risk Indicator developed in this thesis. Moreover, I decided to use only the information avail-
able when the investment had to be done, in order to give to my work an ex-ante perspective. 
In the first part of this Section, I present some definitions of country risk and its decompo-
sition, alongside the basic process of Country Risk Assessment. In addition to that, I present 
the main literature on the evaluation of country risk and its impact on stock returns, that repre-
sents the theoretical base behind my Country Risk Indicator. In the second part, I present the 
                                                          
45
 With the exception of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, in the last fifteen years the systemic crisis hit only Emerg-
ing or Frontier Markets. Of course, we have to consider also the 2008 Financial Crisis, but it was particularly 
widespread and it cannot be considered as a standalone country crisis. 
46
 Some of the Frontier Markets present minimum monthly returns between -35.00 and -50.00 per cent, com-
pared to the average around -19.00 per cent for Developed Markets. 
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Country Risk Indicator, the choices behind the variable selection and the composition. De-
tailed tables on its composition are contained in Appendix C. Finally, I present a basic analy-
sis of the Country Risk Indicator by geographical area. For the passage from the indicator to 
the risk budgets, I refer to the first part of Section 5 on portfolio construction and evaluation. 
4.1 Country Risk and Country Risk Assessment 
4.1.1 The Country Risk Definition 
The definition of country risk is not unique, both in academic literature and in financial 
market practice. The notion is usually shaped according to operational needs, rather than a 
theoretical framework
47
. Moreover, it strictly depends on the knowledge of risks at a given 
point in time and on the type of the investment (e.g., FDI, portfolio investment, loans).  
From an academic point of view, one of the first definition was provided by Haendel, 
Meadow and West (1975) and it was focused on political risk, defined as the “probability of 
occurrence of political events that will change the prospects for profitability of a given in-
vestment”. More recently, Meldrum (2000) defined country risk as the additional risks borne 
by cross-borders international transactions with respect to domestic transactions, able to de-
crease the expected profitability. The sources of these additional risks are varied and they in-
clude differences in  economic structures, policies, socio-political institutions, geography and 
currencies. Oetzel, Bettis and Zenner (2001), defined the objective of country risk. In particu-
lar, country risk measures have to forecast political or economic events in a selected country 
that may affect the business climate, implying that investors will realize negative (or lower 
than expected) returns, when the investment was made. The definitions provided by Alexe et 
al. (2003) and Hoti and Mc Aleer (2004) are more focused on credit risk. In particular, in the 
first paper, country risk is the risk that a country default on its obligations. In the second one, 
country risk is referred to the “likelihood that a sovereign state or borrower from a particular 
country may be unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations towards one or more foreign 
lenders and/or investors”. An example of definition provided by practitioners is the one de-
veloped by COFACE (Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur) in 
2012, where the objective of the country risk is to measure the influence of a country’s mac-
roeconomic and institutional evolution on company credit risk. 
In order to arrive to a useful definition from an operational point view, it’s necessary to 
consider the multiple and systemic nature of the risks and the different types of transactions 
                                                          
47
 The definitions are extracted from the notes of Emerging Market and Country Risk Evaluation course, fol-
lowed at IESEG School of Management (Université Catholique de Lille). Thus, the quotes are indirect. 
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threatened (e.g., FDI, portfolio investment, loans, etc.). Moreover, we need to take into ac-
count the global nature of country risk (i.e., contagion effect risk). In fact, even if country risk 
is mainly affected by country-specific factors, the impact of the international economic envi-
ronment on these factors cannot be neglected
48
. One of the most wide definition, was recently 
provided by Bouchet, Clark and Groslambert (2003). They define country risk as “all the ad-
ditional risks induced by doing business abroad, as opposed to domestic transaction”. Another 
useful operational definition is the one of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) in its 
“Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision” of 2012. It defines country risk as the 
“risk of exposure to loss caused by events in a foreign country”. This concept is broader than 
sovereign risk, as it involves all transactions (lending or investment activity) to or with indi-
viduals, corporates, banks or government. Thus, country risk could be defined as the whole 
set of factors related to the political, institutional or economic characteristics of a given coun-
try that could affect the profitability of an investment or the capacity of a private and/or public 
counterparty to meet its commitments in a way that could be measured ex-ante
49
. 
From the definition presented above, we deduce that country risk is a broad aggregate that 
includes different heterogeneous components, generated by different sources of risk. The 
main risks entering in the broad aggregate and their definitions are: 
 political, legal and institutional risk is the risk that a change in the legal, political or 
institutional environment may affect, positively or negatively, the ability of a coun-
terparty to meet its commitments or the profitability of an investment; 
 macroeconomic risk is the risk that a brutal change in the macroeconomic environ-
ment may affect, positively or negatively, the ability of a counterparty to meet its 
commitments or the profitability of an investment; 
 sovereign risk is the risk that a sovereign state may be unwilling or unable to meet 
its financial commitments (i.e., sovereign default); 
 non transfer risk, or convertibility risk, is the risk that a large exchange rate depre-
ciation, due to currency or balance of payment crisis, or a change in the legal envi-
ronment (e.g., introduction of capital controls) may impact the capacity of a coun-
terparty to meet its commitments in foreign currency. 
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 There are a lot of examples related to this issue. Think about the economic growth in developed countries, that 
strongly affects the economic performance of commodities exporters. Moreover, as shown by the recent drop in 
oil prices, international commodities prices are fundamental factors in the evaluation of commodities’ exporters’ 
economic stability. An example about financial markets is connected to international liquidity. A restrictive 
monetary policy, especially by the Federal Reserve (e.g., the recent Tapering), will lead to huge capital outflows 
from Emerging and Frontier Markets. This consistently increases the risk of severe downturn in the equity mar-
kets and a huge increase of interest rates in government bonds, threatening the government creditworthiness.   
49
 The ex-ante perspective is fundamental in risk definition. In fact, risk measures are designed in order to cap-
ture the potential future threats to investment profitability or to creditworthiness. 
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Financial markets activity and the interaction between the main components of country risk 
generate three other important risks. Given the systemic nature of two of them, these risks 
hide serious potential threat for the investors: 
 market risk is the risk that a change in market variables (e.g., interest rates, stock, 
bond and commodity prices, exchange rate) may affect the ability of a counterparty 
to meet its commitments or the profitability of an investment; 
 systemic banking risk is the risk of a massive wave of defaults or liquidity crises in 
the banking system due to systemic reasons
50
; 
 systemic risk is the risk that a series of private-sector counterparties may default on 
their obligations due to systemic reasons
51
. 
In what follows, I want to present briefly political, legal and institutional risk, sovereign 
risk and the non-transfer risk. These risks are usually the base for the assessment of more 
complex type of risks. Moreover, they present peculiar features that are not present in macro-
economic and market risks. Finally, macroeconomic and market risk assessment is often hid 
in the assessment of the other risks. 
 As above-mentioned, political and institutional risks are the risks coming from heteroge-
neous institutional or political factors. Thus, they include: 
 the risks surging from the institutional specificities of a given country, such as the 
institutional system (e.g., democracy, dictatorship) or the political system structure 
(e.g., multi-party system, political system stability); 
 the risks resulting from internal social tensions and political struggles, such as revo-
lutions, riots, civil war or inadequate policy reactions in face of economic shocks 
(government inefficiency); 
 the risks surging from geopolitical and external tensions, such as war, diplomatic 
tensions and international sanctions or embargo
52
; 
 the risk coming from discretionary decisions of the government, such as nationali-
zation, breach of contracts and discriminatory taxation. 
                                                          
50
 IMF provides a database of systemic banking crisis, based on the work of Laeven and Valencia (2008), updat-
ed by Laeven and Valencia (2012). They identify 147 episodes of banking crisis in the period 1970-2011. More-
over, the work is particularly interesting for the analysis of other important crisis that can be the base or the by-
product of systemic banking crisis, such as currency crisis and sovereign default. I will develop this point in the 
literature part. 
51
 Some examples of systemic reason are changes in the political (especially in the absence of democracy), legal 
(including the introduction of capital controls) or institutional (e.g., coupe d’etat) environment, deterioration of 
the macroeconomic environment, currency crisis, interbank liquidity crisis, sovereign default. 
52
 An important recent example is the introduction of the sanctions against Russia following the Ukrainian war. 
Given Russian solidity, the sanctions took several months to be effective, but they are threatening now economic 
performances and the stability of the financial system. 
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 Generally, they are not measured by specific ratings but they are an important component 
of sovereign ratings, convertibility ratings and systemic credit risk ratings
53
. These risks have 
direct impact on investment. First of all, we have to consider the loss risks. Losses directly re-
lated to political and institutional risks could be particularly high, especially in the case of dis-
ruptive events (e.g. wars, riots, etc.) and nationalizations or breach of contracts. Moreover, in-
surance against these risks is possible but very costly, given the difficult to forecast them and 
the potential amount to be covered. Secondly we have the reputational risks, generally related 
to international sanctions, institutional weaknesses (e.g., corruption) and the identity of the 
counterparties
54
. Finally, we have the operational risks, related to the security of the local 
staff, to the infrastructures and the possible disruption of the supply chain. Alongside the di-
rect impact, we have also indirect impact of political and institutional risks. Political risks 
tend to lower growth and to exacerbate economic volatility, therefore increasing the risks sov-
ereign default and currency crisis. The forecast of political risk is still challenging, given the 
absence of strong quantitative methodology and the difficulties to establish casual relation-
ships in academic literature. Most of the times, it is based on subjective evaluation, consider-
ing a wide set of factors. The first one is history, observing the frequency of the troubles, riots 
and revolutions in the past, trying to identify crisis prone and politically instable countries
55
. 
Moreover, the sources of the past crises are useful to understand from which factors the risks 
might come from (e.g., geopolitical background, internal political situation, institutional fea-
tures, social structure and tensions, economic situation). About geopolitical factors, we should 
evaluate the relationships with great and regional powers, unresolved frontier disputes, inter-
national sanctions and the degree of dependence toward foreign capital flows or foreign aid 
flows. The evaluation of the political system is complicated and even academic literature is 
not able to provide clear answer on which system should be preferred when considering port-
folio investment
56
. For example, democracy is less prone to political frustration and presents 
better scoring for rule of law. On the contrary, it doesn’t necessarily provide the right incen-
tives for implementing policies to ensure stable long term growth (e.g., populism is a source 
of risk). The authoritarian regimes increase the risk of discretionary decisions, present high 
reputational risks and lower scoring for rule of law. Moreover, succession might be disrup-
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 An important exception is the political risk service provided by the PRS Group. 
54
 The identity of counterparties matters especially for companies controlled by the government, that usually rep-
resent the biggest firms in developing countries, controlling the strategic sector (e.g., commodities, banking sys-
tem). 
55
 The interpretation may be difficult and subjective opinion is fundamental. Past crisis can weaken the country 
institutions, increasing the instability and the risk of other turbulence in the future. On the other side, the troubled 
past may make population more tolerant and passive, increasing the stability of an authoritarian regime. 
56
 An interesting work on the economic effect of institutions is the book of Acemoglu, Robinson and Woren 
(2012). However, it doesn’t investigate the impact on investment performance. 
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tive. On the contrary, they present the positive feature that they could stabilize countries with 
weak institution. Another factor to monitor is the political structure, investigating the exist-
ence of appropriate check and balances and the structure of the political parties (e.g., political 
alternation, presence of religious party, etc.)
57
. In addition to that, investors must assess the 
stability of the legal environment, the level of protection of property and contractual rights, 
the guarantees over an equal treatment between national and foreigners operators. In particu-
lar, it’s fundamental to investigate the presence of price controls, capital controls under an un-
stable exchange rate system and frequent nationalizations. Finally, corruption, governance, 
transparency and accountability are fundamental factors influencing the investors’ propensity 
to invest. Some useful additional indicators to assess political risk are: 
 the Corruption Perception Index computed by Transparency International58; 
 the Doing Business Indicators and the Governance Indicators provided by the 
World Bank
59
. 
A broad definition of sovereign risk is the risk that a sovereign state or one of its entity or 
agents fail to meet their financial commitments in a timely manner. When dealing with sover-
eign entities, we have to understand that sovereign are not ordinary counterparties. First of all, 
their big size and the powers and privileges of sovereignty increase the scope of risk assess-
ment and complicate the analysis. Government have a huge impact on the national economy, 
through the legal framework and the policy actions. On the other side, the macroeconomic 
framework can impact the solvency of the sovereign
60
. Moreover, a state benefits from sover-
eignty on the domestic space and sovereign immunities, with consequent limited legal redress 
for creditors (for example see the legal suits following Argentinian default). The second im-
portant aspect is the importance of sovereign risk in Country Risk Assessment. Sovereign rat-
ings usually serve as country ceiling, with only few private counterparties exhibiting better 
rating than their sovereign. This is reinforced by the strong correlation between yields on sov-
ereign bonds and corporate bonds. In assessing sovereign risk, we have to distinguish between 
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 High political noise can be translated in high market volatility. An important example is the one of Italy during 
the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, or, more recently, of Greece. 
58
 To find more information about and the methodology behind the Corruption Perception Index, please visit the 
following website: www.transparency.org. 
59
 Doing Business Indicators try to provide objective and comparable measures of business regulations across 
different countries, covering ten sectors. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are composed by six sectors, 
covering topics from accountability to government effectiveness to regulatory quality. For more information, vis-
it the following websites: www.doingbusiness.org and www.govindicators.org. 
60
 The most simple example is the reduction of revenues from direct and indirect taxation in presence of a reces-
sion. This could be problematic for a state with unstable financial situation. Another recent example is the one of 
banking bailouts, following the subprime crisis. Especially in Europe, some countries faced financial solidity 
problems generated by the costly bailouts of the banking system. Following Laeven and Valencia (2008), the 
median increase of public debt was equal to 23.90 percentage points, but for some countries (e.g. Ireland) was 
much more severe. 
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the willingness to pay and the ability to pay. Given the sovereignty privileges and the above-
mentioned limited legal redress for creditors in the events of a default, sovereign can default 
even if they have enough resources to meet their financial commitments. The willingness to 
pay assessment is mainly based on qualitative and subjective evaluation. Some of the key var-
iables to analyze is the frequency of past defaults (i.e., serial defaulter), the openness and the 
dependency towards external financing flows, institutions efficiency and the balance between 
costs and gains from default
61
. In addition to that, we have to conduct a qualitative analysis 
based on a deep knowledge of a country’s institutions, political scene and economic situation. 
In the assessment of the ability to pay, we can introduce also quantitative analysis. First of all, 
it’s important to analyze levels and trends of the key government finance ratios: 
 fiscal ratios, such as primary balance, total fiscal balance and structural balance (in 
percent of GDP); 
 debt ratios and the external debt ratios, such as total public debt stock (in percent of 
GDP or fiscal revenues) and total public and short term external debt (in percent of 
foreign reserves, exports or current account receipts); 
 the debt servicing costs, i.e. the interests paid on public debt (in percent of GDP or 
fiscal receipts). 
From this analysis, we can understand if the debt is on an unstable path and the relative so-
lidity of government finance. Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) showed that the 
higher the public debt ratios and the higher is the probability of default. Moreover, the ratios 
related to external debt increase in the run-up to a crisis and are significantly higher than dur-
ing non-crisis episodes. However, there is not a well-defined threshold indicating a risky area, 
given the challenges to find causal effect. Each countries have some specificities that make 
the interpretation challenging. It’s more important to assess the stability of the debt path, ra-
ther than look at its level. Other important variables to observe in order to understand the 
source of potential shocks are the structure of fiscal receipts (e.g., tax rate, sensitivity of tax 
receipts to growth, tax basis), of fiscal expenditures, of public debt (e.g., maturity, indexation 
and sensitivity to exchange rate, interest rate growth or inflation shocks), external vulnerabil-
ity and potential growth and short term growth prospects
62
. Finally, an important component 
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 The default will probably result in a suspension of external financing flows (i.e., attachment risks) or in a dra-
matically increase of the cost of external financing. 
62
 About the structure of fiscal receipts, a recent example is the one of oil exporter countries. A sharp drop in oil 
revenues could undermine the stability of the government finance. On the structure of fiscal expenditure, it’s im-
portant to analyze the aging-related expenditures (e.g., pensions, medical services, etc.). Given their size, espe-
cially in developed countries, the dynamic is fundamental to assess the future trajectory of the debt. Finally the 
structure of public debt is fundamental to assess the stability of government finance to shocks generated in the 
financial markets, such as a sharp increase in interest rates. 
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of sovereign risk is the liquidity risk. A government should continuously roll-over its matur-
ing debt. The default occurs when the government has not enough resources to cover the gap 
between its financing needs and the financing resources it can get on the market
63
. Important 
variables to assess liquidity risk are the spreads on government bonds interest rates, that pro-
vide useful indications about the market willingness to roll-over the debt. Moreover, we 
should look at the size of financing needs, the assets that can be used in case of insufficient 
market financing, the public sector assets that can be quickly privatized in the case of a liquid-
ity crisis, the public sector deposits and foreign currency reserves at the central bank and the 
aid flows from international financial institutions (e.g., IMF, World Bank). 
The last risk I want to present is the non-transfer risk, that is the risk that local players 
and/or debtors cannot convert local currency into foreign currency and/or cannot transfer 
funds abroad to non-resident creditors. In practice, it translates into external debt default, ar-
rears on import payments, impossibility to repatriate profits and large exchange rate deprecia-
tion
64
. When assessing non-transfer risk, we can decompose it in two risks. The first one is the 
so called risk de facto, that is the risk of a sharp drop in foreign exchange reserves and/or 
large exchange rate depreciation that makes the access to foreign currency liquidity too costly 
or impossible. This constitutes the base of balance of payment and currency crisis. The second 
one is the risk de jure, that arises with the introduction of capital controls. Sovereign risk and 
non-transfer risk have similar assessment procedure, with the evaluation of sustainability and 
liquidity risk of sovereign debt and external debt respectively. However, sovereign risk is 
strictly related to the public sector, while the non-transfer risk focuses on both public and pri-
vate counterparties’ financial commitments against foreign agents. Moreover, non-transfer 
risk can materialize even when the sovereign remains solvent on its debt
65
. On the contrary, a 
sovereign default usually occur simultaneously to the materialization of non-transfer risk. 
Forecast non-transfer risk is not simple. However, we can count on a consistent literature that 
tries to explain the insurgence of balance of payment and currency crises
66
. In particular, cur-
rency crises are usually preceded by a combination of numerous symptoms. Indicators that 
tend to perform well are the real exchange rate overvaluation, the adequacy of foreign ex-
change reserves coverage (relative to short term debt, imports or monetary aggregates), for-
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 As shown by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, liquidity crisis can occur even if public debt seems sustain-
able or the government appears solvent. 
64
 The standard threshold for large exchange rate depreciation is set between 15.00 and 30.00 per cent. 
65
 This can happen when sovereign debt is low or denominated mainly in local currency or when the government 
can count on the support of International Financial Institutions. Finally, this happens when exchange rate con-
trols have been introduced to protect foreign exchange reserves. 
66
 See the Subparagraph 4.1.3 on the relevant literature for the assessment of currency risk. 
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eign exchange reserves growth, current account deficit and domestic credit growth
67
. About 
the assessment of external liquidity risk, the key variables to analyze are again  foreign ex-
change reserves in months of imports, external financing needs or short term debt or hot mon-
ey relative to foreign exchange reserves,  the Fitch’s liquidity ratio and size, structure and li-
quidity of external assets
68
. 
4.1.2 The Country Risk Assessment 
Country risk definition influences the processes underlying the Country Risk Assessment 
activity. As above-mentioned, this definition evolved during the last 50 years. It strictly de-
pends on the particular historical period and on the crises that characterized that period. Thus, 
Country Risk Assessment is an activity continuously developed and past crises always left 
important lessons for the improvement of assessment procedures. 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2008a) showed that sovereign default usually occurred in default 
waves typically spaced some decades apart. Laeven and Valencia (2008) highlighted the con-
nection between different type of crises (currency crisis, systemic banking crisis, sovereign 
debt default, debt restructuring), the presence of twin or triple crises and the presence of these 
waves of crises. Political crises of the 60s and the 70s represent one of the first wave of crises. 
Decolonization and the emergence for the new sovereign states to renegotiate the business ar-
rangement inherited from the past introduced severe political instability and institutional 
weaknesses. The crisis was characterized by the voluntary breach of contracts, with massive 
nationalizations, assets seizure, repudiation of sovereign debt and regulatory changes with 
damaging effects on foreign companies. According to Williams (1975), assets sized by 
emerging countries over the period 1956-1972 were worth the 25.00 per cent of 1972 FDI 
stock value. Jodice (1980) found 1535 expropriations in seventy-six countries from 1960 to 
1976. These non-economic disruptive events had a huge negative impact on the business envi-
ronment, influencing Country Risk Assessment procedures. First of all, practitioners learned 
that dealing with sovereign states entails specific risks that are not present with a private 
counterparty. Secondly, they understood that non-business factors may influence sharply 
business conditions, impacting on expected performance in a severe way. The second im-
portant series of crises is the wave of debt crises of the ‘80s. The imprudent macroeconomic 
management and borrowing by the debtor countries, the imprudent lending by the internation-
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 A common threshold in financial markets practice for FX reserves relative to imports is 3 months of imports. 
For the current account deficit, the common threshold is 5.00 per cent of GDP. 
68
 For short term debt and hot money ratio the common threshold is 100.00 per cent. Hot money is defined as the 
assets that can dry up or fly out of the country quickly in a stress framework (i.e., the most liquid assets). Fitch’s 
liquidity ratio is the ratio between official FX reserves and foreign assets of commercial banks over external debt 
service and foreign liabilities of commercial banks. For more details, see Fitch’s website: www.fitchratings.com. 
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al banks and adverse economic framework are the backdrop of these crises
69
. During this pe-
riod, we observed a wave of sovereign defaults, with the consequent exclusion from financial 
markets access of the defaulting states and the fears of systemic banking crisis
70
. From this 
wave, practitioners learned the importance of the contagion effects. The recession moved 
from developed to emerging countries and the adverse financial conditions spread across de-
veloping countries
71
. Moreover, it showed the necessity of better risk management practices 
within the banking sector, more efficient supervision and higher capitalization. Another im-
portant wave of crises for Country Risk Assessment development was the multiple crises se-
ries of the late ‘90s. The boom in global capital flows, the combination of weaknesses in re-
cipient countries, the unsustainable current account deficits, the balance sheet vulnerability 
and the weak banking systems constituted the backdrop of the crises
72
. Multiple or systemic 
crises characterized this wave, with a combination of a balance of payment crises,  banking 
crises, a wave of corporate bankruptcies and, sometimes, sovereign defaults
73
. Practitioners 
learned that contagion effects go well beyond what is suggested by trade links, through herd-
ing behavior of foreign investors and exposure to common lenders. In addition to that, the se-
ries of crises highlighted the necessity of a better monitoring of the risks of the private coun-
terparties and of a better monitoring of liquidity and currency risks. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
and the 2011 European Sovereign Debt Crisis gave the last important lessons for Country 
Risk Assessment. In a different way, the two crises showed the importance of contagion effect 
and the difficult to assess this type of risk, even if it was recognized by financial market prac-
titioners since the Asian Crisis
74
. The crises highlighted again the importance of contagion ef-
fects and the global and multiple systemic nature of country risk. Moreover, we saw the rela-
tive inefficiency of macroeconomic analysis based on standard statistical indicators. This 
analysis, fundamental in assessing country risk, must be complemented by microeconomic 
evidences, balance sheet analysis, and information about interlinkage and off balance sheet 
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 Real interest rate increase and recession in industrialized countries due to counter-inflationary policies of the 
early ‘80s, alongside the decline in commodity prices, represented the adverse economic scenario. 
70
 The majority of these repeated sovereign defaults involved Latin American countries: Peru (1978, 1980, 
1984), Bolivia (1980, 1986, 1989), Honduras (1981), Costa Rica (1981, 1983, 1984), Argentina (1982, 1989), 
Mexico (1982), Dominican Republic (1982),  Ecuador (1982), Brazil (1983), Uruguay (1983, 1987, 1990), Chile 
(1983) and Venezuela(1983, 1990). 
71
 During the ‘80s, the tight monetary policy, implemented especially by the Federal Reserve, led to massive 
capital outflows from emerging economies. This situation was observed also during the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
with the flight to liquidity that hit also countries with good economic performance. 
72
 The current account deficit led to real exchange rate overvaluation under pegged exchange rate system, un-
dermining the competitiveness of these countries. Balance sheet vulnerability were mainly due to currency mis-
matches, maturity mismatches and high indebtedness. 
73
 The most important crisis occurred in Mexico (1994-1995), East Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Ko-
rea, 1997-1998), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-1999) and Argentina (2001-2002). 
74
 The difficult was related also to financial innovation, with the introduction of complex instruments. The sub-
prime crisis moved from United States to all over the world, while the European Sovereign Debt Crisis spread 
across the weakest Eurozone countries (e.g., Piigs and some Eastern countries). 
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positions at firm-level. In addition to that, we learned the huge importance of subjective eval-
uation of the quantitative results obtained from the above-mentioned analysis. 
The historical background is necessary to understand the modern structure of the assess-
ment of country risk. In particular, Country Risk Assessment is the set of processes with the 
aim of assessing the different type of risks composing the broad aggregate of country risk, in 
order to: 
 allow for an adequate remuneration of the risk (i.e., determination of the appropri-
ate required rate of return); 
 make easier global portfolio management and cross-border risk-mitigation; 
 favor optimal asset allocation and investment choices, especially from a strategic 
asset allocation point of view; 
 meet regulatory obligations75. 
It is a complex process, requiring a cross-disciplinary approach. Economics plays the ma-
jor role in assessing country risk, especially with the implementation of quantitative tools. 
However, political sciences, history, sociology and geopolitics are fundamental for the inter-
pretation of the results coming from quantitative analysis and for the assessment of political 
and institutional risk
76
. Given the absence of a consistent literature and the lack of strong 
model for assessing country risk, Country Risk Assessment is a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative tools. Qualitative judgment is not a subordinated aspect, especially when 
quantitative results suggest different interpretations. Even if country risk is often a subjective 
evaluation based on quantitative tools, agents should implement a clear and transparent meth-
odology for comparability and counterfactual assessment. 
There are multiple agents involved in Country Risk Assessment. The majority of banks,  
financial institutions and multinational firms have their country risk departments. In addition 
to that, there are several outsourced business services, such as rating agencies (e.g., Standard 
and Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch), export credit agencies (e.g., COFACE, CESCE) and “thinks 
tanks” and consulting firms (e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, PRS Group). 
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 Principe 21 of the Basel Committee “Core principle for effective banking supervision” states that “the supervi-
sor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report 
and control or mitigate country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities on a 
timely basis”. Thus, the country risk is a component of counterparty credit risk assessment and, consequently, it 
influences the regulatory capital requirements. 
76
 History is fundamental in country risk evaluation. For example, from Laeven and Valencia (2008), we know 
that crises tend to repeat (see for example the case of Argentina and, more recently, of Jamaica). Moreover, the 
knowledge of the history of social conflicts in a country helps to implement a more complete assessment of insti-
tutional risk. 
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These agents usually implement a country risk breakdown similar to the one presented 
above
77
. 
Between the above-mentioned agents, rating agencies present some peculiarities. First of 
all, they focus on borrowers’ or specific financial instruments’ creditworthiness, issuing indi-
vidual ratings on these entities or instruments. In general, ratings are subjective opinion based 
on the analysis of publicly available information or provided by the issuer, with established 
criteria and methodology. They focus on issuers’ creditworthiness and solvency, thus as-
sessing credit risk. This assessment provides an ordinal measure of the likelihood of default, 
relative to the other issuers. In fact, a rating does not indicate a numerical probability of de-
fault, that can be retrieved only empirically. Their diffusion is also due to their standardization 
and their alpha-numerical symbol structure easy to understand. Even if they focus on credit 
risk, they consider also other sources of risk, as they can significantly impact the debtor cre-
ditworthiness. Rating agencies’ reports provide a rationale for those ratings, including a com-
plete assessment of country risk. The second fundamental characteristic is the oligopolistic 
feature of rating agency industry. This feature is mainly due to the legal framework. In partic-
ular, it comes from the role assigned to the rating agencies by regulatory institutions
78
. The 
third important characteristic is the revenue generation process. Except for sovereign entities, 
ratings are released at the request of the borrower, with the revenues generated mainly by the 
fees paid by the issuer. All these features are the foundation of the main criticisms to rating 
agencies work,  especially after the 2008 Financial Crisis. The first concern is related to their 
market power and revenue generation process, with the existence of a conflict of interests that 
favors an inflation in ratings. The second concern is about the utility and accuracy of the rat-
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 For example, Economist Intelligence Unit use the following breakdown of country risk in the construction of 
its country rating: 
• sovereign risk is the risk of a build-up in arrears of principal and/or interest on foreign- and/or local-
currency debt of a sovereign entity or guaranteed by the sovereign; 
• currency risk is the risk of a devaluation against the reference currency of 25.00 per cent or more in 
nominal terms over the next twelve months; 
• banking sector risk is the risk of a systemic crisis whereby banks holding 10.00 per cent or more of total 
assets become insolvent and unable to discharge their obligation to depositors and/or creditors. 
• political risk is the risk connected to political stability and effectiveness that could affect a country’s 
ability and or commitment to service its debt obligations and/or cause turbulence in the foreign ex-
change market; 
• economic structure risk is the risk derived from a series of macroeconomic variables of a structural ra-
ther than a cyclical nature 
78
 For example, there is the obligation for some regulated bodies (e.g., pension funds, insurance company) to in-
vest in bonds with a certain minimum rating. Moreover, the eligibility of bonds as collateral in the operation with 
the central bank is strictly connected to the rating assigned. Finally, there is the possibility to use the ratings of 
recognized external credit assessment institutions to risk weight assets and compute capital requirements. Rec-
ognized external credit assessment institutions have to meet strict eligibility criteria. The necessity to respect 
these criteria poses huge entry barrier for potential incoming. 
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ings, especially given their pro-cyclicality and their role in the exacerbation of the crisis
79
. A 
forward-looking through the cycle risk assessment should be the base of the ratings, in order 
to maintain a certain degree of stability during the economic cycle. The final concern, and the 
most important for the objective of this thesis,  is the country risk definition. Country risk is 
often proxied by sovereign risk (e.g. S&P, Fitch), with the sovereign rating serving as a ceil-
ing for most of the ratings of the private counterparties domiciled in the same country. The 
reduction of country risk to sovereign risk is too limitative and this represents one of the rea-
son behind the choice to don’t use the ratings provided by the rating agencies. 
4.1.3 Relevant Literature 
There is not a significant literature over the effect of macroeconomic variables on stock 
market performances for Frontier Markets. Frontier Markets time series are limited and the 
majority of stand-alone country indices were launched after 2002. However, the aim of my 
Country Risk Indicator is to provide a quantitative tool to design the risk budgets on the Fron-
tier Markets asset class. The relevant quantity behind the Risk Budgeting Approach is the risk 
and not the performance. On the risk side, the literature is more focused on the predictability 
of major crises (banking, financial or currency crises and sovereign default) rather than the re-
lation between macroeconomic variables and stock market volatility. However, the Country 
Risk Indicator tries to assess country risk, with the primary objective of avoiding the insur-
gence of losses connected to these major crises. In fact, these crises represent disruptive 
events for investment. For this reason, I present some of the most relevant academic works 
over this topic. The majority of these works have their focus on Emerging Markets (EM), but 
some of their conclusions can be extended to Frontier Markets. 
The first important work on the relation between macroeconomic variables and EM stock 
returns is the one of Bilson, Brailsford and Hopper (2001). It can be considered as an evolu-
tion of the work of Harvey (1995a), where he found that EM stock returns present little expo-
sure to a set of global factors (world inflation, world GDP, world oil prices and a trade-
weighted world exchange rate). They used twenty MSCI indices to proxy the EM stock mar-
kets. They implemented two different regressions. In the first one, they used as relevant mac-
roeconomic factors the world market returns, the percentage change in one aggregate of mon-
ey supply, the percentage change in a good price variable (e.g., inflation), the percentage 
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 Ratings tend to react slowly to the signals of a crisis. Moreover, a rating downgrade can worsen the debtor 
creditworthiness, exacerbating its crisis. Think for example to a sovereign entity that presents liquidity problems, 
with the interest rates on its bonds that increased. A downgrade that moves the rating from the investment grade 
class to the speculative class can exacerbate the crisis, since some institutional investors have to sell these bonds 
and they cannot be used as collateral in the operation with the central bank, threatening the stability of the coun-
try banking system. An example is the 2011 European Sovereign Debt Crisis.  
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change in a real activity variable (e.g., GDP or Industrial Production growth) and the percent-
age change in the exchange rate variable
80
. In the second regression, they implemented a 
Principal Component Analysis. Alongside the macroeconomic factors (money supply, good 
prices, real activity and exchange rates), they introduced a country political risk measure, the 
trade sector, interest rates and regional market returns
81
. Moreover, as suggested by Chen 
(1991), they introduced microeconomic variables, such as price-to-earning (PE) ratio and div-
idend yields. About the results, EM show little sensitivity to the return on the world market 
index, with only 10 markets that present significant coefficients (as expected from Harvey 
[1995a]). The sign is positive as expected. The exchange rate appears to be the most influen-
tial macroeconomic variable, with significance in twelve countries and a negative sign in most 
of the cases. The remaining macroeconomic variables perform relatively poorly, with only 
money supply that exhibit a little significance. The explanatory power is quite small, with low 
R-squared coefficients. In the second set of results, the global factor loses much of its signifi-
cance, while the exchange rate still exhibits the highest significance. The conclusions over the 
other macroeconomic variables do not change. The results show the presence of a regional 
factor, with positive significant coefficients in some markets. The PE ratio is significant and 
positive in sixteen markets, as suggested by previous literature (see for example Bekaert and 
Harvey [2000]). Finally, the dividend yield is significant in ten markets, with negative coeffi-
cients. The explanatory power increases with an average adjusted R-squared of 60.00 per 
cent. However, the authors suggest to take carefully the results due to the large number of var-
iables that can introduce multicollinearity concerns. Another important work is the one of 
Harvey (2004), in which he investigated the importance of political risk, financial risk and 
economic risk in portfolio and direct investment decisions. He used the measures provided by 
PRS International Country Risk Guide. The broad aggregate for country risk is composed for 
the 50.00 per cent by political risk measure and the remaining part is equally distributed be-
tween financial and economic risks. He found that trading strategies based on those ratings 
significantly improved portfolio returns. Moreover, the country risk measures are most useful 
for the analysis of Emerging rather than Developed markets. In fact, these markets face im-
portant non-diversifiable risk and the country risk is rewarded. Hooker (2004) used the Bayes-
ian approach, developed by Cremers (2002), to investigate the relationships between the pre-
dictive power of some macroeconomic factors and EM equity returns. He considered six mac-
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 As suggested by the IMF’s 1996-1997 Annual Report, money supply and good prices are lagged by 1 month 
and real activity by 2 months.  
81
 The politcal risk measure is the one provided by the PRS Group. The trade sector is proxied by the sum of im-
ports and exports as percentage of GDP. The interest rate is proxied by the deposit rate. Finally, the regional 
market is proxied by an equally weighted index for a particular geographical area. 
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roeconomic factors and five financial factors
82
. The results provide strong evidence against 
the significance of most of the macroeconomic variables. The estimated posterior probabili-
ties are well below the preset priors, with the only exception of the change in exchange rate.  
This is consistent with previous literature results, where the exchange rate appeared to be the 
only significant macroeconomic variable. Financial variables show higher significance. 
Among them, beta is a weak predictor, with posteriors always below the priors when all the 
financial variables are included. According to the previous literature findings, momentum, PE 
ratio and downside risk appear to be robust predictors of EM equity returns. Basher and Sa-
dorsky (2006) used unconditional and conditional risk analysis to investigate the relationship 
between oil price movements and stock returns in twenty-one emerging stock markets. In both 
cases, oil price movements appear to have strong effects on EM returns. However, for condi-
tional risk analysis this seems to depend on data frequency. Finally, Abugri (2008) used a six-
variable vector autoregressive model to investigate whether dynamics in key macroeconomic 
indicators significantly explain market returns in four Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico). In particular, they focused more on macroeconomic shocks and 
volatility, rather than the magnitude of macroeconomic variables. The proxies for world mac-
roeconomic factors are the US 3-month T-bill yield and the MSCI world index. The domestic 
macroeconomic variables are the nominal exchange rate, the money supply (M1 monetary ag-
gregate), industrial productivity (industrial production index) and nominal interest rate (nomi-
nal lending or policy interest rate). The global variables appear to have the most consistent 
significant effects on all the four markets. However, it’s difficult to extract a significant mag-
nitude, since the shocks on macroeconomic variables tend to have different effects across the 
different markets. 
The second topic includes the theoretical models behind the BoP and currency crises, that 
represent the core components of non-transfer risk. According to Krugman (1979), BoP crises 
are mainly based on structural weaknesses of the economy. Government bad economic poli-
cies, such as inconsistent fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies,  may lead to a deteriora-
tion of the fundamentals of the economy
83
. Usually, financial market practitioners’ response 
to this inconsistency is the exit from the country, with the consequent capital outflows and 
speculative attacks. This will lead to the exhaustion of the central bank's foreign reserves. 
Thus, high fiscal deficit, decreasing foreign exchange reserves and rising external debt levels 
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 The six macroeconomic factors are: foreign currency exchange rate against USD, local interest rate, short term 
real interest rate (relative to the previous 36 months), change in expected GDP growth, inflation and a proxy of 
credit risk (JPM EMBI spreads). The five financial variables are: CAPM beta (60-months rolling), price momen-
tum, price-to earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, downside risk and market size. 
83
 A common example between developing economies is the persistence of important fiscal deficits financed by 
indebtedness or printing money under fixed exchange rate regimes. 
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are warning signals of the insurgency of a crisis. In Obstfeld (1996), crises are the conse-
quence of self-fulfilling expectations in theoretical settings with multiple equilibria. The gov-
ernment balances the costs and the gains from defending the exchange rate. If the speculators 
believe that the commitment of the government to defend the peg is not credible, they will ask 
for higher interest rates on domestic assets. The cost of defending the peg increases, as rising 
interest rates will translate into weaker growth and will threat a weak banking sector. This is 
the concept of self-fulfilling crises and they may be accelerate by the speculators’ herding be-
havior. From the 90s, academic literature started to introduce the concept of multiple crises, 
especially focusing on the interaction between currency crises and systemic banking crises. 
According to McKinnon and Pill (1996), in an economy with insufficient banking sector regu-
lation, deposit insurance and moral hazard problems, capital inflows result in over-lending 
cycles, consumption booms and current account deficits. Consequently, the real exchange rate 
tend to appreciate and growth slows. As the economy enters a recession, the excess lending 
during the boom makes banks more prone to a crisis. Meanwhile, the deterioration of the cur-
rent account makes investors worried about the possibility of default on foreign loans. The 
systemic banking crisis, with the weaknesses of the banking sector, makes too costly the pro-
tection of the peg. Krugman (1999) and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001) stated that a 
currency depreciation weakens private sector balance-sheets, due to currency mismatches. 
This weakness threat the economic growth, with the consequent exchange rate depreciation, 
putting the economy in a vicious circle that could lead to a systemic banking crisis. 
The last important topic I want to present is on the empirical literature over the major cri-
ses (i.e., financial, banking and currency crises and sovereign default) on developing econo-
mies. The scope for the analysis of these disruptive events is high. Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) identified 147 banking crises, 218 currency crises and 66 sovereign crises from 1970 
to 2011. The first important contribution is the one of Frankel and Rose (1996). They tried to 
investigate the sources of currency crashes using a panel of annual data for 100 developing 
countries from 1971 to 1992. They defined currency crash as a large depreciation of the nom-
inal exchange rate, translating in a substantial increase in the rate of change of nominal depre-
ciation (i.e., 25.00 per cent, that is also at least a 10.00 percentage points increase in the rate 
of depreciation). They found that currency crashes tend to occur when the output growth is 
low, the growth of domestic credit is high and the level of foreign interest rates are high. 
Moreover, a low ratio of FDI to debt significantly increases the probability of a crash. The 
second pillar is the work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), where they introduced the con-
 58 
 
cept of twin crises
84
. They analyzed the links between banking and currency crises, finding 
that problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis
85
. In fact, banking sec-
tor problems may threat the capacity of the central bank to defend the exchange rate. On the 
other side, the currency crisis worsens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral. In their 
work, they focused on a set of macroeconomic variables, in order to understand the sources of 
the crisis
86
. Usually, financial liberalization precedes banking crises. Moreover, a deteriora-
tion of the economic conditions after a prolonged boom in economic activity, financed with 
credit, can represent an early signal of the insurgence of a crisis. This situation is particularly 
important for currency crisis, since it leads to currency over-valuation. However, it is also the 
base of the banking system weaknesses, with an increase of deteriorated positions. Other two 
important works are Chang and Velasco (1998) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), 
on financial and currency crisis respectively. These papers followed the first version of the 
above-mentioned Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). In particular, Chang and Velasco (1998) 
used a simple small open economy version of the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The 
illiquidity of the domestic financial system is the core problem, with banks’ illiquidity repre-
senting the necessary condition for the insurgence of a crisis. They found that the short ma-
turity of capital inflows can contribute to bank fragility more than their size. Moreover, do-
mestic financial liberalization is positive, increasing banks’ wealth, but it increases also the 
risks of the insurgency of a banking crisis. As a consequence of the crisis, the early liquida-
tion of the assets causes a drop in asset prices, spreading the crisis to the whole economy and 
dramatically increasing its real costs. Distortive government policies, such as deposit guaran-
tees and investment subsidies, may alter risk perception, causing over-investment. This will 
worsen the crisis when it will occur. Finally, the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime, 
alongside an illiquid banking system, can be disruptive. In fact, bank run represents a run on 
the currency if the central bank tries to act as a lender of last resort, causing a currency crises 
alongside the banking crises. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) investigated the empir-
ical evidence on currency crises, trying to develop an early warning system able to predict the 
insurgence of these crises. Leading indicators are the base of this system. When an indicator 
exceeds a certain threshold, it is considered as a signal that a currency crisis may occur in the 
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 The oldest version of the work was published in 1996 and it was an important contribution to the literature. 
85
 According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), this type of twin crisis occurred twenty-eight times in the period 
1970-2011. 
86
 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) used sixteen macroeconomic indicators: M2 multiplier (i.e. M2 over base 
money ratio), domestic credit over GDP ratio, real interest rate, lending-deposit rate ratio, excess M1 balances 
(real M1 less an estimated demand for money),  M2 over reserves ratio, bank deposits, exports, imports, terms of 
trade, real exchange rate, reserves, real interest rate differential (country vs US or Germany, depending on 
whether the currency was pegged against USD or Deutsche Mark), output (usually the industrial production), 
stock returns (global indices for EM), consolidated public-sector deficit as a share of GDP. 
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following two years. They analyzed a wide set of variables, covering different areas, in order 
to select the indicators that proved to be the best in predicting currency crises. They selected 
the same sixteen indicators used in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
87
. The indicators that 
proved to be successful in anticipating a currency crisis are the behavior of international re-
serves, the real exchange rate, the domestic credit, the public sector debt and the inflation. 
Other indicators that proved to have limited predictive power are trade balance, export, money 
growth, real GDP growth and fiscal balance
88
. Berg and Pattillo (1999) is an evolution of 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). They compared the KLR leading indicators ap-
proach with a probit-based model of currency crisis prediction in order to understand which 
model would perform better in 1996 in the prediction of Asian crisis. They used the same var-
iables of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). First of all, they implemented the KLR ap-
proach, computing the noise-to-signal ratios
89
. Secondly, they apply a probit regression tech-
nique to the same data and crisis.  The probit model reproduces most of the KLR conclusions 
over the variables that are significant predictors of crisis. In particular, both the approaches 
show that the probability of a currency crisis increases when the real exchange rate is over-
valued relative to the trend, reserve and export growth are low and the growth of money sup-
ply is high. Their analysis adds also large current account deficit and a high ratio of M2 to re-
serves. About the effectiveness in predicting the crisis, both models performed well. Howev-
er, probit model provides slightly better forecast. Another important development on the pre-
diction of currency crises is the work of Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin (2003). They devel-
oped trading strategies in which an investor goes long or short in the currency depending on 
whether crash probabilities are low or high in order to test a currency crisis predictive logit 
model. They used data on thirty-two developing countries from January 1985 to October 
1999, considering a wide set of global and country-specific macroeconomic and financial var-
iables
90
. They found that logit forecasting models have significant explanatory power when 
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 The areas covered are: capital and current account, debt profile, international variables, financial variables, fi-
nancial liberalization variables, real sector, fiscal variables, institutional and political factors. For the sixteen var-
iables selected see Note 86. 
88
 For example, negative factors are real exchange rate over-valuation, sharp domestic credit growth, large cur-
rent account deficits, etc.. 
89
 Ratio of false signals, measured as a proportion of months in which false signals could have been issued (see 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart [1998]). 
90
 The variables considered are: foreign exchange reserves (12-month percentage change and as a ratio to im-
ports), real GDP growth, real exchange rate, exports, budget balance  over GDP ratio, dummy variable for high 
inflation regimes (unity if the percentage change in the level of the CPI over the last 2 months exceeds an annu-
alized rate of 100%), FDI, portfolio investment , dummy for capital account liberalization (unity if liberalized), 
the ratio of official foreign debt to private foreign debt, dummies for currency crashes contagion effect (the first 
dummy takes unity if a country in the same region has experienced a currency crash in the last 3 months, the 
second one takes unity if a country export growth is closely correlated with the country experiencing a crisis ex-
perienced  a crash in the last 3 months), a proxy for the external financial environment (global liquidity indica-
tor), nonfuel commodity prices, a linear time trend and lagged monthly changes in the exchange rate (to catch 
momentum and overreaction to currency crisis). 
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estimated on two thirds of the sample and then used to predict crashes in the remaining third. 
The trading strategies proved to be successful. Consistently with the previous literature, the 
most important explanatory variables are the decrease in foreign exchange reserves, the cur-
rent account balance worsening and weakening real activity. Moreover, contagion seems to 
play an important role in explaining the insurgence of a currency crash, both considering the 
regional factor and the export growth correlations. The last important contributions are the 
ones of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and Laeven and Valencia (2008), updated by Laeven 
and Valencia (2012). In particular, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) showed that developing 
countries are more prone to default than developed countries. Moreover, sovereign defaults 
tend to occur in waves generally spaced some decades apart. Finally, I already quoted some of 
the conclusions of Laeven and Valencia (2008). This work is the base for the construction of 
the IMF Systemic Banking Crises Database. They considered banking, currency and sover-
eign crises. From 1970 to 2011, they found 147 banking crises, 218 currency crises, 66 sover-
eign crises, with 28 cases of currency-banking twin crises, 11 of banking-sovereign twin cri-
ses, 29 of currency-sovereign twin crises and 8 of triple crises. Alongside the definitions of 
the different type of crises and the analysis of initial conditions, they provide an estimation of 
fiscal costs and real effects of banking crisis. In particular, fiscal costs, net of recoveries, are 
quite high, with an average of 13.30 percent of GDP and a maximum 55.1 percent of GDP. 
Recoveries of fiscal aids vary widely across countries. The output losses, measured as devia-
tions from trend GDP, due to systemic banking crises is about 20.00 percent of GDP on aver-
age during the first four years, with a maximum of 98.00 percent of GDP. This results show 
the level of danger of systemic banking crisis, that can represent disruptive events for inves-
tors. Their tendency to arise together with currency crises, increase the scope of non-transfer 
risk assessment. 
4.2 The Country Risk Indicator Structure 
The idea of using macroeconomic variables in allocation strategy is not a new concept. It 
constitutes the base of the strategic asset allocation. Following Eychenne, Martinetti and Ron-
calli (2011), strategic asset allocation requires long-term assumptions over asset risk and re-
turn characteristics as a key input, alongside macroeconomic models and forecasts of structur-
al factors depending on the type of asset class
91
. This concept was extended to Risk Budgeting 
Approach, with the macroeconomic variables as the fundamental determinants of the risk 
budgets. For example, Bruder and Roncalli (2012), quoting Bruder, Hereil and Roncalli 
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 Some of the macroeconomic fundamentals observed are population growth, productivity, inflation, potential 
output growth, public debt path. Of course, these structural factors impact the different asset classes in a different 
way, depending on the structure of the instrument and of the returns. 
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(2011), present a methodology to manage sovereign bond portfolios where the risk budget for 
each country is proportional to its Debt or GDP. They compared four indexation methodolo-
gy: debt weighting, fundamental indexation and risk-based indexation
92
. Bruder and Roncalli 
(2012) developed this issue, using the tools of the strategic asset allocation to design the risk 
budgets. The main limit of these procedures is that they focus only on a small set of macroe-
conomic variables. In the previous subparagraphs, I highlighted the importance of Country 
Risk Assessment procedure when dealing with developing countries. There is a great scope 
behind the evaluation of country risk. In particular, these countries are more prone to major 
crises than developed countries. These major crises can represent disruptive events for inves-
tors, carrying huge losses. Moreover, I showed that country risk is simply a broad aggregate, 
composed by different types of risk. Thus, it depends on a various set of factors and its evalu-
ation cannot be reduced to the analysis of public debt and GDP only. 
The aim of the Country Risk Indicator is to provide an homogeneous measure of individual 
country risk in order to compute the risk budgets on Frontier Market asset class. This tool 
tries to capture the different components of country risk and it is based on a set of various 
macroeconomic and financial variables. This indicator does not cover a complete Country 
Risk Assessment, but it maintains the same methodological procedure focusing on the main 
determinants of country risk. A complete Country Risk Assessment for the thirty-one Frontier 
Markets, over a period of ten years, will require a whole division of analysts and an incredible 
amount of resources. Moreover, the importance of subjective opinions in the evaluation of 
some aspects of country risk makes impossible the automatic computation of a quantitative 
measure useful to design the risk budgets. A deeper analysis of country risk should be con-
ducted in the implementation of actively managed strategies, with the subsequent possibility 
to force the outcomes of the Country Risk Indicator algorithm. In fact, I want to highlight that 
the Risk Budgeting Approach is generally a base for the construction of alternative bench-
marks or for the implementation of active management strategies. It does not ensure higher 
performance with respect to other methodologies in portfolio construction. For this reason, the 
introduction of subjective views should be performed month per month in the implementation 
of active strategies, improving the results of the automatic algorithm of the Country Risk In-
dicator. 
As above-mentioned, the Country Risk Indicator is a measure of individual country risk. I 
computed the indicator for the thirty-one Frontier Markets present in my investment universe 
                                                          
92
 In debt weighting, the weights are proportional to the country debt portion of whole countries’ debt. In funda-
mental indexation, the weights depend on the country GDP portion of the whole set of countries GDP. In risk-
based indexation, the risk budgets, and not the weights, are proportional to debt or GDP portion. 
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from February 2005 to January 2015, on a monthly base. The indicator varies between 0 and 
100 points (the higher the score the lower the risk) and it is given by the sum of three sub-
indicators: 
 the Economic Risk Indicator, with a maximum of 60 points; 
 the Liquidity Risk Indicator, with a maximum of 25 points; 
 the Political Risk Indicator, with a maximum of 15 points. 
The Economic Risk indicator tries to assess the macroeconomic and the sovereign risk. It 
is important to note that some macroeconomic factors (e.g., current account deficits) and sov-
ereign risk factors (e.g., government deficit) have an impact on non-transfer risk. The Liquidi-
ty Risk Indicator tries to capture the liquidity risk, especially related to the international li-
quidity, and the non-transfer risk, in particular from an exchange rate point of view. Note that 
the non-transfer risk assessment is present both in the Economic Risk and in the Liquidity 
Risk Indicator, with the evaluation of different aspects. The Political Risk Indicator tries to 
capture the political and institutional risk, with a specific section dedicated to serious turbu-
lence (e.g., civil war). About the weights assigned to Economic, Liquidity and Political Risk 
Indicator (60.00, 25.00 and 15.00 per cent), I followed financial markets practice and I evalu-
ated the reliability of the variables used to assess the different risks. In particular, the most 
important indicator is the Economic Risk Indicator. Academic literature demonstrated that 
macroeconomic variables tend to have no statistically significant effects on stock returns. 
However, the aim of Country Risk Indicator is not to forecast the markets that can potentially 
drive the highest returns. The indicator focuses on country risk and macroeconomic variables 
proved to be important in the prediction of major crises. In fact, country-specific economic 
framework is often a fundamental backdrop for the insurgence of these crises. Political and 
institutional risk is relatively important in Country Risk Assessment, due to the potential dis-
ruptive effects of negative shocks generated by this class of risk. However, I assigned a low 
weight to Political Risk Indicator because in the assessment of political and institutional risk, 
subjective evaluations and interpretations are fundamental. Subjective opinions cannot be tak-
en into account in an automatic algorithm used for the computation of a quantitative measure 
of country risk. Thus, the reliability of the political risk measure significantly reduces when 
subjective interpretations are avoided. 
The main limit of the Country Risk Indicator is the determination of the weights assigned 
to the single components. Unfortunately, they are mainly base on subjective evaluations, fol-
lowing, when it was possible, the theory and financial market practice. An econometric model 
able to produce more reliable weights is a necessary development for the future works. I can-
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not apply such a model, given the limited number of observations. As I will explain later, 
even an in-sample and out-of-sample analysis cannot be performed. Thus, if I want to test the 
significance of macroeconomic and financial variables preserving the investment period, I had 
to conduct a cross-country analysis from 2000 to 2004. At the time, I had only five countries 
and the cross-country model produced statistically significant coefficients only for the ex-
change rate and oil prices. This is consistent with the literature I presented above on the rela-
tion between stock returns and macroeconomic variables. However, in a Country Risk As-
sessment I had to consider other variables able to forecast major crises that are not captured 
by stock market returns in normal time. Conclusions are unchanged even introducing dummy 
variables for asset volatility and returns (e.g., increase in volatility, decrease in return) and for 
the various macroeconomic and financial variables (e.g., GDP growth above or below a spe-
cific threshold). In my opinion, future works could focus on the determination of Country 
Risk Indicator weights, thanks to longer time series and a greater availability of data. 
One might ask why I decided to compute a new risk indicator to design the risk budgets 
when there are several measures proposed by various institutions. The main reason is that I 
want to provide an indicator of country risk using only freely available data. In this way, any 
investor can compute its own indicator without investing resources for the access to costly da-
tabase and services. For this reason, I excluded the indicator proposed by the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit and the PRS Group
93
. Between other diffused risk measures, the sovereign rat-
ings issued by Credit Rating Agencies are freely available. However, as above-mentioned, 
this country risk measure focuses mainly on sovereign risk. I have already explained that 
country risk is composed by several components and sovereign risk is only one aspect. Even 
if behind sovereign ratings there is a complete Country Risk Assessment, the access to the pa-
pers is costly and they are not available for the whole investment period (i.e., 120 months). In 
addition to that, sovereign ratings issued by Credit Rating Agencies present several limits, 
that I have already discussed in the previous subparagraph. 
Finally, I want to present the common principles behind the choice of the set of variables 
used for the computation of the Country Risk Indicator. I have already mentioned one of this 
principle: the macroeconomic and financial variables have to be freely available
94
. Secondly, 
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 These services are too costly for non-professionals like me (in most of the cases more than € 3,000). EIU 
country risk indicator is available on Datastream only for a set of Frontier Markets. Moreover, it’s present the 
broad aggregate, without the decomposition between the different type of risk. For these reasons, I decided to 
exclude it.  
94
 For example, following this principle, I used the expectations on some macroeconomic variables provided by 
the IMF in its World Economic Outlook databases or in its International Financial Statistic database. 
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the variables have to be disposable for the whole set of Frontier Markets and for the whole in-
vestment period, excluding some exceptional cases
95
. The most important cases are: 
 Foreign Exchange Reserves: in this case there are some missing during the invest-
ment period, but they never exceed the 10.00 per cent of the observations; 
 Zimbabwe hyperinflation and currency crisis (2008-2009): it was not possible to re-
trieve estimations over some key variables, such as Real GDP Growth, Inflation, 
exchange rate; 
 Ukraine (2014): Ukrainian civil war is the cause of the absence of some key varia-
bles; 
The impact of these exceptional cases is limited. About Foreign Exchange Reserves, I will 
explain in Subparagraph 4.2.2 how I solved the problem of missing through their replacement 
with a coherent expectation. About Zimbabwe, MSCI Zimbabwe was launched later in 2010. 
Thus, the missing relative to Zimbabwe didn’t influence the portfolio allocation. Finally, also 
in the Ukraine case, the missing didn’t influence the portfolio allocation. In fact, if there is the 
presence of a serious conflict involving one country belonging to the investment universe, the 
risk budget is set automatically equal to 0.00 per cent. Finally, the most important principle: 
the variables had to be available when the investor had to make its investment choice. As 
mentioned in Section 1, I took the point of view of an investor that wanted to invest in Fron-
tier Markets in February 2005. In the Country Risk Assessment, I cannot take an ex-post point 
of view, using the information available today. I had to conduct the country risk evaluation as 
an investor could do at the time in which the investment choice was made
96
. This strictly re-
duces the set of variables that can be used. For these countries, good sets of information are 
available only after 2013. Someone could argue that an in- and out-of-sample analysis would 
help to solve this point. However, given the limited number of observations for the return 
time series and the will to maintain a minimum diversification in subsequent portfolio alloca-
tion, makes impossible this methodology. 
In the following subparagraphs, I present the structure of the Economic, the Liquidity and 
the Political Risk Indicator. For a detailed presentation of the points assigned to each variable, 
please refer  to Appendix C, where I provide the tables with detailed specific case for each 
variable. 
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 An example is the choice to use government overall balance instead of primary balance in the assessment of 
sovereign risk. 
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 It is difficult to explain this point. An example is referred to Real GDP Growth. In 2005 I cannot use for the 
allocation process the Real GDP Growth of  2005. Now, in 2014, I know that data, but in February 2005 It was 
not available. Thus, I had to use the expectations on 2005 Real GDP Growth provided in the IMF WEO 2004 
and 2005 databases. 
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4.2.1 The Economic Risk Indicator 
The Economic Risk Indicator tries to assess the macroeconomic risk and the sovereign 
risk. It partially assesses the non-transfer risk, through the inclusion of current account bal-
ance and export structure evaluation. The indicator is given by the sum of: 
 GDP Indicator (15 points); 
 Inflation Indicator (5 points); 
 Current Account Balance Indicator (5 points); 
 Export Indicator (10 points); 
 Government Finance Indicator (25 points). 
The indicator presents a stable part and a sensitive part. The stable part is given by GDP 
Indicator, Inflation Indicator, Current Account Balance Indicator and Government Finance 
Indicator. The stability comes from the fact that the variables at the base of these indicators do 
not vary every month. The Export Indicator represents the sensitive part. It varies every 
month, since it is based on commodity prices. For the evaluation of the Economic Risk Indi-
cator, I used, when it is possible, the data provided by the IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO)
97
. IMF provides expectations also in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) sec-
tion. However, expectations are available only for some countries and only from 2015. IMF 
WEO section included also the older databases, up to 1999. In this way, I can retrieve the ex-
pectations that an investor could observe in the past years. 
The reference variable for the Real GDP Indicator is the Real GDP Growth. This variable 
is fundamental in assessing macroeconomic risk, since it represents a signal of economic sta-
bility. Moreover, it is an important component of sovereign risk. In fact, government revenues 
and the sustainability of the debt strictly depends on economic growth. It is also connected to 
non-transfer risk, since economic recession could accelerate the insurgence of currency and 
banking crises. I used the expectations on Real GDP growth provided by the IMF in the WEO 
databases. World Economic Outlook papers are usually issued every April and October, thus 
their estimations are available for May and November. Using the most recent available expec-
tations, for the first six months of the year I considered the expected Real GDP Growth for 
that year, while for the second half I considered an average between the Real GDP Growth for 
that year and the Real GDP Growth for the next year. In this way, I can take into account rel-
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 World Economic Outlook databases are available in Data section of the IMF website: www.imf.org. 
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evant future expectations in asset allocation, as financial market practice suggests
98
. Real 
GDP Growth is examined under two aspects: 
 the magnitude of the expected Real GDP Growth; 
 the difference between the value of expected Real GDP Growth and the average of 
the Real GDP Growth of the previous two years. 
The second component has the objective to detect signals of potentially upcoming down-
turn. However, it has also the objective to detect signals of economic recovery, with the con-
sequent potential stock market upturn from the depressed quotations that usually characterized 
the recession phase. In this way, I can anticipate the choice to enter in a market that presents 
high growth opportunities, alongside a potential reduction in risk. If Real GDP Growth were 
not available (i.e., missing), the value assigned is 0, since it is a signal of high instability
99
. 
Annualized inflation in percentage term is the core variable of the Inflation Indicator. I 
took the expectations from the IMF WEO databases and I used the same procedure adopted 
for the Real GDP Growth in the computation of inflation expectations. Inflation is a base for 
the assessment of macroeconomic risk, being a relevant signal of economic stability. It is also 
relevant for non-transfer risk, since high inflation is a signal of currency depreciation. Finally, 
it is connected to sovereign risk, as it enters in the computation of the real interest rate. I ana-
lyzed the value of expected inflation and there are two relevant extreme cases. I assigned 0 
value to the indicator in presence of extreme negative events, such as hyperinflation (more 
than 25.00 per cent) and deflation. The maximum was assigned in presence of stable prices. 
Price stability concept is broadened with respect to developed countries, with less strict 
thresholds. Again, to the missing I assigned a value of 0. 
The reference variable for the Current Account Indicator is the current account balance as 
percentage of GDP. Current account balance is fundamental in the assessment of non-transfer 
risk. In fact, strong current account deficits are early signals of a currency crisis. It is also re-
lated to economic stability. I took the expectations from the IMF WEO databases and I used 
the same procedure adopted for the Real GDP Growth and inflation in the computation of my 
current account balance expectations. I examined current account balance under two aspects: 
 the current value of the expected current account balance; 
 the difference between the value of expected current account balance and the aver-
age of the current account balance of the previous two years. 
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 A simple example to explain this point is the one of a top-down investor that has to allocate its wealth in De-
cember 2005. This investor will not look only at the Real GDP Growth expected for 2005, but he will take into 
account especially the Real GDP Growth of 2006. 
99
 I have already mentioned the currency crisis in Zimbabwe and the civil war in Ukraine. 
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The second aspect is much more important and takes into account the dynamic of the cur-
rent account balance, in order to identify potential threats coming from a quick worsening of 
the economic framework. As in the previous cases, to the missing I assigned a value of 0. 
The Export Indicator represents the sensitive portion of the Economic Risk Indicator, vary-
ing each month. The majority of the Frontier Markets are commodity exporters. Thus, their 
revenues strictly depends on international commodity prices. This indicator tries to capture 
the risk associated to the fluctuations of commodity prices. This risk threats economic growth, 
government revenues and current account balance position, representing a source of macroe-
conomic, sovereign and non-transfer risk. I used three commodity indices provided by the 
IMF with a monthly frequency: the Commodity Fuel (energy) Index, the Commodity Food 
and Beverage Price Index and the Commodity Metals Price Index
100
. I took annual data on 
exports from the World Trade Organization, computing the portion of agricultural and fuel 
and metal exports on the country’s total export101. About fuel and metal exports, I divided the 
countries in three different class (fuel exporters, metal exporters and fuel and metal exporters) 
in order to select the right Commodity index to use
102
. The thresholds used in the evaluation 
of negative and positive monthly variations in commodity prices become tighter the higher 
the portion of commodities on total exports. In fact, if the incidence of commodities on coun-
try’s revenues is high, even small changes in prices can affect significantly the revenues and, 
consequently, the economic framework
103
. 
The Government Finance Indicator tries to assess sovereign risk. Of course, the assessment 
refers to the ability to pay, since the assessment of the willingness to pay requires qualitative 
and subjective considerations. I used two variables for the assessment of this important risk: 
 the general government overall balance as percentage of GDP; 
 the general government gross debt as percentage of GDP. 
In order to maintain the same source, I downloaded the data from the IMF WEO databases. 
However, government overall balance and gross debt data were completed in the April 2010 
IMF WEO database. Thus, the expectations were not available till May 2010. In the assess-
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 They are available in Research section of the IMF website: www.imf.org. 
101
 The data are available in the World Trade Organization website: www.wto.org. 
102
 For fuel and metal exporters, I used a combination between Commodity Fuel (energy) Index and Commodity 
Metals Price Index. 
103
 For example if the percentage of agricultural export is between 10.00 and 25.00 per cent the minimum and 
maximum thresholds for commodity price variations are -10.00 and +10.00 per cent. If the percentage is above 
50.00 per cent, the minimum and maximum thresholds for commodity price variations are -3.00 and +3.00 per 
cent. 
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ment of sovereign risk, I used the data of the previous year with a lag of six months
104
. In the 
selection of these variables, the above-mentioned principles played a central role. First of all, 
in assessing sovereign risk, primary balance is more efficient than overall government bal-
ance. However, for the majority of the countries included in the investment universe, primary 
balance data are not available. Even the more complete IMF IFS database does not cover all 
countries. Other important variables are the debt service and the interest rate spread on gov-
ernment bonds. In particular, the last variable could be useful in the assessment of the liquidi-
ty risk related to the roll-over of the debt. However, both the IMF IFS database and 
Datastream do not provide these data for a consistent number of countries. About public debt 
analysis, other useful variables are the net debt and the external debt. In particular, external 
debt is fundamental in the combined assessment of sovereign and non-transfer risk. There is a 
common opinion that external debt is much more important in the assessment of sovereign 
risk, since sovereign debt crisis are driven mainly by foreign investors’ actions rather than 
domestic investors’ ones. However, these variables were available only for a small number of 
countries in the IMF IFS database without significant missing. Alternatively, there are non-
free databases that provide them. For these reasons I have to exclude them. The general gov-
ernment overall balance and gross debt are analyzed under two aspects: 
 the value of the overall balance and the gross debt; 
 the difference between the value of the overall balance and the gross debt and the 
average of the overall balance and the gross debt of the previous two years. 
The first component tries to capture the risk associated to risky level of public deficit and 
debt. For general government overall balance the important threshold is -5.00 per cent of 
GDP. For the general government gross debt is 90.00 per cent of GDP. I didn’t select this 
threshold following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). I chose 90.00 per cent because it is close to 
the psychological barrier of 100.00 per cent and above this threshold the risk of capital flight 
from the country in adverse economic framework increases substantially. I gave more im-
portance to the second component. In both cases, it tries to capture the dynamic of public bal-
ance and debt, in order to understand if the path is sustainable. 
4.2.2 The Liquidity Risk Indicator 
The Liquidity Risk Indicator tries to capture the liquidity risk and the non-transfer risk. I 
have already highlighted the importance of these two risks and the high scope for their as-
sessment. The combination of illiquidity and currency crisis represents serious threats for the 
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 After six months (June), data on government balance and debt position of the previous year can be considered 
enough precise and they don’t represent an estimate. 
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investment and they are the base of systemic banking crises. Currency crises and systemic 
banking crises, combined with the impossibility to close the position, can carry huge losses 
for the investors. The indicator is the sum of two sub-indicators: 
 the International Liquidity Indicator, common for all Frontier Markets (15 points); 
 the Foreign Exchange Reserve Indicator (10 pints). 
I assigned an higher weight to the international liquidity indicator. Total reserves present 
some missing values and the confidence over the estimations is not complete. I conducted the 
assessment of the liquidity risk taking an international point of view. International liquidity 
conditions significantly affect the investment in the more risky assets. In particular, they af-
fect the capital flows towards Emerging and Frontier Markets . Restrictive monetary policies 
in developed countries are usually associated to capital outflows from emerging economies
105
. 
Massive capital outflows usually generate currency and financial crisis, leading in some cases 
to a sovereign default too. I used Federal Reserve Policy Rate as a proxy for international li-
quidity. First of all, Federal Reserve monetary policy is a relevant variable in financial market 
agents’ choices106. It affects liquidity conditions in the biggest financial market and it influ-
ences the performance of US Dollar, that still remains the most important currency in interna-
tional transactions. Moreover, it affects massively the exchange rate of the currencies pegged 
to the USD. Between the Frontier Markets, fourteen countries on thirty-one present a currency 
pegged against USD. I decided to don’t use a proxy of world money supply (given by the sum 
of Fed, ECB, BoE, BoJ and PBOC money supply), because in the last 15 years is always in-
creasing. I downloaded Federal Reserve Policy Rate at monthly frequency
107
. I analyzed this 
proxy of the international liquidity under various aspects: 
 the difference between the current policy rate and the 6-month moving average; 
 the difference between the current policy rate and the previous month policy rate; 
 the number of consecutive months with an increase in the policy rate. 
I performed this evaluations considering also the level of the policy rate. In particular, 
when the policy rate exceeds the 2.00 per cent threshold, I assigned 0 value to the indicator. 
Especially during the dot-com bubble and the subprime crisis, this is a psychological barrier 
that signals the attempts to fight against a potential speculative bubble. In order to reduce the 
impact on the investment choices of the high variability of this indicator, the final value as-
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 An example is the sovereign default wave that hit Latin America during the ‘80s. I briefly presented this crisis 
in the Subparagraph 4.1.2. 
106
 Think for example to the capital outflows that hit Emerging and Frontier stock markets when the Federal Re-
serve announced the Tapering during the 2014. 
107
 The time series of Federal Reserve Policy Rate can be found at the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System website: www.federalreserve.gov. 
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signed to the indicator is the 6-month moving average of the initial values computed. The first 
and the third indicator are particularly important in order to capture the objective of monetary 
policy. For example, two or three months of consecutive increases in policy rate can be 
viewed as important signals of a reinforcement of restrictive monetary policy. 
The Foreign Exchange Reserve Indicator tries to assess the non-transfer risk. It can assess 
both the risk de facto and the risk de jure. First of all, with large capital outflows and the drop 
in foreign exchange reserves, the probability of the introduction of capital controls significant-
ly increases. Secondly, large foreign exchange reserves decreases are usually associated to 
depreciation in the exchange rate and they represent early signals of a currency crisis. The 
variable used is the country-specific total reserves in US Dollar, given by the sum of FX re-
serves, gold reserves and the reserve position at the IMF
108
. Other fundamental variables are 
capital flows and the exchange rate. However, it is very difficult to find capital flow data for 
the countries included in my investment universe. About the exchange rate, the main concern 
arises for pegged exchange rates. For them, it’s particularly difficult to forecast large depreci-
ation looking at the value of the exchange rate, that remains stable until a currency crisis oc-
curs. However, one of the objective of the Country Risk Indicator is to anticipate the insur-
gence of a currency crisis. For this reason, total reserves can capture both capital flows and 
exchange rate movements. I downloaded the data from the IMF IFS database. I replaced the 
missing values in two ways: 
 if the data on total reserves were available in World Bank database, I replaced the 
missing with the value provided by the World Bank
109
; 
 if no data on total reserves were available in World Bank database, I replaced the 
missing with an estimated value
110
. 
I detected seasonality in total reserves time series for almost all countries. For this reason, I 
implemented the X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment program of the U.S. Census Bureau (see  
Findley et al. [1998]). Total reserves are analyzed under three points of view: 
 the difference between the total reserves value and the 12-month moving average; 
 the difference between the total reserves value and the previous month value; 
 the number of consecutive months with a decrease in total reserves. 
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 The value of gold reserves is obtained multiplying the monthly quantity in ounce provided by the IMF IFS 
database with the monthly price of gold (3.00 PM, London Bullion Market). 
109
 Total reserves data are available at the following website: data.worldbank.org .  
110
 First of all, I estimate the FX reserve value using the sensitivity to exchange rate variation. Secondly, I main-
tain unchanged the quantity in ounce of gold reserves (gold reserves in quantity tend to be stable over time and 
changes were always reported). Finally, I assigned the same rate of variation in FX reserve to the IMF reserve 
position. 
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As in the previous case, the most important indicators are the first and the third. Total re-
serves significantly below the 12-month moving average are an early signal of currency crisis. 
Moreover, as suggested in the literature, it is one of the most powerful predictor of currency 
crisis.  The number of consecutive months with a decrease in total reserves is a signal of mas-
sive capital flows and an early signal of a potential currency crisis. In general, total reserves 
below, even if not significantly, the 12-month moving average are a signal of potential cur-
rency depreciation. Finally, I assigned the maximum number of points to the countries be-
longing to the Euro Area, since they do not carry exchange rate risk. 
4.2.3 The Political Risk Indicator 
The Political Risk Indicator tries to capture the political and institutional risk. As above-
mentioned, the assessment of political and institutional risk requires qualitative interpretations 
of political and institutional factors. It’s extremely difficult to quantify the risk associated to 
these factors. The automatic computation of the Country Risk Indicator does not allow quali-
tative interpretations. For this reason, I assigned a relative low weight to the Political Risk In-
dicator. Moreover, I decided to use an index computed by a third entity that captures relevant 
country’s political and institutional characteristics. I used a personal scale only for the social 
conflicts and war component. The indicator is divided in two main components: 
 the War Risk Indicator (5 points); 
 the Political and Institutional Risk Indicator (10 points). 
The War Risk Indicator tries to capture the risks coming from riots, social conflicts, civil 
wars and wars. The scope for the assessment of this risk is high, since these turbulences are 
disruptive events for foreign investors
111
. I created a scale to assign a score increasing with 
the importance of the conflict. The value of this score varies from 0 to 5
112
. On the basis of 
this scale, I designed the War Risk Indicator. If the conflict is particularly severe, I assigned a 
0 value to the indicator. 
In the computation of Political and Institutional Risk Indicator, I used the State Fragility 
Index provided by the Centre of Systemic Peace. The State Fragility Index is a quantitative 
indicator that tries to evaluate the stability of a country. It includes the evaluation of  political, 
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 The most recent case is the Ukrainian civil war. From the beginning of the civil war to January 2015 (i.e., less 
than one year), MSCI Ukraine index in EUR lost the 43.49 per cent of its value.   
112
 The score assigned are the following: 0 (no conflicts), 1 (riots), 2 (social conflicts), 3 (civil war), 4 (serious 
civil war or war against a foreign state outside country territory), 5 (civil war with the involvement of a foreign 
state or war against a foreign state on country territory). 
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social and institutional factors
113
. It is based on the effectiveness and the legitimacy of four 
performance dimensions (Security, Political, Economic and Social) and ranges from 0 (no 
fragility) to 25 (extreme fragility). The relevant thresholds used in the computation of Politi-
cal and Institutional Risk Indicator are the same provided by the Centre of Systemic Peace
114
. 
4.3 The Country Risk Indicator Analysis 
In this paragraph, I provide a quick analysis of the outcomes of Country Risk Indicator 
computation. Over the 120-month investment period, the geographical area that presents the 
highest average rating is the Middle-East, with a value close to 63.30. The good performance 
is driven especially by the Foreign Exchange Reserve Indicator. These countries are for the 
major part oil exporters and their total reserves increase significantly in the last years. This is 
consistent with the already discussed appreciation of the exchange rate
115
. In the middle part, 
they also benefit from a boost in oil prices during the 2008 Financial Crisis. On the other side, 
the average indicator decreased during the 2014, when the oil prices drop. Good performance 
of Foreign Exchange Reserve Indicator explains also the high average rating of European 
Frontier Markets, due to the presence of Eurozone countries. The value of 61.20 is close to the 
one of Latin America, at  61.00. Latin American value is mainly due to the good rating as-
signed to Trinidad and Tobago. Argentina and Jamaica present high variability, due to the 
sovereign defaults that characterized the performance of these countries in the last ten years. 
The lowest average values are the ones of Africa and Asia, with 59.30 and 57.50 respectively. 
However, African countries’ ratings present high variability, with a big difference between 
the minimum and the maximum. For example, for more than three years, Zimbabwe had the 
lowest rating, due to the currency crisis that hit the country. The following figures present the 
time series of the average Country Risk Indicator by geographical area, with the dot-lines rep-
resenting the minimum and the maximum Country Risk Indicator in that geographical area. I 
present both the overall indicator and the long-term indicator. The long-term indicator is the 
overall indicator minus the sensitive part, represented by the Export Indicator and the Liquidi-
ty Indicator. 
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 For an extensive presentation of the State Fragility Index, please visit the following website at the Analysis 
section: www.systemicpeace.org. 
114
 The thresholds are: 0-3 (very low fragility), 4-7 (low fragility), 8-11 (medium fragility), 12-15 (medium high 
fragility), 16-19 (high fragility), 20-25 (very high fragility). 
115
 See the Subparagraph 3.2.2. 
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Figure 11 – Latin America Average Country Risk Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 – Europe Average Country Risk Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 – Africa Average Country Risk Indicator 
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Figure 14 – Middle East Average Country Risk Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 – Asia Average Country Risk Indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One important thing to note is that the long-term version of the Country Risk Indicator 
tend to react slowly to negative shocks, such as the 2008 Financial Crisis. This confirmed the 
positive feature of the inclusion of a sensitive portion. Moreover, without the Liquidity and 
the Export Indicator, Middle East countries present a rating very close to Europe and Latin 
America, with an average value of 41.00. Europe, with the exclusion of the Liquidity Indica-
tor, presents an average rating lower than Latin America (40.00 and 41.00 respectively). This 
confirms the above conclusions that Europe and Middle East ratings are in some way inflated 
by the Liquidity Risk Indicator. 
Europe, Africa and Asia Country Risk Indicators exhibit the highest heterogeneity, with 
important differences between the minimum and the maximum. For Africa, this variability 
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slightly decrease after the 2008 Financial Crises. This is due to the jump of Zimbabwe, i.e. the 
country with the lowest Country Risk Indicator. This country was in a deep hyperinflation pe-
riod, with a subsequent currency crises. This crisis was solved only in 2009. Looking at Eu-
rope, the high variability of the last months is given by the drop of the Ukraine Country Risk 
Indicator, following the start of the civil war. 
Looking at the trend, in the last years African and Asian countries show the strongest posi-
tive trend. If we consider the last 12 months, African countries present an average rating close 
to Middle East countries, at 65.30 and 65.80 respectively. Asian countries reduced significant-
ly the distance and overcome Latin American countries, with average ratings of 64.30 and 
64.10 respectively. In the meanwhile, Europe lagged behind, with the lowest average rating at 
63.40. The European Sovereign Debt Crises and the recent turbulence in Ukraine depressed 
significantly the average Country Risk Indicator for this geographical area. 
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5 Portfolio Analysis 
In this Section, I apply the Risk Budgeting Approach to construct internationally diversi-
fied portfolios. A portion of these portfolios is invested in the Frontier Market asset class. As 
presented in Section 2, the inputs for the implementation of Risk Budgeting Approach are the 
risk measure and the risk budgets. In this thesis, I focus on volatility risk measure
116
. Thus, 
one of the input for the risk budgeting algorithm is the variance-covariance matrix. About the 
second input, I present how to use the Country Risk Indicator for the determination of the risk 
budgets. In general, the lower the country risk, and the higher the risk budget I assigned to a 
particular Frontier Market is. I applied this methodology only to Frontier Markets. In my in-
vestment universe, only Frontier Market asset class includes stand-alone country indices. De-
veloped and Emerging Markets are broad aggregate of different and very heterogeneous coun-
tries, making impossible the computation of the Country Risk Indicator. 
The investment period is 120 months, from February 2005 to January 2015. I included 
MSCI indices as soon as their variance-covariance matrix estimation became available. Thus, 
the investment universe varied during the ten years considered. I constructed four different 
portfolios, with a maximum risk exposure to Frontier Markets of 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 
per cent
117
. However, the monthly risk budget assigned to the Frontier Market asset class var-
ied during the investment period and it was not always equal to the maximum exposure. As I 
will show later, this risk exposure depends on international liquidity condition and the average 
risk perceived in Frontier Markets. Alongside risk budgeting portfolios, I used the Markowitz 
model to construct portfolios with a weight exposure of 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent 
on Frontier Market asset class. Between the efficient allocations, I selected the most diffused 
ones, i.e. the Global Minimum Variance and the Maximum Sharpe portfolio. Then, I com-
pared the risk budgeting portfolios with the portfolios obtained with the mean-variance opti-
mization. For the comparison, I analyzed a wide set of basic characteristics and performance 
measures. I analyzed also portfolio composition, asset risk contribution, turnover, value at risk 
for the last year and tracking errors
118
. 
In the first paragraph, I present the computation of the inputs of the Risk Budgeting Ap-
proach (variance-covariance matrix and risk budgets) and Markowitz model (variance-
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 In Section 2, I showed that volatility risk measure is not the only measure that we can use. In a Gaussian 
world, also Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall are coherent risk measure. Further development of this thesis 
can include different risk measures. 
117
 As I will show later, the portfolios have different inception dates, based on the number of Frontier Markets 
available. 
118
 I performed Tracking Error analysis on the basis of a GDP-weighted portfolio of Developed Markets.  
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covariance matrix and expected returns). I will briefly present also the constrained imposed to 
the mean-variance optimizer. In the second paragraph, I analyze and compare the portfolios 
obtained through the Risk Budgeting Approach and the Markowitz model. Appendix D pre-
sents the equations of the various performance measures used in this Section. 
5.1 The Inputs of Risk Budgeting Approach and Markowitz Model 
In order to provide the optimal allocation, the risk budgeting and the mean-variance opti-
mization algorithms require two inputs. For the Risk Budgeting Approach these inputs are the 
risk measure and the risk budgets. For the Markowitz model, the inputs are the variance-
covariance matrix and the expected returns. As above-mentioned, in this thesis I focused on 
volatility risk measure. Thus, the risk budgeting and the mean-variance optimization algo-
rithm share one input (i.e., the variance-covariance matrix), while the second input is different 
on the basis of the approach implemented (i.e., the risk budgets and the expected returns re-
spectively). 
5.1.1 The Estimation of the Variance-Covariance Matrix and the Expected Returns 
There are several ways to estimate the asset returns and the variance-covariance matrix. 
The most common approach in financial market practice are: 
 sample estimators of mean and variance, including rolling method; 
 exponential smoothing method; 
 financial economic models, especially equilibrium models (e.g., CAPM, APT); 
 econometric models (e.g., VARMA+GARCH); 
 financial mathematic models (e.g., option pricing based models, stochastic volatili-
ty models). 
Academic literature tried to answer to the question on which methodology provide the best 
and the most profitable estimation of returns and variance-covariance matrix. However, there 
is a broad consensus only on the inefficiency of sample estimators
119
. Most of the methodolo-
gies listed above were proposed to overcome the limit of the sample estimators. In particular, 
they tried to reduce the estimation error and its impact on the mean-variance optimization, 
that seriously affects the resulting allocation. However, the most diffused methodologies for 
the estimation of the inputs are the rolling method, the exponential weighted moving average 
(EWMA) and the equilibrium models. In some cases, we can have the combination of differ-
                                                          
119
 I have already presented in Section 2 the criticism of Michaud (1989) and the solutions proposed by this work 
and Black and Litterman (1991). 
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ent approaches (e.g., equilibrium returns and EWMA variance-covariance matrix). Following 
Bruder and Roncalli (2012), other diffused approaches are: 
 regularization of the objective function through resampling techniques (Tütüncü 
and Koenig [2004]); 
 regularization of the covariance matrix, such as factor analysis (Hyvärinen and Oja 
[2000]), shrinkage methods (Ledoit and Wolf [2003]) and random matrix theory 
(Laloux et al. [1999]); 
 regularization of the program specification by introducing some constraints on 
weights
120
. 
Only in the recent years, financial mathematic and econometric model increased there dif-
fusion in the estimation of expected returns and variance-covariance matrix
121
. 
The implementation of the best and the most profitable way to estimate the risk measure 
and the inputs of the Markowitz model is outside of the objectives of this thesis. For this rea-
son, I decided to estimate the expected returns and the variance-covariance matrix through the 
most diffused and classical methodologies. In particular, I used a 60-month rolling estimation 
and a 12-month exponential weighted moving average. About the rolling methodology, the 
relevant element to choose is the size of the evaluation window. Generally, it depends on the 
sample size and on the number of the assets for which I have to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix. Sample estimator produces inconsistent result when the number of assets is 
greater than the elements of the return time series used to estimate the expected returns and 
variance-covariance matrix
122
. For this reason, the size of the rolling window has to be at least 
equal to the number of assets for which I want to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. As 
presented in Section 3, there are thirty-five assets in my investment universe. Thus, I chose a 
rolling window of sixty months, that is quite diffused in financial market practice. The draw-
back of this choice is that I require an initialization period of five years for each asset, in order 
to estimate the expected returns and the variance-covariance matrix. In this way, I cannot in-
vest in the asset as soon as it is available, but I need to wait for five years. Given the short 
length of the time series, this procedure strictly reduces the investment opportunities in Fron-
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 This is the most diffused procedure in financial market practice to obtain satisfactory solution. Moreover, 
Jagannathan and Ma (2003) show that this procedure is equivalent to shrink the covariance matrix. 
121
 Before, these models were diffused in financial market practice in different areas. In particular, financial 
mathematic models were diffused mainly in derivative pricing, while econometric models were diffused in val-
ue-at-risk computation.  
122
 Ledoit and Wolf (2003) declared that when the number of stocks is larger than the number of historical re-
turns per stock, the sample covariance matrix is always singular, even if the true covariance matrix is known to 
be non-singular. 
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tier Markets
123
. For this reason, I used another methodology to estimate the inputs: the 12-
month exponential weighted moving average. The EWMA gives more weight to recent obser-
vations and produces more variable estimations
124
. The EWMA is characterized by two ele-
ments: the size of the initialization window and the factor lambda (i.e., the smoothing parame-
ter). In this case I lost only one year of observations. The aim of this procedure is to increase 
the investment opportunities reducing the number of observations lost for the initialization of 
the estimation methodology. Finally, I chose a lambda equal to 0.85. For monthly returns, JP 
Morgan suggests a lambda equal to 0.97 and this is quite common in financial market prac-
tice. However, the weight assigned to the last observation would be too small. For this reason, 
I reduced the value of lambda. 
Especially the rolling estimations present some limits. Mean-variance optimizer is not ro-
bust to inputs computed using the sample moments. For risk budgeting portfolios, this is not a 
serious concern. In fact, Bruder and Roncalli (2012) show that the Risk Budgeting Approach 
produces satisfactory allocation even using the sample estimator for the variance-covariance 
matrix. About this concern, the Markowitz model implemented in this thesis presents some 
constraints on weights (i.e., constrained mean-variance model). This is one of the solution 
mentioned above and frequently used by financial practitioners to obtain satisfactory asset al-
location. In this way, the concern about sample estimators is partially solved. In any case, fur-
ther development of this work could focus on estimation procedures able to reduce the estima-
tion errors. Even if the allocation obtained in this thesis will be satisfactory, the reduction of 
the estimation errors will improve the allocation process in any case. 
5.1.2 The Risk Budgets Computation 
The second input required by the Risk Budgeting Approach is the vector of risk budgets. In 
particular, I focus on the determination of the risk budgets assigned to Frontier Markets. As 
mentioned in Section 4, I used the Country Risk Indicator to design the risk budgets on Fron-
tier Market asset class, while the risk budgets on Developed and Emerging Market asset class 
are designed in a different way. The process for the computation of the risk budgets on Fron-
tier Markets is divided in two steps: 
 the determination of the total risk budget for the Frontier Market asset class; 
 the repartition of the total risk budget in individual risk budgets for the single Fron-
tier Market. 
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 A consistent number of Frontier Market indices were launched after 2005. Thus, they became investable only 
after 2010, reducing the investment period on these assets to 4 years more or less. 
124
 EWMA estimations adapt to the shocks quickly than rolling estimations. However, they can produce large 
estimation errors if this shock is isolated and it does not represent a change in the trend. 
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As above-mentioned, I created four different portfolios with a maximum risk budget for 
the Frontier Market asset class of 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent. However, the risk 
budget is variable over the investment period. The risk budget assigned to this asset class in a 
particular month depends on the international liquidity condition and on the average risk 
framework in Frontier Markets. Excluding the choice to enter in one particular Frontier Mar-
ket, that depends on country-specific condition, these are the main determinants behind inves-
tors’ choice to invest in this alternative asset class. International liquidity condition is proba-
bly the most important one. When the international liquidity framework is adverse (e.g., re-
strictive monetary policies by the major central banks), investors tend to exit from the most 
illiquid markets, moving towards more secure markets
125
. On the contrary, when international 
liquidity framework is favorable, investors are more prone to bear risky activities as Frontier 
Market financial instruments. There are two main reasons behind this reasoning. First of all, 
when interest rates are low, the high differential between risky asset classes returns and the 
cost of raising funds generates good investment opportunity. Thus, investors are more willing 
to bear more risk in order to achieve these good return differentials. Secondly, an adverse li-
quidity framework can complicate the exit from illiquid assets. This happens especially when 
a speculative bubble bursts or a crisis arises, with massive capital outflows that can force the 
introduction of capital controls. The second determinant is the average risk framework. In par-
ticular, investors tend to exit from Frontier Market asset class when a series of common 
shocks increases the country risks of a large portion of these countries
126
. In this case, the ad-
verse economic and financial framework forces the investors to exit before the insurgence of a 
serious crisis. The proxies for these two determinants are: 
 the International Liquidity Risk Indicator for the international liquidity framework; 
 the average Country Risk Indicator for the country economic and risk framework. 
The value of the Liquidity Risk Indicator considered is the one of the month for which we 
want to compute the Frontier Market total risk budget. The average Country Risk Indicator 
considered is the average between all the Frontier Market Country Risk Indicators in the 
month for which we want to compute the Frontier Market total risk budget. The two determi-
nants contribute to determinate the total risk budget in equal way (i.e., 5.00, 10.00 and 20.00 
per cent for each determinant), with the exception of the 5.00 per cent risk budgeting portfolio 
(3.00 and 2.00 per cent for international liquidity and risk framework respectively). The rele-
vant threshold for the Liquidity Risk Indicator is the half of its maximum value (i.e., 7 points). 
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 In Section 4, I made the example of Latin America crises during the ‘80s. Restrictive monetary policy of the 
Federal Reserve led to massive capital outflows, exacerbating a precarious economic framework.  
126
 The most common examples are global recession, global financial crisis, default wave, etc.. 
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The relevant thresholds for the Country Risk Indicator are 50 and 55 points. An average rating 
below 50 points represents very adverse condition, while an average rating above 55 points 
represents normal condition
127
. Another way to proxy economic and risk framework in Fron-
tier Markets is to compute the number of countries behind a certain risky threshold. However, 
this procedure is already used in the determination of the individual risk budgets. Table 6 pre-
sents the constraints for the determination of the total risk budget. The total risk budget is giv-
en by the sum of the risk budget portion determined using the Liquidity Risk Indicator and the 
risk budget portion determined using the average Country Risk Indicator. 
Table 6 – Total risk budget computation 
TOTAL RISK BUDGET COMPUTATION 
DETERMINANTS 
PORTFOLIO 
5% 10% 20% 40% 
LIQUIDITY RISK INDICATOR RISK BUDGET 
LRI lower than 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LRI higher than 7 3.00 5.00 10.00 20.00 
AVERAGE COUNTRY RISK INDICATOR RISK BUDGET 
Average CRI lower than 50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average CRI between 50 and 55 1.00 2.50 5.00 10.00 
Average CRI lower higher than 55 2.00 5.00 10.00 20.00 
TOTAL RISK BUDGET = LRI RB + ACRI RB 
 
After the computation of the total risk budget for the Frontier Market asset class, I distrib-
uted it across the various Frontier Markets included in the investment universe in each month. 
I used the individual Country Risk Indicator to determine which is the country risk exposure 
that I’m willing to bear. The process has two steps: 
 division of the countries in five categories on the basis of their investment quality; 
 repartition of the risk budget assigned to a given class in equal parts between the 
countries belonging to that class. 
In order to divide the various countries in the five different groups, I used their individual 
Country Risk Indicator. The higher the Country Risk Indicator, and the lower the country risk 
is. Thus, the country investment quality increases as the value of the Country Risk Indicator 
increases. The relevant thresholds for the classification change every month, on the basis of 
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 These thresholds are not relevant for an individual country risk measure. In fact, they are relevant only for the 
average between all Frontier Markets Risk Indicator. 
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the values assumed by the indicators of the thirty-one countries in that particular month. The 
groups are: 
 low investment quality: bottom 10.00 per cent of the country indicator values; 
 medium-low investment quality: between the 10th and the 40th percentile of the 
country indicator distribution; 
 medium investment quality: between the 40th and the 60th percentile of the country 
indicator distribution; 
 medium-high investment quality: between the 60th and the 90th percentile of the 
country indicator distribution; 
 high investment quality: top 10.00 per cent of the country indicator values. 
After the division of the countries in the five groups, I determined the individual risk budg-
et dividing the portion of the total risk budget assigned to a particular group in equal parts 
across the countries belonging to that group: 
𝑏𝑖 =
𝑥𝑗𝑏𝐹𝑀
𝑛𝑗
                                                                   (5.1) 
 bi = risk budget of country i 
 xj = portion of total risk budget assigned to the group quality j 
 nj = number of Frontier Markets belonging to the group quality j 
 bFM = total risk budget assigned to Frontier Market asset class 
The portion of total risk budget assigned to low, medium-low, medium, medium-high and 
high quality groups are 0.00, 20.00, 25.00, 30.00 and 25.00 per cent respectively. The number 
of countries belonging to each group varies in each month. Of course the individual risk 
budgets for the low quality Frontier Markets are 0.00 per cent. For these countries, the coun-
try risk is too high compared to the others. I decided to assign a portion of total risk budget to 
medium-low quality Frontier Markets. Even if they present a consistent country risk, I want to 
preserve the diversification. Moreover, I take into account the possibility of estimation error 
in country risk. If the country risk is not particularly high, I can accept a small bet on these 
markets. In any case, the individual risk budgets assigned to these Frontier Markets is rela-
tively low compared to the others. Generally this is the most numerous group, with a variable 
number between 8 and 11 countries. In this way, the individual risk budgets are contained and 
the impact on the portfolio of negative shocks in one of these countries will be sustainable. 
Finally, the portion assigned to the top quality group is 25.00 per cent, the same of the medi-
um quality group. This could be strange, since someone can expect a more aggressive bet on 
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these markets. However, I still have to take into account potential error in the assessment of 
the country risk. Moreover, the countries belonging to that group vary between 3 and 5. Thus, 
their individual risk budgets are relatively high compared to the others. In order to preserve 
the diversification and to control the liquidity risk, I cannot assign too large risk budgets on a 
single Frontier Market, even if I perceived that its risk is low. These markets still remain illiq-
uid and the impact of negative shocks related to liquidity risk can be disruptive for the portfo-
lio performance. Finally, I determined the risk budgets through this methodology for all the 
Frontier Markets. However, the investment universe varies over time and not all the Frontier 
Markets are present in some months. For this reason, I extracted the individual risk budgets of 
the countries included in the investment universe in each month and I normalized them in or-
der that they sum to the total risk budget for the month considered. 
I designed the individual risk budgets on the core part (i.e., Developed and Emerging Mar-
kets) in a different way. For these indices I don’t have a Country Risk Indicator128. One of the 
aim of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of Frontier Market asset class on portfolio perfor-
mance. For this reason, the only relevant condition on the core part is that the risk budgets are 
determined in the same way for all the portfolios, in order to ease the comparison between 
them. The risk budget assigned to Emerging Markets is equal to 10.00 per cent and it is fixed 
for all the portfolios. The individual risk budgets assigned to the three Developed Market in-
dices are GDP-weighted risk budgets, computed on the residual risk budget available for a 
particular portfolio. In this way, the risk budgets are different in absolute term between the 
different portfolios, but they maintain the same relative structure. Eq.(5.2) presents the com-
putation: 
𝑏𝑘 = (1 − 𝑏𝐸𝑀 − 𝑏𝐹𝑀)𝑤𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘                                               (5.2) 
 bk = risk budget for Developed Market index k (North America, Europe and Middle 
East, Pacific) 
 bEM = risk budget of Emerging Market index, equal to 10.00 per cent 
 bFM = total risk budget assigned to Frontier Market asset class 
 wGDPk = GDP-weight of geographical area k on the total GDP of Developed Mar-
kets 
I downloaded the data on GDP for the countries belonging to the Developed Market class 
from the IMF WEO databases. 
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 In Section 4 I explained the impossibility of computing the country risk for these indices, given the fact that 
they are an aggregate of very heterogeneous countries. 
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5.1.3 The Constraints on the Markowitz Model 
The introduction of constraints on Markowitz model is one of the most diffused solution 
adopted by the asset managers in order to obtain satisfactory asset allocation
129
. In particular, 
asset managers usually set constraints on weights. These constraints can be individual or 
group constraints. In addition to that, I’m interested in posing constraints on mean-variance 
optimization in order to make comparable the portfolios generated with the Risk Budgeting 
Approach and the Markowitz model
130
. For this reason, I set weight constraints on all the as-
set classes presented in my investment universe. 
For the Frontier Market asset class I introduced a group constraint, in order to limit the 
maximum exposure on the Frontier Markets. The constraints are equal to the maximum risk 
budgets, in order to ease the comparison between the different portfolio. Thus, I created four 
portfolios where the weights assigned to the Frontier Market group are 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 
40.00 per cent. In this way, I can compare the two different approaches for asset allocation. In 
the risk budgeting portfolios, I set the constraint on the risk exposure, while in the Markowitz 
model, I set the constraint on the weight exposure. The above-mentioned constraints are fixed 
for all the investment period. In fact, for the Markowitz model I don’t use the Country Risk 
Indicator. Thus, I cannot determine on the basis of this indicator a variable monthly exposure. 
The individual weights of the Frontier Markets are the result of the constrained model and I 
didn’t impose individual constraints. 
For the Emerging Markets index, I set a weight constraint equal to 10.00 per cent for all 
the investment period. Again, I used the same constraint adopted in the Risk Budgeting Ap-
proach. The difference is that in one case I constrained the risk exposure and in the other case 
I constrained the weight exposure. For the Developed Market asset class, I set individual con-
straints on each index. These constraints are lower and upper bounds that try to force the op-
timization algorithm to assign a weight close to the GDP-weight. In this way, I tried to use a 
methodology similar to the one behind the design of the risk budgets of the Developed mar-
kets. These constraints vary between the portfolios (the residual portions are different depend-
ing on Frontier Markets weights) and across the time, reflecting the variation in the GDP-
weights. 
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 I have already discussed about it in Subparagraph 5.1.1. Moreover, in Section 2 and Appendix A, I presented 
the constrained Markowitz model from a theoretical point of view. 
130
 For example, I cannot compare the 5.00 per cent risk budgeting portfolio with a general mean-variance opti-
mized portfolio. The portion invested in Frontier Markets can be very different and the comparison will lose its 
informational power. 
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5.2 Portfolio Allocation and Analysis 
In this paragraph, I present the allocations generated by the risk budgeting and the mean-
variance optimization algorithms. I also analyze the different portfolios, with the comparison 
between risk budgeting and mean-variance optimized portfolios. However, I have to discuss 
an important topic before the presentation of the analysis. 
As above-mentioned, the investment period is not the same for the various Frontier Mar-
kets. MSCI launched stand-alone country indices for Frontier Markets starting from the 80s, 
but a consistent number of these indices were introduced after 2005
131
. Moreover, I have to 
take into account that the rolling and the EWMA methodology require an initialization win-
dow. This causes a loss of observations equal to five years and to one year respectively. At the 
beginning of the investment period (i.e., February 2005), the size of the investment universe 
was limited (i.e., five countries for rolling methodology and twelve countries for EWMA 
methodology). For this reason, I could not launch the portfolios with an high total risk budget 
on Frontier Markets, such as the 20.00 and the 40.00 per cent portfolios. In fact, the resulting 
individual exposures would have been too large, increasing dramatically the liquidity risk
132
. 
The EWMA method was introduced exactly to increase the investment opportunities, easing 
the introduction of the portfolios with greater exposure on Frontier Market asset class. Table 7 
presents the different investment period for each portfolio. Table 8 presents the number of 
countries included in each sub-periods (i.e., the evolution of the investment universe). About 
the inception date, there are no differences between risk budgeting and mean-variance opti-
mized portfolios. 
Table 7 – Portfolios investment periods 
PERIOD 
ROLLING 
5% 10% 20% 40% 
Starting date 01/02/2005 01/02/2005 01/06/2007 01/06/2010 
Ending date 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 
PERIOD 
EWMA 
5% 10% 20% 40% 
Starting date 01/02/2005 01/02/2005 01/02/2005 01/06/2006 
Ending date 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 31/01/2015 
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 See Table 1 in Section 3 for more details. 
132
 For example, the 40.00 per cent risk budgeting portfolio with rolling method could present individual risk 
budgets higher than 8.00 per cent. This is clearly an excessive exposure given the relative illiquidity of these 
stock markets. 
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Table 8 – Investment sub-periods 
ROLLING 
SUB-PERIODS 
NUM 
FM * 
EWMA 
SUB-PERIODS 
NUM 
FM * 
02/2005 - 05/2007 5 02/2005 - 05/2006 12 
06/2007 - 05/2010 12 06/2006 - 11/2009 18 
06/2010 - 11/2011 18 12/2009 - 11/2011 28 
12/2011 - 11/2013 22 12/2011 - 01/2015 31 
12/2013 - 01/2015 28     
* NUM FM = Number of investable Frontier Markets per sub-period 
 
For the introduction of the 20.00 per cent and the 40.00 portfolios, I require the presence in 
the investment universe of a number of countries close to 10 and to 20 respectively. In this 
way, I can maintain a certain degree of diversification, avoiding too large individual expo-
sures on these illiquid markets. Of course, the portfolios obtained using the EWMA inputs 
were launched before, given the smaller initialization window. Moreover, they are divided in 
less sub-periods, since the Frontier Markets became available for the investment more quick-
ly. Finally, when I used the rolling method in the computation of the inputs, I was not able to 
invest in three Frontier Markets (i.e., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh). 
5.2.1 Portfolio Analysis and Comparison: RB and MVO - Rolling Method 
In this paragraph, I present the portfolios obtained using the Risk Budgeting Approach and 
the Constrained Markowitz model described above, with the expected returns and the vari-
ance-covariance matrix estimated using a 60-month rolling methodology. As mentioned in 
Section 1, all the computations, the optimization algorithms and the analysis are implemented 
using the Matlab software. I analyzed twelve different allocations: 
 four risk budgeting (RB) portfolios with maximum total risk exposure on Frontier 
Markets equal to 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent; 
 four mean-variance optimized portfolios with Global Minimum Variance (GMV) 
allocation and total weight exposure on Frontier Markets equal to 5.00, 10.00, 
20.00 and 40.00 per cent; 
 four mean-variance optimized portfolios with Maximum Sharpe (MS) allocation 
and total weight exposure on Frontier Markets equal to 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 
40.00 per cent; 
I performed the evaluation of the different portfolios over their entire investment periods. 
For the 5.00 and the 10.00 per cent portfolios, the investment period is 120 months, while for 
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the 20.00 and the 40.00 per cent portfolios, it decreases to 92 and 56 months respectively. 
When I compare the portfolios with different risk or weight exposure on Frontier Market asset 
class, I perform the analysis over the same investment period
133. Allocations’ basic character-
istics are the starting point of the analysis. In Table 9, I present the basic characteristics of the 
twelve portfolios over the different investment periods. 
Table 9 – Portfolios basic characteristics (Rolling) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy Mean Vol Min Max Skew Kur IQR 
Risk Budget 5 0.51 3.64 -11.54 11.57 -0.70 4.62 3.72 
Risk Budget 10 0.52 3.56 -11.54 11.22 -0.75 4.70 3.46 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.38 3.66 -11.74 11.73 -0.60 4.54 3.85 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.47 3.75 -11.99 11.96 -0.69 4.59 3.70 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.39 3.60 -11.39 11.56 -0.61 4.49 3.79 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.47 3.66 -12.45 11.66 -0.75 4.84 3.50 
Investment Period 06/2007 - 01/2015 
Strategy Mean Vol Min Max Skew Kur IQR 
Risk Budget 5 0.21 3.85 -11.54 11.57 -0.57 4.33 3.75 
Risk Budget 10 0.19 3.74 -11.54 11.22 -0.61 4.45 3.56 
Risk Budget 20 0.16 3.58 -11.54 10.59 -0.68 4.61 3.21 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.10 3.89 -11.74 11.73 -0.49 4.29 3.93 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.18 4.00 -11.99 11.96 -0.56 4.24 3.56 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.14 3.82 -11.39 11.56 -0.52 4.25 3.82 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.18 3.90 -12.45 11.66 -0.64 4.50 3.53 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.05 3.65 -11.67 10.94 -0.60 4.50 3.54 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.15 3.84 -13.36 10.97 -0.75 4.75 3.44 
Investment Period 06/2010 - 01/2015 
Strategy Mean Vol Min Max Skew Kur IQR 
Risk Budget 5 0.75 2.46 -7.61 6.06 -0.59 4.22 2.96 
Risk Budget 10 0.69 2.37 -7.26 5.97 -0.57 4.17 2.76 
Risk Budget 20 0.60 2.23 -6.73 5.83 -0.53 4.05 2.49 
Risk Budget 40 0.46 2.07 -5.90 5.63 -0.38 3.76 2.57 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.60 2.54 -7.51 6.24 -0.34 3.83 2.79 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.75 2.68 -7.83 5.98 -0.72 3.90 2.74 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.68 2.51 -7.07 6.37 -0.36 3.58 3.07 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.77 2.52 -7.71 5.76 -0.71 4.11 2.79 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.56 2.39 -5.86 6.32 -0.10 3.03 2.81 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.72 2.49 -7.41 5.61 -0.75 4.05 2.51 
Markowitz 40 GMV 0.30 2.17 -3.83 6.29 0.36 2.92 2.81 
Markowitz 40 MS 0.52 2.56 -7.23 5.39 -0.70 4.42 2.16 
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 For example, I computed the characteristics of the 5.00 per cent portfolios, when I compared them with the 
20.00 per cent portfolios, over the same investment period of 92 months. 
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First of all, I want to recall that Risk Budgeting Approach should ensure a reduction in 
risk, while it does not ensure higher returns. Bruder and Roncalli (2012) showed that, in ex-
pectations, the risk of the RB portfolio is between the GMV and weight budgeting (WB) port-
folio risks. However, in my case, the volatilities of the RB portfolios are always lower than 
the volatility of the GMV portfolios. Of course, they are lower than the MS portfolios too. 
This condition is verified for all the portfolios, independently on their exposure on Frontier 
Markets. Moreover, this is verified in every investment period. The result is definitely better 
than what expected in theory. About average monthly returns, it is quite surprising that RB 
portfolios generally provide higher returns than MVO portfolios, in particular the MS portfo-
lios. This situation normalized during the last investment period considered, when I intro-
duced the 40.00 per cent portfolios. In this case the 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent MS port-
folios present higher average returns than the 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent RB portfolios 
(0.69 vs 0.77, 0.60 vs 0.72 and 0.46 vs 0.52 per cent respectively). However, this is associated 
to an higher volatility (2.37 vs 2.52, 2.23 vs 2.49 and 2.07 vs 2.56 per cent respectively). 
Comparing the different investment periods, we can see that the last period is generally char-
acterized by higher average monthly returns and lower volatility. In fact, this period started in 
June 2010, excluding the 2008 Financial Crisis. Moreover, it is a period of expansive mone-
tary policies that led to massive capital flows towards the Frontier Markets. Generally, this 
boosted the performance of some of these markets and reduced the volatility. For the same 
reason, the period with the lowest return and the highest volatility is the second one. This pe-
riod started at the beginning of the 2008 Financial Crisis. The crisis characterized almost one 
fourth of this period, amplifying its impact. About skweness, kurtosis and interquartile range 
(IQR), there are no clear conclusions, except for a reduction of kurtosis and IQR in the last 
investment period. This result is consistent with the above discussion on the financial frame-
work that characterized the last period. About a comparison between the different portfolios, 
there is a surprising result. The volatility reduces as the total risk exposure on Frontier Mar-
kets increases. Considering the investment period from February 2005 to January 2015, the 
10.00 per cent RB portfolio presents lower volatility and higher monthly average returns than 
the 5.00 per cent RB portfolio (3.56 vs 3.64 and 0.52 vs 0.51 per cent respectively). In the 
second investment period, the 20.00 per cent RB portfolio has a volatility lower than the 5.00 
and 10.00 per cent RB portfolio (3.58 vs 3.85 and 3.74 per cent respectively). Finally, in the 
last investment period we pass from the 2.46, 2.37 and the 2.23 per cent of the 5.00, 10.00 and 
20.00 per cent RB portfolio to the 2.07 per cent of the 40.00 per cent RB portfolio. Probably, 
this result is driven by the diversification. Increasing the exposure to Frontier Markets, we al-
so increase the potential benefits in risk reduction coming from international diversification. 
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The second important analysis regards the weights and the risk contributions of the differ-
ent asset classes. Figures from 15 to 19 show the allocation across the different asset classes, 
aggregating individual weights and risk contributions of the Frontier Markets. Figures from 
20 to 23 focus on Frontier Markets only, presenting individual weights and risk contributions. 
Figure 16 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 5% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 10% Portfolios (Rolling) 
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Figure 18 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 20% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 40% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is interesting the relation between the weights and the risk contributions for the Frontier 
Market asset class. The risk contributions for the GMV portfolios are always lower than the 
weights. On the contrary, for the MS portfolios the risk contributions are sensibly higher than 
the relative weights. RB portfolios have the ex-ante risk contributions fixed a priori. In this 
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case, we can observe that to achieve the constraints on the risk budgets, the portfolio weight 
has to be larger than the risk exposure. Thus, except for the few cases in which the risk con-
tribution on Frontier Market asset class is equal to 0.00 per cent, the weights of this asset class 
in RB portfolios are generally higher than the weights in GMV and MS portfolios. This is as-
sociated to higher risk contributions with respect to GMV portfolios, but lower risk contribu-
tions with respect to MS portfolios. MS portfolios present allocations that lead to higher con-
tribution to the portfolio risk for the Frontier Market asset class, even if the weight exposures 
are lower than or equal to RB and GMV portfolios respectively. About the evolution over 
time, the risk contributions, given the weights, tend to increase during the crises and to de-
crease during booming periods. This is evident looking at 2008-2009 crisis period (i.e., sub-
prime crisis) and at 2010-2014 booming period, with a break during 2012 in which risk con-
tributions tended to increase again (i.e., European Sovereign Debt crisis). The result is largely 
expected, since volatility tend to increase and correlations tend to be stronger during the peri-
od of crisis
134
. For RB portfolios the point of view is different, but the conclusions are the 
same. In fact, in order to meet risk budget constraints, during booming period of low volatility 
and less strong correlations, the weights have to increase. This is clear observing the last four 
years, in which the positive international liquidity framework (e.g., expansive monetary poli-
cies) led to huge capital flows towards these markets, strongly reducing the volatility in Fron-
tier Markets. Finally, it is interesting to note the effect of the determination of variable risk 
budgets. In particular, between 2008 and 2009 and in 2012, risk contributions and weights for 
RB portfolios are equal to 0.00 per cent. In this way, I avoided the most turbulent periods of 
the subprime and the sovereign debt crises. 
Figure 20 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 5% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
134
 About the correlations, I discussed this aspect in Subparagraph 3.2.3. 
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Figure 21 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 10% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 20% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 40% Portfolios (Rolling) 
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In Section 2, I have already mentioned that risk diversification is the core aspect of the 
Risk Budgeting Approach. In addition to that, I discussed about the poorly diversified out-
comes produced by the mean-variance optimizer. The individual weights and risk contribu-
tions of the Frontier Market asset class show clearly these characteristics. As expected, RB 
portfolios always present an higher diversification, both in terms of risk and weight, than 
MVO portfolios. Of course, the number of Frontier Markets present in RB portfolios depends 
on the number of investable markets. In general, I have a coverage of the investable set be-
tween 75.00 and 90.00 per cent. On the contrary, MVO portfolios are poorly diversified, with 
a number of Frontier Markets included that are, usually, below five. Moreover, in a consistent 
number of months, I invested only in one asset. These conclusion are stable for every portfo-
lio, regardless of the portfolio portion invested in Frontier Market asset class. Higher diversi-
fication is positive when dealing with illiquid and low correlated assets, as Frontier Markets. 
In fact, higher diversification increases the benefits from diversification in the reduction of 
portfolio risk. The low volatility presented by the RB portfolios can be explained by the high 
degree of diversification in these portfolios. Moreover, diversified exposures, especially in 
terms of risk, reduce the impact of country-specific negative shocks. Given the relative il-
liquidity of these markets, the impact of country-specific negative shocks are amplified and 
can lead to huge losses. A lower individual exposure helps to mitigate this important threat. 
The third important portfolio characteristic that I want to analyze is portfolio turnover. 
Turnover represents the portion of the portfolio that changes (i.e., the securities bought and 
sold) over a certain period. It is expressed in percentage terms and it is a measure of portfolio 
rotation and activity. It is an important variable, since higher turnover could be associated to 
an higher impact of the transaction costs on portfolio performance. In this thesis I computed 
the monthly actual turnover. Actual turnover differs from the approximate one because it 
takes into account that portfolio weights change between the beginning and the end of the 
month, due to the returns realized on each asset within the month. Actual turnover is the turn-
over computed at the end of the month, and not at the beginning, considering the realized re-
turns
135
. Table 10 presents the average monthly actual turnover for the twelve portfolios. Fig-
ures 24 and 25 present the evolution over time of the monthly actual turnover. The lighter 
lines represent the MVO portfolios, while the darker lines represent the RB portfolios
136
. 
                                                          
135
 In Appendix D I present the relation between approximate turnover and actual turnover. 
136
 Turnover is a discontinuous time-series. As already discussed, I divided the investment period in sub-periods, 
in order to add the new investable markets. This approach is necessary for the implementation of the algorithms 
in Matlab. When I introduced new assets I had to change the size of the matrices used as inputs. However, turno-
ver is a measure of variation between two months. In this way I lost the first month and the change between the 
sub-periods, introducing discontinuity. 
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Table 10 – Average Monthly Actual Portfolio Turnover (Rolling) 
ALLOCATIONS 
PORTFOLIOS 
5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 3.06 4.08 6.01 9.36 
Global Minimum Variance 1.77 2.90 2.86 5.24 
Maximum Sharpe 2.07 3.24 4.09 8.56 
 
Average monthly actual turnover is quite limited in all the portfolios, with a minimum val-
ue of 1.77 per cent (5.00 per cent GMV) and a maximum value of 9.36 per cent (40.00 per 
cent RB). Portfolio turnover is mainly driven by the activity on the Frontier Market asset 
class. In fact, increasing the portion of portfolio assigned to this asset class, the turnover in-
creases
137
. RB portfolios tend to present higher average actual turnover than MVO portfolios, 
with GMV portfolio exhibiting the lowest. A possible explanation is that RB portfolios pre-
sent a contribution to turnover also from the Emerging Markets. In fact, in Risk Budgeting 
Approach I set a fixed constraint on the risk contribution of this asset class, but the weights 
are variable over time. Moreover, the monthly changes in Frontier Markets’ risk budgets can 
contribute to slightly increases in the trading activity. However, we are observing relatively 
low turnovers and, consequently, small differences in absolute term. Thus the impact of trans-
action costs is very small
138
. 
Figure 24 – Monthly Actual Turnover 5% and 10% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
137
 This is a byproduct of the determination of risk budget and weight constraints over the core portion. In Sub-
paragraph 5.1.2 and Subparagraph 5.1.3, I presented a fix constraint on Emerging Markets and GDP-weighted 
constraints on Developed Markets. When imposed on the weights, a fix constraint determines a null contribution 
of Emerging Markets on portfolio turnover. The GDP-weighted constraints tend to produce stable weights at 
least within the year, with low contribution to turnover. 
138
 Assuming a transaction cost between 0.10-0.15 per cent, the impact in most of the case will be close to 0.01 
per cent. 
 95 
 
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Portfolio 20% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Portfolio 20% - RB (dark) vs MS (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Portfolio 40% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Portfolio 40% - RB (dark) vs MS (light)
Figure 25 – Monthly Actual Turnover 20% and 40% Portfolios (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The spikes in the time series of monthly actual turnover represent changes in the inputs of 
risk budgeting and mean-variance optimization algorithms that justify a large change in the 
allocation. In normal conditions, RB portfolios tend to present a turnover higher than MVO 
portfolios. However, MVO portfolios present a consistently larger number of spikes than RB 
portfolios, with the exception of the comparison between 40.00 per cent RB and GMV portfo-
lios. This is consistent with the theory presented in Section 2. Small changes in the inputs of 
the mean-variance optimizers (i.e., changes in risk-return trade-offs), especially changes in the 
expected returns, tend to produce large changes in the allocation. Thus, even in normal condi-
tions, MVO portfolios present more spikes. On the contrary, RB portfolios tend to produce 
more stable portfolios. From the time-evolution of the monthly actual turnover for RB portfo-
lios, we can see that the spikes are clustered around months of deep changes of the economic 
and financial conditions. This can be seen also from a preliminary analysis of the weights, 
where I showed that during the subprime and the sovereign debt crises, the RB portfolios had 
no exposure on the Frontier Market class. Thus the most important spikes for the RB portfoli-
os are clustered across 2008-2009 (i.e., subprime crisis) and at the beginning of 2012 (i.e., 
sovereign debt crisis). These events dramatically changed the financial framework. The spikes 
represent the exit from these markets at the insurgence of the crises and the comeback when 
favorable financial conditions were restored. 
The fourth step of portfolio analysis regards the analysis of the cumulated returns. Figures 
from 26 to 28 present the cumulated returns time series of RB and MVO portfolios. The first 
panel provides the comparison with the GMV portfolios, while the second one provides the 
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comparison with the MS. Table 11 summarizes the results, with average annual returns be-
tween parenthesis. 
Table 11 – Portfolios Cumulated Returns (Rolling) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy 5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 
70.12 
(5.46) 
72.10 
(5.58) 
- - 
Global Minimum Variance 
45.05 
(3.79) 
48.31 
(4.02) 
- - 
Maximum Sharpe 
60.72 
(4.86) 
61.87 
(4.93) 
- - 
Investment Period 06/2007 - 01/2015 
Strategy 5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 
13.10 
(1.61) 
11.70 
(1.45) 
9.45 
(1.18) 
- 
Global Minimum Variance 
2.60 
(0.33) 
6.31 
(0.80) 
-1.24         
(-0.16) 
- 
Maximum Sharpe 
9.85 
(1.23) 
10.16 
(1.27) 
7.63 
(0.96) 
- 
Investment Period 06/2010 - 01/2015 
Strategy 5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 
49.52 
(8.81) 
45.02 
(8.12) 
38.02 
(7.00) 
28.14 
(5.34) 
Global Minimum Variance 
37.67 
(6.94) 
43.91 
(7.94) 
34.90 
(6.49) 
17.00 
(3.35) 
Maximum Sharpe 
49.27 
(8.78) 
51.40 
(9.10) 
46.98 
(8.42) 
31.56 
(5.93) 
 
Considering the first and the second period, the RB portfolios provide the highest cumulat-
ed returns. The difference is important when we compare RB and GMV portfolios. In the last 
period, RB portfolios still exhibit cumulated returns higher than GMV portfolios, but they are 
lower than cumulated returns of their relative MS portfolios. Generally, for RB portfolios in-
creasing the portion allocated to Frontier Markets, the cumulated returns decrease. The only 
exception is the first period, in which the 10.00 per cent RB portfolio presents a cumulated re-
turn over ten years of 72.10 per cent (5.58 per cent average annual return) compared to 70.12 
per cent (5.46 per cent average annual return) of the 5.00 per cent RB portfolio. In order to 
compare the different periods, we have to look at the average annual returns. As expected, 
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they are sensibly higher during the investment period started in June 2010. During this period, 
returns are above 6.00 per cent per year, with the only exception of the 40.00 per cent portfo-
lios. In particular, for the 5.00 and 10.00 per cent RB and MS portfolios and for the 20.00 per 
cent MS portfolio, we have returns well above the 8.00 per cent per year. However, as above 
mentioned, we have to take into account that this period is characterized by the exit from the 
subprime crisis, with a very favorable monetary framework that boost the quotations. In any 
case, even considering the 10-year investment period, that includes both severe crises and 
booms, returns per annum are satisfactory, with the RB portfolios that present average annual 
returns well above 5.00 per cent (46 and 58 bps for the 5.00 and the 10.00 per cent RB portfo-
lios respectively). 
Figure 26 – Cumulated Returns from 02/2005 to 01/2015 (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 – Cumulated Returns from 06/2007 to 01/2015 (Rolling) 
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Figure 28 – Cumulated Returns from 06/2010 to 01/2015 (Rolling) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another important step in portfolio analysis is the performance measure analysis. The ra-
tionale behind this type of analysis is the complexity of the selection of the best portfolios 
based on the basic characteristics. In general, the analysis of the basic characteristics can lead 
to different interpretations. Moreover, the analysis of average monthly returns do not provide 
a satisfactory answer, given the fact that we are not considering the risk borne for the 
achievement of these returns. It is better to analyze the portfolio performance relatively to the 
portfolio risk. In this way, we can draw some conclusions on which portfolio provides the 
best remuneration of the risk. In general, the best portfolio is the one that respects the risk 
constraint posed by the investor’s risk aversion and that provides the highest reward of the 
risk borne. In this thesis, I used six performance measure. Two of them use a normal risk 
measure, while the other four use extreme risk measures. These measures are the Sharpe Ra-
tio, the Sortino Ratio, the Return-VaR (Value at Risk) Ratio, the Return-ES (Expected Short-
fall) Ratio, the Calmar Ratio and the Sterling Ratio
139
. These performance measures are very 
diffused in financial market practice. Table 12 presents the different performance measures 
for the twelve portfolios, with the same investment-period breakdown of Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139
 In Appendix D I provide the theoretical presentation of the risk measures used in this thesis. 
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Table 12 – Performance Measures (Rolling) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy Sh So Var ES Cal St 
Risk Budget 5 0.14 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Risk Budget 10 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Investment Period 06/2007 - 01/2015 
Strategy Sh So Var ES Cal St 
Risk Budget 5 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk Budget 10 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk Budget 20 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Investment Period 06/2010 - 01/2015 
Strategy Sh So Var ES Cal St 
Risk Budget 5 0.30 0.41 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.18 
Risk Budget 10 0.29 0.39 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.17 
Risk Budget 20 0.27 0.36 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.15 
Risk Budget 40 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.13 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.14 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.28 0.36 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.16 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.27 0.39 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.16 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.30 0.41 0.24 0.15 0.10 0.18 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.24 0.38 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.15 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.28 0.36 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.16 
Markowitz 40 GMV 0.14 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 
Markowitz 40 MS 0.20 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.10 
 
Sharpe and Sortino Ratio are performance measures that consider non-extreme risk 
measures (total risk and downside risk, both based on volatility). I prefer the Sortino Ratio, 
since it focuses on downside risk. In fact, investors are generally worried about an increase in 
volatility when the returns on their investment are negative. Looking at the evolution of these 
measures over the different investment period, we can draw the same conclusions derived 
from the analysis of the basic characteristics. In the last period, performance measures signifi-
cantly increase for all the portfolios, while the second period is characterized by the worst 
level of the performance measures. Especially in the first two periods, RB portfolios present 
higher Sharpe and Sortino Ratio than their relative MVO portfolios. This result is very im-
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portant, since the RB portfolios are able to achieve higher Sharpe Ratios than the MS portfo-
lios, which is not expected in theory. Over the last investment period, the situation tends to 
normalize. Looking at the Sharpe Ratio, RB portfolios still present higher ratios than MVO 
portfolios. The only exceptions are 10.00 and 20.00 per cent RB portfolios when they are 
compared with their peer MS portfolios (0.29 and 0.27 vs 0.30 and 0.28 respectively). The 
analysis of Sortino Ratio produces the same conclusions. The RB portfolios that present the 
highest difference in performance measures with respect to their relative MVO peers are the 
5.00 and the 40.00 per cent RB portfolios. In general, with the exception of the first period, 
increasing the portion allocated to Frontier Market asset class, we can notice a reduction in 
the performance measures. Especially in the last period, we can see that the highest perfor-
mance relatively to the risk is the one of the 5.00 per cent RB portfolio, with a Sharpe and a 
Sortino Ratio equal to 0.30 and 0.41 respectively. The only portfolio able to share similar re-
sults is the 10.00 per cent MS portfolio. The other four performance measures (i.e., Return-
VaR, Return-ES, Calmar and Sterling Ratio) focus on extreme-risk measures. The analysis of 
these measures leads to the same conclusions derived for the normal performance measure. 
The only interesting thing to note is that the distance between RB portfolios and MVO portfo-
lios tend to be tighter when we consider performance measures based on extreme risk. Thus, 
RB and MVO portfolios tend to reward extreme risk equally, while RB portfolios tend to 
over-perform MVO portfolios when we consider non-extreme risk. 
The last important step is the Tracking Error (TE) Analysis. The aim of this analysis is to 
compare a portfolio against its benchmark. TE are the deviations of portfolio returns from the 
benchmark returns. The other relevant quantity is the TE Volatility (TEV), that represents the 
volatility of the TE. If we compute the TEV only on downside deviations, we obtain the 
Semi-TEV. The ratio between TE and TEV (or Semi-TEV) gives an important index, the In-
formation Ratio (or Semi-Information Ratio)
140
. This index is frequently used by fund manag-
ers in order to evaluate their ability in over-performing the benchmark. Sometimes is also 
used to design performance bonuses and management fees. Table 13 presents the TE analysis, 
with TE, TEV, Semi-TEV, IR and Semi-IR. The benchmark used is a GDP-weighted portfo-
lio of Developed Markets only. This portfolio presents an average monthly return and volatili-
ty equal to 0.47 and 3.69 per cent respectively, over the 10- year investment period. Average 
monthly returns and volatilities move to 0.23 and 3.96 and to 0.81 and 2.63 per cent during 
the second and the last investment period respectively. Except for the first period, returns are 
                                                          
140
 See Appendix D for the mathematical formulation. 
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higher on average than the returns of the RB portfolios. About the volatility, the GDP-
weighted Developed Market portfolio present always an higher volatility than RB portfolios. 
Table 13 – Tracking Error Analysis (Rolling) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy TE TEV Semi-TEV IR Semi-IR 
Risk Budget 5 0.04 0.49 0.22 0.09 0.20 
Risk Budget 10 0.05 0.68 0.33 0.07 0.15 
Markowitz 5 GMV -0.09 0.59 0.41 -0.15 -0.22 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.00 0.76 0.54 0.00 0.00 
Markowitz 10 GMV -0.07 0.63 0.36 -0.11 -0.20 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.00 0.77 0.46 0.00 0.01 
Investment Period 06/2007 - 01/2015 
Strategy TE TEV Semi-TEV IR Semi-IR 
Risk Budget 5 -0.02 0.41 0.22 -0.06 -0.10 
Risk Budget 10 -0.04 0.60 0.33 -0.07 -0.12 
Risk Budget 20 -0.07 0.92 0.51 -0.07 -0.13 
Markowitz 5 GMV -0.13 0.61 0.43 -0.21 -0.30 
Markowitz 5 MS -0.05 0.83 0.57 -0.06 -0.08 
Markowitz 10 GMV -0.09 0.62 0.35 -0.15 -0.26 
Markowitz 10 MS -0.05 0.79 0.49 -0.06 -0.10 
Markowitz 20 GMV -0.18 1.02 0.56 -0.17 -0.32 
Markowitz 20 MS -0.08 1.37 0.75 -0.06 -0.10 
Investment Period 06/2010 - 01/2015 
Strategy TE TEV Semi-TEV IR Semi-IR 
Risk Budget 5 -0.13 0.34 0.21 -0.38 -0.62 
Risk Budget 10 -0.19 0.51 0.33 -0.36 -0.57 
Risk Budget 20 -0.28 0.74 0.48 -0.37 -0.59 
Risk Budget 40 -0.42 1.15 0.75 -0.36 -0.55 
Markowitz 5 GMV -0.28 0.63 0.46 -0.43 -0.60 
Markowitz 5 MS -0.13 0.92 0.63 -0.14 -0.20 
Markowitz 10 GMV -0.20 0.53 0.34 -0.37 -0.58 
Markowitz 10 MS -0.11 0.63 0.39 -0.17 -0.27 
Markowitz 20 GMV -0.32 0.83 0.52 -0.38 -0.61 
Markowitz 20 MS -0.16 1.12 0.67 -0.14 -0.24 
Markowitz 40 GMV -0.58 1.41 0.88 -0.41 -0.66 
Markowitz 40 MS -0.36 1.84 1.30 -0.19 -0.27 
 
Except for the first period, TE are always negative, both for the RB and MVO portfolios. 
Consequently, also the Information and the Semi-Information Ratio are negative. Only the 
5.00 and the 10.00 per cent RB portfolios evaluated over their 10-year investment period are 
able to produce acceptable positive Information and Semi-Information Ratio. Thus, the intro-
duction of Frontier Markets in internationally diversified portfolios, with the methodologies 
proposed in this thesis, is not able to create portfolios that outperform a portfolio of Devel-
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oped Markets only. It is important to notice that Tracking Error Analysis focuses on the ex-
cess return of a portfolio with respect to its benchmark. Thus, the outperformance considered 
is on the side of the returns. However, the aim of Risk Budgeting Approach is not to construct 
portfolios that guarantee an excess return with respect to other approaches. The aim is to di-
versify and reduce the risk. From this point of view, the RB portfolios created in this thesis 
are successful. I was not able to outperform a portfolio of Developed Markets in terms of re-
turn, that present stronger growth over the last four years, especially considering the US stock 
market, than Frontier Markets
141
. However, introducing Frontier Markets in internationally 
diversified portfolios, I was able through the Risk Budgeting Approach to construct portfolios 
with lower risks than a GDP-weighted Developed Market portfolio. Given the high risk and 
the relative illiquidity of these markets, the result can be considered satisfactory. With the RB 
portfolios I was able to amplify the diversification benefits coming from the investment in the 
Frontier Market asset class. Moreover, in two cases I was able to produce outperformance 
with respect to the benchmark, something that neither the MS portfolios were able to achieve. 
5.2.2 Portfolio Analysis and Comparison: RB and MVO - EWMA Method 
In this paragraph, I present the portfolios obtained using the Risk Budgeting Approach and 
the Constrained Markowitz model described in Paragraph 5.1, with  the expected returns and 
the variance-covariance matrix estimated using a 12-month exponential weighted moving av-
erage. I analyzed the same twelve different allocations of the previous paragraph, i.e. four RB 
portfolios, four GMV portfolios and four MS portfolios with an increasing risk or weight ex-
posure on Frontier Markets equal to 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per cent. I performed the 
analysis of the different portfolios over their entire investment periods. As above-mentioned, 
with EWMA methodology, I increased the number of investable markets in each period, 
thanks to the shorter initialization window. In this way, I was able to launch the 20.00 per cent 
portfolios since the beginning and the 40.00 per cent portfolios after sixteen months. Thus, the 
investment period is equal to 120 months for the 5.00, the 10.00 and the 20.00 per cent portfo-
lios. For the 40.00 per cent portfolios, the investment period is equal to 104 months. As I did 
in the analysis of the portfolios with the inputs estimated through the rolling method, when I 
compare the portfolios with different inception dates, I perform the analysis also over the 
same investment period . The analysis is structured in the same way as the analysis performed 
in the previous subparagraph. In particular, I used the same tools and steps. In the analysis, I 
will briefly compare the results of the portfolios generated with the two different methods for 
the computations of the inputs.  
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 This can be clearly seen in the price series graphs in Appendix B. 
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As in the previous subparagraph, allocations’ basic characteristics are the starting point of 
the analysis. In Table 14, I present the basic characteristics of the twelve portfolios over the 
different investment periods. 
Table 14 - Portfolios basic characteristics (EWMA) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy Mean Vol Min Max Skew Kur IQR 
Risk Budget 5 0.41 3.61 -11.61 12.16 -0.71 5.10 3.60 
Risk Budget 10 0.45 3.56 -11.61 12.25 -0.77 5.36 3.57 
Risk Budget 20 0.41 3.45 -11.61 11.61 -0.79 5.46 3.35 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.47 3.68 -11.53 11.77 -0.73 4.86 3.58 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.57 3.68 -11.56 12.57 -0.58 4.66 3.72 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.44 3.62 -11.52 11.64 -0.83 5.28 3.32 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.63 3.69 -11.57 13.25 -0.49 4.68 3.69 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.41 3.62 -14.92 11.17 -1.26 7.12 2.66 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.74 3.73 -11.37 14.51 -0.34 4.86 3.82 
Investment Period 06/2006 - 01/2015 
Strategy Mean Vol Min Max Skew Kur IQR 
Risk Budget 5 0.25 3.67 -11.61 12.16 -0.72 5.20 3.64 
Risk Budget 10 0.30 3.62 -11.61 12.25 -0.78 5.46 3.34 
Risk Budget 20 0.23 3.48 -11.61 11.61 -0.81 5.61 3.35 
Risk Budget 40 0.22 3.36 -11.61 11.65 -0.77 5.86 3.45 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.34 3.73 -11.53 11.77 -0.74 4.95 3.54 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.44 3.73 -11.56 12.57 -0.55 4.76 3.61 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.30 3.66 -11.52 11.64 -0.87 5.40 3.07 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.51 3.75 -11.57 13.25 -0.45 4.77 3.55 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.24 3.68 -14.92 11.17 -1.33 7.24 2.55 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.64 3.77 -11.37 14.51 -0.28 5.00 3.61 
Markowitz 40 GMV 0.23 3.69 -15.61 12.96 -1.33 8.83 2.88 
Markowitz 40 MS 0.76 3.96 -12.67 17.04 -0.02 6.10 3.74 
 
As expected, the volatility of RB portfolios are lower than the volatility of MVO portfoli-
os. Again, the surprising result is that RB portfolios present volatility lower than both the 
GMV and the MS portfolios. This condition is verified for all the different portfolios, inde-
pendently on their exposure on Frontier Markets. Moreover it is verified for the whole set of 
investment periods. For RB portfolios, the volatility reduces as the total risk exposure on 
Frontier Markets increases. Considering the investment period from February 2005 to January 
2015, the 20.00 per cent RB portfolio presents lower volatility than the 5.00 and 10.00 per 
cent RB portfolios (3.45 vs 3.61 and 3.56 per cent respectively). In the second investment pe-
riod, the 40.00 per cent RB portfolio has a volatility lower than the other RB portfolios (3.36 
vs 3.67, 3.62 and 3.48 per cent). Again, a possible interpretation is associated to the benefits 
in the reduction of risk coming from diversification. Increasing the exposure to Frontier Mar-
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kets, we increase also the potential diversification benefits. About average monthly returns, 
the results are normal from a theoretical point of view and the opposite with respect to the one 
obtained with rolling mean method. RB portfolios always provide returns lower than or equal 
to MVO portfolios. The only exception is the 10.00 per RB portfolio compared to its peer 
GMV portfolio (0.45 vs 0.44 per cent respectively). This conclusion is valid for both the in-
vestment periods. Comparing the two periods, we can notice that the various portfolios tend to 
present a slightly increase in the volatilities (generally between 3 and 10 bps) during the sec-
ond period. This is related to a consistent reduction in the average monthly returns, that in 
some cases are the half of the returns in the first period. About skweness, kurtosis and inter-
quartile range (IQR), there are no clear conclusions. It is difficult to compare the portfolios 
obtained using the rolling method and these portfolios, since the investment periods are dif-
ferent. The portfolios that share the same investment period are the 5.00 and the 10.00 per 
cent portfolios. However, the portfolios obtained using the EWMA method for the computa-
tion of the inputs tend to present a similar risk profile than the portfolios analyzed in the pre-
vious paragraph. Moreover, they tend to have lower average returns and higher kurtosis. For 
the 5.00 and 10.00 per cent EWMA RB portfolios , the average monthly returns are 10 and 7 
bps below the average monthly returns of their Rolling peers. 
The second step is the analysis of the weights and the risk contributions. Figures from 29 
to 32 show the allocation across the different asset classes, aggregating the individual weights 
and the individual risk contributions of the Frontier Markets. Figures from 33 to 36 focus on 
Frontier Markets only, presenting individual weights and risk contributions. 
Figure 29 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 5% Portfolios (EWMA) 
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Figure 30 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 10% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 20% Portfolios (EWMA) 
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Figure 32 – Weights and Risk Contributions in 40% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first important thing to notice is the unusual behavior of the MVO portfolios during 
the 2012, when their weights went suddenly to 0.00. This problem comes from the optimiza-
tion algorithm, due to an error in the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. However, 
it characterized only two months, leaving the conclusions unchanged. As expected, the 
weights of the RB portfolios and the risk contributions of MVO portfolios are more unstable 
than their Rolling peers. The reason is that EWMA method, given the heavier weights as-
signed to the most recent observation, produces much more unstable (variable) estimations of 
the expected returns and of the variance-covariance matrix. This instability tend to produce 
unstable allocations and risk contributions. About the relation between weights and risk con-
tributions for the Frontier Market asset class, the conclusions are similar to the ones presented 
in the previous subparagraph. The risk contributions for the GMV portfolios are always lower 
than the weights. In some special cases regarded the 5.00 and 10.00 per cent portfolios, the 
weights arrived to be 5 times larger than the risk contribution. On the contrary, for the MS 
portfolios the risk contributions are sensibly higher than the relative weights. When the Fron-
tier Market risk contribution area disappeared, it doesn’t mean that the risk contribution is 
0.00 per cent. For the MVO portfolios, this situation means that the risk contribution of this 
asset class to the portfolio risk is negative. This situation was present also in the previous par-
agraph, but in very limited and special cases. For this reason, I didn’t highlight the point. 
About the evolution over time, we can draw similar conclusions to the one of the previous 
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subparagraph. In particular, for the MVO portfolios the risk contribution of the Frontier Mar-
ket asset class given the weight, tends to increase during the crises and to decrease during 
booming period, especially in the last four years when it became negative. For RB portfolios 
the weight of this asset class, given the risk contribution, tends to increase during booming 
periods and to decrease during crises periods. Again, between 2008 and 2009 and in 2012, 
risk contributions and weights for RB portfolios are equal to 0.00 per cent. As mentioned in 
the previous subparagraph, in this way, I avoided the most turbulent periods of the subprime 
and sovereign debt crises. 
Figure 33 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 5% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 10% Portfolios (EWMA) 
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Figure 35 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 20% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – Frontier Markets weights and risk contributions in 40% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in the previous subparagraph, RB portfolios always present higher diversification, both 
in terms of risk and weight, than MVO portfolios. Also in this case, I have a coverage of in-
vestable Frontier Markets between 75.00 and 90.00 per cent. On the contrary, MVO portfolios 
are poorly diversified, with a number of Frontier Markets included that usually are never 
above five. In a consistent number of months, MVO portfolios had only one Frontier Market. 
These conclusion are stable in every portfolio, regardless of the portfolio portion invested in 
Frontier Market asset class. However, there are two important differences. I have already 
mentioned the first, that is the higher variability in the weight and risk exposures. This is a 
byproduct of the methodology used to compute the inputs in this part (i.e., EWMA). The sec-
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ond is the risk contributions of the GMV portfolios. These portfolios exhibit negative risk 
contribution from the Frontier Market asset class, especially in the last months (the exception 
is the 40.00 per cent GMV portfolio that exhibits this feature in 2012). The negative risk con-
tributions were higher than 10.00 per cent in some cases. 
The third step is the analysis of the turnover. To perform the analysis, I used again the 
monthly actual turnover. Table 15 presents the average monthly actual turnover during the in-
vestment period for the twelve portfolios. Figures 37 and 38 present the evolution over time 
of the monthly actual turnover. Again, the lighter lines represent the MVO portfolios, while 
the darker lines represent the RB portfolios. Given the problem in the algorithm of the 
weights, I was not able to compute the turnover for the last 37 months for the MVO portfoli-
os. In the computation of the average turnover, I used the first 83 months, assuming that the 
relation between the turnovers of the RB portfolios and MVO portfolios didn’t change over 
the last period. This is consistent with the time evolution. In general, turnovers of the different 
approaches exhibit similar pattern during the whole investment period, maintaining the rela-
tive comparison stable. 
Table 15 - Average Monthly Actual Portfolio Turnover (EWMA) 
ALLOCATIONS 
PORTFOLIOS 
5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 9.74 10.37 11.11 14.14 
Global Minimum Variance 5.73 10.38 6.55 12.35 
Maximum Sharpe 7.29 16.85 9.40 18.39 
 
Average monthly actual turnovers increased substantially with respect to the turnovers of 
the Rolling portfolios. The minimum value increases from 1.77 to 5.73 per cent (5.00 per cent 
GMV in both cases) and the maximum value increases from 9.36 to 18.39 per cent (40.00 per 
cent RB and MS respectively). In general, the turnovers for the portfolios generated using the 
EWMA method for the inputs computations are between two and six times larger than the 
turnovers of the portfolios presented in the previous subparagraph (i.e., rolling portfolios). 
The 5.00 and 10.00 per cent portfolios exhibit the highest increases. This result was largely 
expected. A preliminary analysis of the weights showed an higher variability in the portfolio 
allocations, driven by the higher variability of the inputs used in the algorithms. This is the 
byproduct of using EWMA estimates. RB portfolios present a turnover always higher than 
GMV portfolios. With respect to MS portfolios, RB portfolio turnovers are higher for the 5.00 
and the 20.00 per cent portfolio. The explanation is still the activity on Emerging Market asset 
 110 
 
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 5% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 5% - RB 8dark) vs MS (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 10% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 10% - RB (dark) vs MS (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 20% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 20% - RB (dark) vs MS (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 40% - RB (dark) vs GMV (light)
Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Portfolio 40% - RB (dark) vs MS (light)
class, that is not present in MVO portfolios (the weight is fixed at 10.00 per cent). In any case, 
portfolio turnover is mainly driven by the activity on the Frontier Market asset class. 
Figure 37 – Monthly Actual Turnover 5% and 10% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 – Monthly Actual Turnover 20% and 40% Portfolios (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the time-evolution of the turnover cannot be done for the last 3 years. 
However, the conclusions would not change. It is interesting to compare Figures 37 and 38 
with Figures 24 and 25. As expected, the use of EWMA estimates lead to a larger number of 
spikes with respect to the use of rolling estimates. EWMA estimates are much more variable 
than rolling estimates and the changes are generally larger. Consequently, the algorithms ad-
justed the allocations. However, this is done with a consistent change in portfolio weights, in 
order to reflect the new estimates. In this case, I think that EWMA method introduced too 
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much variability in portfolio allocations, eliminating one of the most positive feature of Risk 
Budgeting Approach. This positive feature is the stability of the allocations. 
The fourth step of portfolio analysis regards the analysis of the cumulated returns. Figures 
39 and 40 present the cumulated returns time series of RB portfolios and MVO portfolios. 
Table 16 summarizes the results, with average annual returns between parenthesis. 
Table 16 – Portfolios Cumulated Returns (EWMA) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy 5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 
50.34 
(4.16) 
58.74 
(4.73) 
52.02 
(4.28) 
- 
Global Minimum Variance 
61.78 
(4.93) 
57.01 
(4.61) 
51.67 
(4.25) 
- 
Maximum Sharpe 
81.92 
(6.17) 
96.40 
(6.98) 
122.10 
(8.31) 
- 
Investment Period 06/2006 - 01/2015 
Strategy 5% 10% 20% 40% 
Risk Budgeting 
21.45 
(2.16) 
27.12 
(2.67) 
19.27 
(1.96) 
18.97 
(1.93) 
Global Minimum Variance 
31.83 
(3.09) 
26.98 
(2.66) 
19.95 
(2.02) 
18.00 
(1.84) 
Maximum Sharpe 
46.60 
(4.30) 
58.16 
(5.17) 
81.32 
(6.77) 
101.91 
(8.04) 
 
RB portfolios tend to present cumulated returns, and relative average annual return, close 
to the GMV portfolios. MS portfolios provide significantly higher returns, that in some cases 
are more than two times the annual average return of RB portfolios. In particular, this is the 
case of the 20.00 and 40.00 per cent MS (1.96 vs 6.77 per cent and 1.93 vs. 8.04 per cent). It 
is difficult to compare EWMA and Rolling portfolios, given the fact that the investment peri-
ods are different, with the exception of 5.00 and 10.00 per cent portfolios over their entire in-
vestment period. In this case, Rolling RB portfolios present higher return than EWMA RB 
(5.46 and 5.58 vs 4.16 and 4.73 per cent, for 5.00 and 10.00 per cent RB portfolios respective-
ly). We can derive the opposite conclusions when considering the MVO portfolios and, in 
particular, the MS portfolios. They present high annual average returns, even if the two peri-
ods include the subprime crises
142
. On the side of cumulated returns, it seems that the imple-
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 With Rolling Portfolios I had to wait the last period in order to see returns above 8.00 per cent. 
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mentation of the EWMA method damaged the RB portfolios, while it had a positive effect on 
MS allocations. However, we will see later, with the analysis of the performance measures, if 
the risk is adequately remunerated. In fact, from the analysis of the basic characteristics, the 
higher returns of the MVO portfolios are associated to higher risk. 
Figure 39 – Cumulated Returns from 02/2005 to 01/2015 (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40 – Cumulated Returns from 06/2006 to 01/2015 (EWMA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fifth step is the performance measure analysis. I used the same performance measures 
analyzed in the previous paragraph and presented in Appendix D. To recap, these measures 
are the Sharpe Ratio, the Sortino Ratio, the Return-VaR (Value at Risk) Ratio, the Return-ES 
(Expected Shortfall) Ratio, the Calmar Ratio and the Sterling Ratio. Table 17 presents the dif-
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ferent performance measures for the twelve portfolios, with the same investment-period 
breakdown of Table 14. 
Table 17 – Performance Measures (EWMA) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 05/2006 
Strategy Sh So Var ES Cal St 
Risk Budget 5 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Risk Budget 10 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Risk Budget 20 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.09 
Investment Period 06/2006 - 01/2015 
Strategy Sh So Var ES Cal St 
Risk Budget 5 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Risk Budget 10 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Risk Budget 20 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Risk Budget 40 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 10 GMV 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 20 GMV 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Markowitz 40 GMV 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Markowitz 40 MS 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 
First of all, I want to focus on Sharpe and Sortino Ratio. During the first investment period, 
MVO portfolios generally provide a significantly better reward of the non-extreme risk (i.e., 
better performance measures) with respect to their RB peers. The only exceptions are the 
10.00 and 20.00 per cent GMV portfolios, with Sharpe and Sortino Ratio equal to or slightly 
below the ratios of their RB peers. The portfolio that provides the best performance measures 
is the 20.00 per cent MS portfolio, with a Sharpe and a Sortino Ratio equal to 0.20 and 0.25 
respectively. During the second investment period, the difference between the two approaches 
tend to disappear and the portfolios present very similar performance measures. However, the 
MVO portfolios tend to exhibit slightly higher ratios than their RB portfolios (1 or 2 bps 
higher). This results are the opposite with respect to what I found in the previous subpara-
graph. This confirmed that MVO portfolios benefited from the implementation of the EWMA 
method in inputs estimation. The analysis of the measures focused on extreme risk leads to 
 114 
 
the same conclusions derived for the normal performance measure. In the first period, MVO 
portfolios tend to present better performance measures, while in the second period we have 
very similar rewards of the extreme risk. Looking at the time evolution, during the second pe-
riod, GMV and RB portfolios present stable performance measures. A significant worsening 
is present only for the 20.00 per cent RB portfolio, with the Sharpe and the Sortino Ratio that 
moved from 0.12 and 0.14 to 0.08 and 0.10 respectively. On the contrary, MS portfolios pre-
sent a significant drop in the level of the performance measures. The 10.00 per cent MS port-
folio Sharpe and Sortino Ratios decrease from 0.17 and 0.21 to 0.11 and 0.13 respectively. 
Moreover, the 20.00 per cent MS portfolio exhibits performance measures that are close to the 
half of the level presented in the first period. Comparing rolling and EWMA portfolios, the 
performance measures of the rolling portfolios over the last investment period exhibit the 
highest level, as expected. If we compare the 5.00 and the 10.00 per cent RB portfolios over 
the same investment period, rolling portfolios exhibit better performance measures than EW-
MA portfolios. The Sharpe and the Sortino Ratio are 0.14 vs 0.11 and 0.15 vs 0.13, for the 
5.00 per cent RB portfolios, and 0.17 vs 0.13 and 0.17 vs 0.14, for the 5.00 per cent RB port-
folios. However, Rolling RB portfolios present worse performance measures than EWMA 
MS portfolios over the first investment period, as expected in theory. In fact, the situation pre-
sented in the previous subparagraph was anomalous from a theoretical point of view, since in 
expectations the Sharpe Ratio of a MS portfolio should be higher than the ratio of a RB port-
folio. However, I want to clarify again that the aim of Risk Budgeting Approach is to reduce 
and diversify risk, and not to construct highly performing portfolios. Thus, the results still re-
main satisfactory. 
Finally, the last step is the Tracking Error (TE) Analysis. I used the same tools presented in 
the previous paragraph (i.e., Tracking Error, Tracking Error Volatility, Semi-TEV, Infor-
mation Ratio and Semi-IR). The benchmark considered is the GDP-weighted portfolio of De-
veloped Markets. I recall that the portfolio presents an average monthly return and volatility 
equal to 0.47 and 3.69 per cent respectively, over the 10-year investment period. Average 
monthly return and volatility move to 0.36 and 3.78 during the second investment period. Av-
erage monthly return is higher than the average returns exhibited by RB portfolios. However, 
the risk is higher and especially in the second period this difference is important, usually 
higher than 10 bps. Table 18 summarizes the TE analysis. 
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Table 18 – Tracking Error Analysis (EWMA) 
Investment Period 02/2005 - 01/2015 
Strategy TE TEV Semi-TEV IR Semi-IR 
Risk Budget 5 -0.06 1.01 0.96 -0.06 -0.06 
Risk Budget 10 -0.02 1.08 0.92 -0.02 -0.02 
Risk Budget 20 -0.06 1.23 0.92 -0.05 -0.06 
Markowitz 5 GMV 0.00 0.67 0.45 0.00 0.00 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.10 0.70 0.46 0.14 0.22 
Markowitz 10 GMV -0.02 0.92 0.72 -0.03 -0.03 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.17 0.99 0.63 0.17 0.26 
Markowitz 20 GMV -0.05 1.54 1.32 -0.03 -0.04 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.27 1.54 0.93 0.18 0.29 
Investment Period 06/2006 - 01/2015 
Strategy TE TEV Semi-TEV IR Semi-IR 
Risk Budget 5 -0.10 1.07 0.98 -0.10 -0.11 
Risk Budget 10 -0.06 1.14 0.94 -0.05 -0.07 
Risk Budget 20 -0.13 1.29 0.93 -0.10 -0.14 
Risk Budget 40 -0.13 1.76 1.23 -0.08 -0.11 
Markowitz 5 GMV -0.02 0.69 0.47 -0.03 -0.05 
Markowitz 5 MS 0.08 0.69 0.47 0.12 0.17 
Markowitz 10 GMV -0.06 0.95 0.74 -0.06 -0.08 
Markowitz 10 MS 0.15 0.98 0.64 0.16 0.24 
Markowitz 20 GMV -0.11 1.59 1.36 -0.07 -0.08 
Markowitz 20 MS 0.29 1.53 0.95 0.19 0.30 
Markowitz 40 GMV -0.13 2.31 1.61 -0.06 -0.08 
Markowitz 40 MS 0.40 2.54 1.41 0.16 0.28 
 
The MS portfolios are the only portfolios able to outperform the benchmark, both in the 
first and in the second period. Looking at the Information Ratio, the 20.00 per cent MS port-
folio present the highest value in both the periods, with 0.18 and 0.19. RB and GMV portfoli-
os always exhibit a negative Information Ratio. 5.00 and 10.00 per cent EWMA MS portfoli-
os exhibit higher Information Ratio than their Rolling RB peers (0.14 vs 0.09  and 0.17 vs 
0.07 respectively). TE Analysis confirmed that EWMA inputs boost MS portfolios perfor-
mance. In this way, the theoretical framework is partially restored. In any case, EWMA RB 
portfolios obtained the results expected in theory, and under some aspects better than the ex-
pectations. Moreover, these results are in line with the objectives of the Risk Budgeting Ap-
proach. In fact, EWMA RB portfolios are still the portfolios with the lowest risk between the 
EWMA portfolios. However, differently from the rolling RB portfolios, EWMA RB portfoli-
os do not exhibit good performances when compared with EWMA MVO portfolios. 
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5.2.3 Daily Value at Risk: RB and MVO – Rolling and EWMA Method 
The last topic I want to discuss is related to Risk Management procedures. In this para-
graph, I present the computations of the daily Value at Risk (VaR). Given the number of port-
folios, it was not possible to compute the daily VaR for all of them and for all the investment 
period. For this reason, I focused on the 5.00 per cent portfolios, considering both the RB and 
the MVO portfolios. The reason behind that choice is that they represent, with the 10.00 per 
cent portfolios, the most realistic and relevant portfolios in practice
143
. I computed the daily 
VaR over the last year and I compare the results between the different portfolios and the 
GDP-weighted Developed Markets portfolio. In this way, I can analyze if the introduction of 
Frontier Markets significantly impact, in a positive or in a negative way, the most diffused 
measure of extreme risk. 
Financial risk management represents the set of concepts, tools, approaches and measures 
whose final purpose is to actively manage risks. Risk management in financial world is a fun-
damental activity, both for economic and regulatory reasons. First of all, the whole society has 
an interest in the stability of the financial system. Efficient and stable financial system is a 
fundamental condition for economic growth and for the wealth of the society. Proper risk 
management allows controlling the spill-over of financial risks that otherwise might under-
mine the stability and the functioning of the financial system. Secondly, the legal system re-
quires the implementation of risk management procedures. The principles behind the inter-
vention of the legislator are generally the preservation of the stability of the financial system 
and the protection of savings. In asset management activity, the most relevant risk is the mar-
ket risk (i.e., the risk of a change in the value of a financial position due to changes in the val-
ue of the underlying components, such as stock and bond prices, exchange rates, commodity 
prices, etc.). The assessment of market risk can count on a regulated framework provided by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, with minimum requirements on the model 
choice, the adoption and the test of internal procedure
144
. The framework evolved during the 
years, but it maintained some core principles. The most important is the definition of the risk 
measure. This should represent the maximum loss a portfolio or an instrument can suffer at 
the 99.00 per cent probability in the holding period, which is the definition of the VaR. Thus, 
                                                          
143
 In financial market practice it is difficult to find portfolios with a risk or a weight exposure on illiquid alterna-
tive asset class above 10.00 per cent. The exceptions are generally the thematic-portfolio or the hedge funds. 
However, in this thesis I wanted to provide a wider analysis, considering also larger exposures. 
144
 For more details see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a,b) and the regulatory developments 
provided in the next Basel agreements (Basel II and Basel III) and available at the following website: 
www.bis.org/bcbs. 
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the VaR is fundamental in risk management procedures, since it is the most relevant risk 
measure for the assessment of market risk. 
There is a consistent literature on the best approaches to compute the VaR
145
. In this thesis 
I used the EGARCH(1,1) model with Student Innovations. GARCH models have been intro-
duced to capture the volatility clustering feature of financial returns time series (i.e., the per-
sistence of volatility). In addition to that, the EGARCH specification allows for leverage ef-
fect (i.e., positive shocks decrease conditional variances). As above-mentioned, I computed 
the VaR for the 5.00 per cent RB and MVO portfolios and for the GDP-Weighted Developed 
Market portfolio over the last year, from February 2014 to January 2015. Figure 41 shows the 
time-evolution of the daily VaR for the seven different portfolios. The VaR time series is the 
green line. Table 19 presents the average daily VaR for the seven portfolios considered. 
Figure 41 – Daily Value at Risk from 02/2013 to 01/2015 
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 See for example the book of Jorion (2007). 
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Table 19 – Average Daily Value at Risk from 02/2013 to 01/2015 
ALLOCATIONS 
INPUT 
Rolling EWMA 
5% Risk Budgeting 1.43 1.31 
5% Global Minimum Variance 1.50 0.21 
5% Maximum Sharpe 1.55 1.57 
GDPw Developed Markets 1.64 
 
We have already seen that RB portfolios provide the lowest volatility (i.e., non-extreme 
risk measure) between the portfolios considered in this thesis. Looking at the average daily 
VaR, RB portfolios provide a lower VaR than the GDP-weighted Developed Market portfo-
lio. Moreover, with the exception of the 5.00 per cent EWMA GMV, which is a peculiar case 
as can be seen in Figure 41, RB portfolios provide significantly lower average daily VaR than 
MVO portfolios. However, also the MVO portfolios present an average VaR lower than the 
GDP-weighted Developed Market portfolio. The introduction of Frontier Markets in interna-
tionally diversified portfolios, with a realistic exposure in terms of risk and weights, didn’t in-
crease the VaR, at least in the last year. Thus, Frontier Markets help to mitigate the portfolio 
risk, especially using the Risk Budgeting Approach in portfolio construction. This mitigation 
is present for both the non-extreme and the extreme risk. Moreover, a lower VaR implies a 
lower capital requirement associated to market risk for the bank. This represents costs reduc-
tion for the bank. In fact, minimal capital requirement are an immobilization of resources and 
liquidity, representing an opportunity cost of investing resources. Finally, the risk exposure 
measured by the VaR depends crucially on the underlying model used for the return series. 
One of the ways to test the accuracy of the model is the back-testing of the exceptions to the 
model, i.e. the number of times that the daily returns exceed the VaR. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 41, daily returns exceeded the VaR between three and four times over the last year (260 
days) for all the portfolios. Thus, I can conclude that the model is quite accurate
146
. 
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 The Market Risk Amendment of the Basel I agreement established a similar procedure for the testing the ac-
curacy of internal procedures. The number of exceptions that I found in my portfolios are lower than the mini-
mum threshold for the application of the sanctions, confirming the validity of the approach.  
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6 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I implemented the Risk Budgeting Approach proposed by Bruder and Ron-
calli (2012) to construct internationally diversified portfolio, with a variable portion invested 
in the Frontier Market asset class. In particular, I constructed four risk budgeting portfolios, 
with a maximum risk exposure to Frontier Markets equal to 5.00, 10.00, 20.00 and 40.00 per 
cent. I simulated the activity of an asset manager that had to construct internationally diversi-
fied portfolios at the beginning of 2005. I used the same information available to him in each 
month, in order to give to my work an ex-ante perspective. The first aim of the thesis was to 
construct a tool, the Country Risk Indicator, useful to design the individual risk budgets on 
Frontier Markets. The second objective was to test the validity of the approach, comparing 
risk budgeting portfolios with their mean-variance optimized peers, with Global Minimum 
Variance and Maximum Sharpe allocation.  
Risk budgeting portfolio is a generalization of the equally risk contribution portfolio (Mail-
lard, Roncalli and Teiletche [2010]), with the risk budgets that are not necessarily the same. It 
is an heuristic method, since financial theory does not promote it as an optimal portfolio. 
However, risk budgeting portfolios are quite diffused in financial market practice. In particu-
lar they are used: 
 as alternative benchmarks with respect to cap-weighted benchmarks; 
 in risk management process; 
 as a starting point for the implementation of active management strategy. 
In this thesis, I focused on equity asset class. The investment universe is composed by 
three broad indices of Developed Markets, one broad index of Emerging Markets and thirty-
one standalone-country indices of Frontier Markets, provided by Morgan Stanley Capital In-
ternational. In the last years, asset managers are seeking for new investment opportunities able 
to boost portfolio performances, both in terms of returns and risk management. For this rea-
son, I focused on Frontier Markets, since they represent an alternative asset class. These mar-
kets are smaller and less liquid than Developed and Emerging Markets. Section 3 discussed 
their basic characteristics. As expected, these markets generally exhibit higher risk than Core 
Markets (i.e., Developed and Emerging Markets). However, they present a very positive fea-
ture. In fact, they are less correlated within the group and with the other asset classes. Thus, 
they could be a source of potential diversification benefits, especially through the reduction of 
portfolio risk. The low correlation with traditional equity markets makes the Frontier Markets 
a perfect alternative asset class. 
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To design the risk budgets, I computed the Country Risk Indicator. This tool tried to use a 
simplified procedure of Country Risk Assessment to forecast individual country risk. As men-
tioned in the previous sections, the idea of using macroeconomic variable to manage the risk 
budgets is not new. However, previous works focused only on a small set of macroeconomic 
variable (i.e., GDP and public debt) able to partially assess only the sovereign risk. In Section 
4, I highlighted that country risk is a broad aggregate of different types of risk and the sover-
eign risk is only one component. For this reason, my Country Risk Indicator is based on a 
larger set of variables. It is divided in sub-indicators, in order to assess the different types of 
risk (e.g., macroeconomic, sovereign, political-institutional and non-transfer risk). Through 
the assessment of country risk, I tried to avoid the major crises (i.e., financial, banking and 
currency crises) or other disruptive events (e.g., wars) that can lead to huge losses. These 
losses are amplified by the relative illiquidity of Frontier Markets, that complicates the exit 
process from these stock markets. Focusing on the geographical area, the Frontier Markets 
that exhibit the lowest country risk are the Middle-East countries. These countries benefit 
from positive Liquidity Risk Indicator, due to their consistent total reserves. However, during 
the last years, the distance between the different countries became tighter. 
The total risk budget exposure on the Frontier Market asset class is variable over the in-
vestment period. It depends on the international liquidity framework and on the perception of 
the economic and financial risk over the Frontier Markets, proxied by the average Country 
Risk Indicator. After the construction of the risk budgets, I estimated the other inputs of the 
risk budgeting and the mean-variance optimization algorithms (i.e., expected returns and vari-
ance-covariance matrix). I implemented a 60-month rolling method and a 12-month exponen-
tial weighted moving average method. Using Matlab software, I constructed and compared 
the different allocations over a variable investment period (from 56 to 120 months), depend-
ing on the Frontier Market asset class exposure and the methodology adopted to estimate the 
inputs. Section 5 present the portfolio analysis, performed using a wide set of tools. Results 
are quite interesting. First of all, risk budgeting portfolio exhibit lower risk than mean-
variance optimized portfolios (both GMV and MS portfolios). This result is valid inde-
pendently from the investment period considered, from the risk/weight exposure on Frontier 
Markets and from the methodology used in the estimation of the inputs. The most surprising 
thing is that risk budgeting portfolios present a risk lower than global minimum variance 
peers. The result is better than what I expected from the theory, confirming the validity of the 
Country Risk Indicator Approach in the design of the risk budgets. About risk budgeting port-
folios performances, I am not able to derive general conclusions. In fact, performance and 
tracking error analysis conclusions depend on the investment period considered, the input es-
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timation method used, the risk/weight exposure on Frontier Market asset class and the mean-
variance optimized allocation considered. In general, risk budgeting portfolios generated us-
ing rolling method for the estimation of the inputs, provide in some cases superior perfor-
mances with respect to mean-variance optimized portfolios. In particular, they sometimes ex-
hibit a Sharpe Ratio higher than the Maximum Sharpe portfolios. Again, this result is definite-
ly better than what I expected. The introduction of the EWMA method penalized risk budget-
ing portfolios, with a general reduction of the performances and a slightly increase in risk. On 
the contrary, this method boost Maximum Sharpe portfolios performances. This methodology 
produces highly variable inputs, significantly reducing the stability of the allocation. Thus, it 
eliminates one of the most positive feature of the risk budgeting methodology, that is the sta-
bility of the asset allocation. About the comparison with a GDP-weighted portfolio of Devel-
oped Markets, the internationally diversified portfolios generated in this thesis are not able to 
provide higher performances. The only exceptions are the 5.00 and 10.00 per cent rolling risk 
budgeting portfolios and the EWMA Maximum Sharpe portfolios. The main constraints on 
internationally diversified portfolios performances are the modest returns of some Frontier 
Markets during the last five years. These years were characterized by the recovery from the 
2008 Financial Crisis. However, only a small set of Frontier Markets were able to replicate 
the performance of the US stock market, that constitutes the major asset of the GDP-weighted 
Developed Market portfolio. On the risk side, the portfolios including Frontier Market asset 
class generally provide lower risk than the GDP-weighted portfolio of Developed Markets, 
regardless of the allocation considered. This result is consistent with the expectations. Frontier 
Markets are a source of diversification benefits, given their relatively low correlation. The re-
duction in risk is particularly relevant for the risk budgeting portfolios. As shown in Section 
5, risk budgeting portfolios present an higher degree of diversification, both in terms of risk 
and weights, with respect to mean-variance optimized portfolios. This result was largely ex-
pected, since the core aspect of the Risk Budgeting Approach is the risk diversification. 
Moreover, the generation of poorly diversified portfolios is one of the main drawback of the 
Markowitz model. The higher degree of diversification of risk budgeting portfolios implied 
higher diversification benefits in risk reduction. In addition to that, it helps to reduce the nega-
tive impact of country-specific shocks, that can be particularly severe when dealing with illiq-
uid asset. Finally, I completed the risk analysis with the computation of the daily VaR for the 
5.00 per cent portfolios (both RB and MVO portfolios) over the last year. Except for one non-
normal case, risk budgeting portfolios exhibit the lowest average daily VaR. This result is 
confirmed even considering the GDP-weighted portfolio of Developed Markets. Thus, the 
combination of risk budgeting techniques and Country Risk Assessment procedure, prove to 
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be fundamental in risk management and led to satisfactory results, both in terms of non-
extreme risk (e.g., volatility) and in terms of extreme risk (e.g., value at risk). 
This thesis can represent a starting point for future works, given the fact that the literature 
on Frontier Markets is quite limited. An important further development regards the construc-
tion of the Country Risk Indicator. In particular, thanks to the increasing number of infor-
mation available for developing countries, it will be possible to substitute some variables, or 
to integrate the set, with better determinants of the various type of risk assessed
147
. Moreover, 
it will be possible to determine the weights assigned to the various determinants of the risks 
on the basis of more consistent models, given the availability of longer returns time series. 
The second important development regards the use of Risk Budgeting Approach. As above-
mentioned, risk budgeting portfolios, constructed on the basis of the Country Risk Indicator, 
exhibit a consistent lower risk than mean-variance optimized portfolios. However, I was not 
able to derive any conclusion about the performance. I suggest to use the risk budgeting port-
folios created in this work as a base for the implementation of an active management strategy. 
The aim will be to test whether the combination of risk budgeting, country risk evaluation and 
active management will be able to generate allocations able to outperform mean-variance op-
timized portfolios and Developed Market portfolios in a consistent way, maintaining the risk 
under control. 
In conclusion, I showed that the introduction of Frontier Markets in an internationally di-
versified portfolio brings significant diversification benefits through risk reduction. These 
benefits are significantly higher when I created portfolios combining the Risk Budgeting Ap-
proach and the Country Risk Indicator (i.e., a Country Risk Assessment tool), confirming the 
validity of the approach used in this thesis. Unfortunately, I was not able to derive clear con-
clusions about the performance of these portfolios. 
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 Some examples are the substitution of the overall government balance with the primary balance and the inte-
gration of the set with debt service and external debt. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Markowitz model optimal weights 
As shown in Eq.(2.9) in paragraph 2.1.1, the optimal portfolio of the risk averse agent is a 
combination of the weights of the Maximum Sharpe and the global minimum variance portfo-
lio. The solution of the simple Markowitz model can be written as: 
?̂? = 𝑫 + 𝑬𝜇𝑝 =
𝐴𝛴−1𝟏 − 𝐵𝛴−1𝒓
∆
+
𝐴𝛴−1𝒓 − 𝐵𝛴−1𝟏
∆
𝜇𝑝 
The expected return and the volatility for the MS and the GMV portfolio can be defined as: 
𝑟𝑀𝑆 =
𝒓′𝛴−1𝟏
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓
=
𝐴
𝐵
               𝜎𝑀𝑆 =
√𝐴
|𝐵|
 
𝑟𝐺𝑀𝑉 =
𝒓𝛴−1𝟏
𝟏′𝛴−1𝟏
=
𝐵
𝐶
               𝜎𝐺𝑀𝑉 =
1
√𝐶
 
Given the relation between weights and portfolio risk and return, the weights of the MS 
and the GMV portfolio are: 
𝑤𝑀𝑆 =
𝛴−1𝒓
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓
               𝑤𝐺𝑀𝑉 =
𝛴−1𝟏
𝟏′𝛴−1𝟏
 
From Eq.(2.9) we can show that starting from the weights of the optimal portfolio of the 
risk averse agent expressed in terms of the combination between the weights of the MS and 
the GMV portfolio, we end up with the general solution: 
?̂? =
𝐵
𝛾
𝑤𝑀𝑆̂ −
𝐵 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝑤𝐺𝑀?̂? =
𝐵
𝛾
𝛴−1𝒓
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓
−
𝐵 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝛴−1𝟏
𝟏′𝛴−1𝟏
 
=
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓
𝛾
𝛴−1𝒓
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓
−
𝟏′𝛴−1𝒓 − 𝛾
𝛾
𝛴−1𝟏
𝟏′𝛴−1𝟏
                   
=
1
𝛾
𝛴−1𝒓 −
𝐵 − 𝛾
𝐶
1
𝛾
𝛴−1𝟏                                           
A.2 The Capital Market Line 
In paragraph 2.1.1, I presented the equations for the capital market line and the return and 
variance of the tangency (i.e., the Maximum Sharpe) portfolio. Recalling these equations, we 
can demonstrate that the slope of the CML is equal to the Sharpe ratio of the MS portfolio. 
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𝜇𝑝 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝜎𝑝√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2 
𝜇𝑀𝑆 =
𝐴 − 𝐵𝑟𝑓
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
                    𝜎𝑀𝑆
2 =
𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
(𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)
2  
From the CML we can see that the intercept is equal to the risk-free rate. The slope is ex-
actly equal to the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio: 
𝜇𝑀𝑆 − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑀𝑆
= (
𝐴 − 𝐵𝑟𝑓
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
− 𝑟𝑓) 
|𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓|
√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
 
                                     = (
𝐴 − 𝐵𝑟𝑓 − (𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)𝑟𝑓
𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓
) 
|𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓|
√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
 
              = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)
𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2
 
              = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝐵 − 𝐶𝑟𝑓)√𝐴 − 2𝐵𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑟𝑓
2 
A.3 Example of Constrained Markowitz model 
As mentioned in Paragraph 2.1.2, a solution to the limits of the Markowitz model is to add 
constraints to the problem presented in Eq.(2.3), in order to obtain more realistic allocations. 
I’m going to present the formulations of some of these constrained Markowitz model.  
A.3.1 No-short-selling constraint 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤     
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 
        𝑤′𝟏 = 1 
     𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 
The no-short-selling constraint is one of the most common constraint, given the impossibil-
ity for some institutional investors to open short positions. However, in it’s pure form it leads 
to poorly diversified portfolio. Thus, it has to be integrated with other constraints.  
A.3.2 Linear Equalities or Inequalities 
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𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤     
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 
        𝑤′𝟏 = 1 
                                     𝐻𝑤 = ℎ      𝑜𝑟      𝐻𝑤 ≤ ℎ 
H is a matrix qxn and h is a vector qx1 to set q linear constraints. It can be added to the no-
short-selling constraint. It is mainly used to create group constraints, such as imposing upper 
and/or lower bound or a specific weight to a particular asset class or group of assets with ho-
mogenous characteristics (e.g., geographical area, sector, etc.). 
A.3.3 Upper and Lower Bounds 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤     
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 
        𝑤′𝟏 = 1 
            𝑙 ≤ 𝑤𝑖 ≤ 𝑢 
Lower and upper bound constraints are used to limit the minimum and the maximum expo-
sure on a single asset. We can impose only lower bounds, only upper bounds or both lower 
and upper bounds (as in the example). They are useful in order to guarantee a minimum diver-
sification. In fact the number of assets included in the portfolio will be equal to the reciprocal 
of the upper bound u. Moreover the lower bounds can be set in order to allow the short-
selling, limiting the maximum exposure (in reality there are several limits for some institu-
tional investors on the size of short selling positions). 
A.3.4 Turnover constraint 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑤  𝑤
′𝛴𝑤     
𝑠. 𝑡𝑜  𝜇𝑝 = 𝑤
′𝒓 
        𝑤′𝟏 = 1 
                      
1
2
|𝑤 − ?̃?|𝟏 ≤ 𝜏 
Turnover constraint is set to limit the trading activity or the portfolio rotation, consequently 
reducing the impact of transaction costs on portfolio performances. Given the initial allocation 
?̃?, τ is the maximum turnover allowed, representing the fraction of portfolio that can change 
in  the re-allocation process. This constraint is very useful and common in real application. 
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A.3.5 The Efficient Frontier 
For all of these optimal problems, the resulting efficient frontier will shift to the right with 
respect to the unconstrained efficient frontier, as shown in Figure A.1 for no short selling con-
straint: 
Figure A.1: Unconstrained vs Constrained Efficient Frontier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.4 Euler Decomposition of the Volatility Risk Measure 
I want to show that the volatility risk measure satisfies the Euler decomposition of the port-
folio risk presented in Eq.(2.20): 
𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) =∑𝑤𝑖 ∙
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛) = 𝑤𝑖 ∙
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
 
Using the volatility as the risk measure we obtain the Eq.(2.23), Eq.(2.24) and Eq.(2.25) 
and we can provide the check that volatility satisfies the Euler decomposition: 
(𝑤) = 𝜎(𝑤) = √𝑤′𝛴𝑤               
𝜕 𝑅(𝑤)
𝜕 𝑤𝑖
=
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
               𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑤) = 𝑤𝑖
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
 
∑𝑅𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝑤𝑖
(𝛴𝑤)𝑖
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑤′
𝛴𝑤
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
= √𝑤′𝛴𝑤 = 𝜎(𝑤) 
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The same proof can be done for other risk measures. As mentioned in Paragraph 2.2.1, un-
der the assumptions of normally distributed returns, value at risk and expected shortfall are 
admissible risk measures: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑤; 𝛼) = 𝛷−1(𝛼)√𝑤′𝛴𝑤 
𝐸𝑆(𝑤; 𝛼) =
1
1 − 𝛼
√
𝑤′𝛴𝑤
2𝜋
𝑒−
1
2(𝛷
−1(𝛼))
2
 
A.5 Risk Budgeting Approach explicit solutions 
A.5.1 Explicit solution for the two-asset case (n = 2) 
We start from the case in which there are two assets and the weights are subjected to a pos-
itive constraint. Let w be the vector of weights (composed by y and (1-y)), (b,1-b) be the vec-
tor of budgets and ρ be the correlation. 
(
 𝑅𝐶1 
 𝑅𝐶2 
) =
1
𝜎(𝑤)
(
𝑦2𝜎1
2 + 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)𝜌𝜎1𝜎2
(1 − 𝑦)2𝜎2
2 + 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)𝜌𝜎1𝜎2
) 
𝑦∗ =
(𝑏 − 1 2⁄ )𝜌𝜎1𝜎2 − 𝑏𝜎2
2 + 𝜎1𝜎2√(𝑏 −
1
2⁄ )
2
𝜌2𝑏(1 − 𝑏)
(1 − 𝑏)𝜎1
2 − 𝑏𝜎2
2 + 2𝜌𝜎1𝜎2
 
The solution is quite complex even with only two assets. To make easier the interpretation 
I show three extreme cases: 
𝜌 = 0     ⇒      𝑦∗ =
𝜎2√𝑏
𝜎1√1 − 𝑏 + 𝜎2√𝑏
 
𝜌 = 1     ⇒      𝑦∗ =
𝜎2𝑏
𝜎1(1 − 𝑏) + 𝜎2𝑏
  
𝜌 = −1   ⇒      𝑦∗ =
𝜎2
𝜎1 + 𝜎2
                      
When the assets are not correlated, the weight of the asset i is proportional to the square 
root of its risk budget and inversely proportional to its volatility. This conclusions are quite 
intuitive. In fact, the higher the budget assigned to a particular asset and the higher will be the 
weight, while the higher the volatility and the lower will be its weight. If the assets are per-
fectly correlated, the weight is proportional to the risk budget, instead of its square root. Final-
ly if the assets are perfectly negative correlated the optimal weight doesn’t depend on the risk 
budgets, but on the volatilities of the two assets. 
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A.5.2 General case (n > 2) with constant correlation 
To provide an explicit solution for the general case we have to introduce the assumption of 
constant correlation (i.e., ρij = ρ). If the assets are not correlated (i.e., ρ = 0), we have the fol-
lowing equation for the risk contributions, and given the normalizing budget constraints, we 
can find the explicit solution: 
𝑅𝐶𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝜎(𝑤)     ∀ 𝑖          ⇒           √𝑏𝑗𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 = √𝑏𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗 
𝑤∗ =
√𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖
−1
∑ √𝑏𝑗𝜎𝑗
−1𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The weight of asset i is proportional to the square root of its risk budget and inversely pro-
portional to its volatility, as in the two-asset case. In the case of perfect correlation (i.e., ρ = 
1), we have: 
𝑅𝐶𝑖 =
𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖(∑ 𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )
𝜎(𝑤)
     ∀ 𝑖          ⇒           𝑏𝑗𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗 
𝑤∗ =
𝑏𝑖𝜎𝑖
−1
∑ 𝑏𝑗𝜎𝑗
−1𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Again, the solution is similar to the one provide in the two-asset case, with the weight of 
the asset proportional to its risk budget and inversely proportional to its volatility. The last 
explicit solution that can be found is the case in which the constant correlation is equal to the 
lower bound of the constant correlation matrix (i.e., ρ = -1/(n-1)). In this case the volatility of 
the portfolio is equal to zero and the solution is the equal risk contribution (ERC) portfolio: 
𝑤∗ =
𝜎𝑖
−1
∑ 𝜎𝑗
−1𝑛
𝑖=1
 
In this case the solution doesn’t depend on the risk budgets, that are equal for all the assets. 
The proof of this last result is reported below, with the first equation defining the risk budget-
ing problem with constant correlation: 
𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 ((1 − 𝜌)𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 + 𝜌(∑𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)) = 𝑏𝑖𝜎
2(𝑤) 
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(1 − 𝜌)𝑤𝑖
2𝜎𝑖
2 +
𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗
(𝑏𝑗𝜎
2(𝑤) − (1 − 𝜌)𝑤𝑗
2𝜎𝑗
2) = 𝑏𝑖𝜎
2(𝑤)  
𝑖𝑓    𝜎2(𝑤) = 0     ⇒      𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗 = ?̅? 
𝜎2(𝑤) = 𝜌∑𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
(∑𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
) + (1 − 𝜌)∑𝑤𝑖
2𝜎𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝜌𝑛2?̅?2 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑛?̅?2 
 
If the correlation reaches the minimum (i.e., ρ = -1/(n-1)), it’s possible to verify that the 
volatility of the portfolio is equal to zero. Thus, the ERC portfolio is the solution when the 
constant correlation reaches its lower bound. The weight is obviously inversely proportional 
to its volatility. Except for these three special and extreme cases, it is not possible to find an 
explicit solution for the general case. However, it is possible to find an implicit solution. Giv-
en the formulation of the risk budgeting problem with constant correlation matrix: 
𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 ((1 − 𝜌)𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖 + 𝜌(∑𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
)) = 𝑏𝑖𝜎
2(𝑤)                   𝑖𝑓     𝑊𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝜎𝑖       𝐵𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝜎
2(𝑤) 
(1 − 𝜌)𝑊𝑖
2 + 𝜌𝑊𝑖 (∑𝑊𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
) = 𝐵𝑖       ⇒      𝑤𝑖 =
𝑓𝑖(𝜌, 𝑏)𝜎𝑖
−1
∑ 𝑓𝑗(𝜌, 𝑏)𝜎𝑗
−1𝑛
𝑗=1
 
The function fi depends on the constant correlation and on the risk budgets and it general-
izes the solution found in the three extreme cases. This function has to satisfy: 
𝑓𝑖(0, 𝑏) = √𝑏𝑖          𝑓𝑖(1, 𝑏) = 𝑏𝑖          𝑓𝑖(−(𝑛 − 1)
−1, 𝑏) = 1 
In this way, from the implicit solution we can derive the explicit solution in the three spe-
cial cases. 
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Appendix B 
B.1 Investment Universe 
Table B.1 – Frontier Markets Complete List 
 
MSCI S&P FTSE RUSSELL 
 L
A
T
IN
  
  
  
  
A
M
E
R
IC
A
 
Argentina   Argentina   Argentina   Argentina   
Jamaica   Ecuador       Trinidad & Tobago   
Trinidad & Tobago   Jamaica           
    Panama           
    Trinidad & Tobago           
E
U
R
O
P
E
 
Bosnia Herzegovina  Serbia Bulgaria  Lithuania Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Macedonia 
Bulgaria  Slovenia Croatia  Romania Croatia Serbia Croatia Malta 
Croatia  Ukraine Cyprus  Slovakia Cyprus Slovakia Cyprus Romania 
Estonia   Estonia  Slovenia Estonia Slovenia Estonia Serbia 
Lithuania   Georgia  Ukraine Lithuania   Kazakhstan Slovakia 
Kazakhstan   Kazakhstan   Macedonia   Kyrgyzstan Slovenia 
Romania   Latvia   Malta   Lithuania Ukraine 
A
F
R
IC
A
 
Botswana  Mauritius Botswana  Tunisia Botswana   Botswana Nigeria 
Benin  Morocco Côte d'Ivore  Zambia Côte d'Ivore   Egypt Tunisia 
Burkina Faso  Nigeria Egypt   Ghana   Gabon Zambia 
Côte d'Ivore  Senegal Kenya   Kenya   Ghana   
Guinea Bissau  Togo Mauritius   Mauritius   Kenya   
Ghana  Tunisia Namibia   Nigeria   Mauritius   
Kenya  Zimbabwe Nigeria   Tunisia   Namibia   
M
ID
D
L
E
 E
A
S
T
 
Bahrain   Bahrain   Bahrain   Bahrain   
Jordan   Jordan   Jordan   Jordan   
Kuwait   Kuwait   Oman   Kuwait   
Lebanon   Lebanon   Qatar   Oman   
Oman   Oman       Qatar   
Palestine               
Saudi Arabia               
A
S
IA
 
Bangladesh   Bangladesh   Bangladesh   Bangladesh   
Pakistan   Cambodia   Sri Lanka   Pakistan   
Sri Lanka   Pakistan   Vietnam   Papua New Guinea   
Vietnam   Sri Lanka       Sri Lanka   
    Vietnam       Vietnam   
 
38 36 26 36 
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Table B.2 – Investment Universe Complete Set 
DEVELOPED EMERGING FRONTIER 
MSCI North America MSCI Emerging Markets MSCI Argentina 
Canada Brazil MSCI Jamaica (1) 
US Chile MSCI Trinidad & Tobago (4) 
  Colombia MSCI Bosnia Herzegovina (2) 
MSCI  Europe & Middle East Mexico MSCI Bulgaria 
Austria Peru MSCI Croatia 
Belgium Czech Republic MSCI Estonia 
Denmark Greece MSCI Lithuania 
Finland Hungary MSCI Kazakhstan 
France Poland MSCI Romania 
Germany Russia MSCI Serbia 
Ireland Egypt MSCI Slovenia 
Israel Qatar MSCI Ukraine 
Italy South Africa MSCI Botswana (1) 
Netherlands Turkey MSCI Ghana (1) 
Norway UAE MSCI Kenya 
Portugal China MSCI Mauritius 
Spain India MSCI Morocco 
Sweden Indonesia MSCI Nigeria 
Switzerland Korea MSCI Tunisia 
United Kingdom Malaysia MSCI WAEMU (6) 
  Philippines Benin 
MSCI Pacific Taiwan Burkina Faso 
Australia Thailand Côte d'Ivore 
Hong Kong   Guinea Bissau 
Japan   Senegal 
New Zeland   Togo 
Singapore   MSCI Zimbabwe (3) 
    MSCI Bahrain 
    MSCI Jordan 
    MSCI Kuwait 
    MSCI Lebanon 
    MSCI Oman 
    MSCI Palestine (5) 
    MSCI Saudi Arabia 
    MSCI Bangladesh 
    MSCI Pakistan 
    MSCI Sri Lanka 
    MSCI Vietnam 
(1) Added as stand-alone country at the November 2008 Semi-Annual Index Review 
(2) Added as stand-alone country at the May 2010 Semi-Annual Index Review 
(3) Added as stand-alone country at the November 2010 Semi-Annual Index Review 
(4) Added as stand-alone country at the May 2011 Semi-Annual Index Review 
(5) Added as stand-alone country at the May 2013 Semi-Annual Index Review 
(6) Added as stand-alone country at the May 2014 Semi-Annual Index Review 
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B.2 MSCI Indices – Prices and Returns Time Series (EUR) 
 
Figure B.1 – Core indices Price Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.2 – Frontier Markets indices Price Series 
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Figure B.3 – Core indices Return Series and 12-Month Moving Average 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4 – Core indices Return Series and 12-Month Moving Average 
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B.3 Currency Composition 
 
Figure B.5 – Spot Exchange Rate 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Economic Risk Indicator 
REAL GDP GROWTH INDICATOR POINTS 
Current Value (A) 8 
Missing Data 0 
Negative Real GDP Growth 0 
Positive Real GDP Growth 8 
Comparison with previous years (B) 7 
Missing Data 0 
RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -5.00% 0 
RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 0.00%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
0 
-5.00% ≤ RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -2.50%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
1 
-2.50% ≤ RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
2 
RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 0.00%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
2 
0.00% ≤ RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) < 5.00%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
6 
RGDPGrowth - AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 5.00%  & 
AvRGDPGrowth (lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
7 
Total (A + B) 15 
 
INFLATION INDICATOR POINTS 
Missing Data 0 
Deflation 0 
Hyperinflation (Inflation  ≥ 25.00%) 0 
Inflation - AvInflation(lag1 and 2) ≥ 10.00% 0 
Low Inflation (0.00% ≤ Inflation ≤ 0.50%) 3 
High Inflation (5.00% ≤ Inflation ≤ 25.00%) 3 
Normal Inflation (0.50% ≤ Inflation ≤ 5.00%) 5 
Total 5 
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CURENT ACCOUNT BALANCE INDICATOR POINTS 
Current Value (A) 1 
Missing Data 0 
Negative Current Account Balance 0 
Positive Current Account Balance 1 
Comparison with previous years (B) 4 
Missing Data 0 
CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -5.00%   &    AvCA(lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 0 
-5.00% ≤ CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 0.00%   & 
AvCA(lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
1 
CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -5.00%   &    AvCA(lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 1 
0.00% ≤ CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 5.00%   & 
AvCA(lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
3 
-5.00% ≤ CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 0.00%   & 
AvCA(lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
3 
CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 5.00%   &    AvCA(lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 4 
CA - AvCA (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 0.00%   &    AvCA(lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 4 
Total (A + B) 5 
 
EXPORT INDICATOR POINTS 
Fuel and Metal Exports (A) Agricultural Exports (B) 5 
    F&M Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 10.00%     AG Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 10.00% 5 
Missing Data Missing Data 0 
No Missing Data No Missing Data 5 
10.00% ≤ F&M Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 25.00%   10.00% ≤ AG Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 25.00% 5 
Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -10.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -10.00% 0 
-10.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -5.00% -10.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -5.00% 1 
-5.00% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% -5.00% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% 2 
0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 10.00% 0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 10.00% 4 
Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 10.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 10.00% 5 
25.00% ≤ F&M Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 50.00%   25.00% ≤ AG Exp (% of Tot Exp) < 50.00% 5 
Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -5.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -5.00% 0 
-5.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -2.50% -5.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -2.50% 1 
-2.50% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% -2.50% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% 2 
0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 5.00% 0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 5.00% 4 
Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 5.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 5.00% 5 
F&M Exp (% of Tot Exp) ≥ 50.00%   AG Exp (% of Tot Exp) ≥ 50.00% 5 
Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -3.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -3.00% 0 
-3.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -1.50% -3.00% < Return on IMF COM Index ≤ -1.50% 1 
-1.50% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% -1.50% < Return on IMF COM Index < 0.00% 2 
0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 3.00% 0.00% ≤ Return on IMF COM Index < 3.00% 4 
Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 3.00% Return on IMF COM Index ≥ 3.00% 5 
Total (A + B) 10 
 146 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE INDICATOR POINTS 
General Government Gross Debt-to-GDP Ratio Current Value (A) 2 
Missing Data 0 
Debt-to-GDP Ratio ≥ 90.00% 0 
Debt-to-GDP Ratio < 90.00% 2 
General Government Gross Debt-to-GDP Ratio Comparison with previous years (B) 4 
Missing Data 0 
Debt-to-GDP Ratio - AvDebt-to-GDP Ratio (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 10.00% 0 
0.00% < Debt-to-GDP Ratio - AvDebt-to-GDP Ratio (lag 1 and 2) < 10.00% 1 
-5.00% < Debt-to-GDP Ratio - AvDebt-to-GDP Ratio (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 0.00% 3 
Debt-to-GDP Ratio - AvDebt-to-GDP Ratio (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -5.00% 4 
General Government Net Balance (% of GDP) Current Value (C) 4 
Missing Data 0 
Net Balance ≤ -5.00% 0 
-5.00% < Net Balance < 0.00% 2 
Net Balance ≥ 0.00%  4 
General Government Net Balance (% of GDP) Comparison with previous years (D) 5 
Missing Data 0 
Net Balance - AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) ≤ -5.00%     & 
AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
0 
-5.00% ≤ Net Balance - AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) ≤ 0.00%     & 
AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00% 
1 
Net Balance - AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) < 0.00%     & 
AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) > 0.00% 
2 
0.00% ≤ Net Balance - AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) < 5.00% 4 
Net Balance - AvNetBalance (lag 1 and 2) ≥ 5.00% 5 
Total (A + B + C + D) 15 
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C.2 Liquidity Risk Indicator 
INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY INDICATOR POINTS 
Comparison with 6-month Moving Average (A) 5 
FedPR ≥ 2.00% 0 
FedPR - 6-monthMA ≥ 10 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 0 
FedPR - 6-monthMA ≤ 10 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 5 
Comparison with previous month (B) 5 
FedPR ≥ 2.00% 0 
FedPR - FedPR (lag 1m) ≥ 25 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 0 
0 bps ≤ FedPR - FedPR (lag 1m) < 25 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 2 
-25 bps ≤ FedPR - FedPR (lag 1m) < 0 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 4 
FedPR - FedPR (lag 1m) < -25 bps  &  FedPR ≤ 2.00% 5 
Number of Consecutive Months with an Increase in Fed Rate (C) 5 
FedPR ≥ 2.00% 0 
Number of  Months = 4 0 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 0 0 
Number of  Months = 3 1 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 1 1 
Number of  Months = 2 2 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 2 2 
Number of  Months = 1 3 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 3 3 
Number of  Months = 0 5 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 5 5 
Total (A + B + C) 15 
FedPR = Federal Reserve Policy Rate 
6-monthMA = 6-month Moving Average Federale Reserve Policy Rate 
C-Section = Number of Points for Section C 
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INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY INDICATOR POINTS 
Comparison with previous month (A) 1 
TotRes - TotRes (lag 1) ≥ 0.00% 0 
TotRes - TotRes (lag 1) ≥ 0.00% 1 
Comparison with 12-month Moving Average (B) 5 
TotRes - 12-monthMA ≤ -15.00% 0 
-15.00% < TotRes - 12-monthMA ≤ -5.00% 1 
-5.00% < TotRes - 12-monthMA < 0.00% 2 
TotRes - 12-monthMA ≥ 0.00% 5 
Number of Consecutive Months with a Decrease in Total Reserve (C) 4 
FedPR ≥ 2.00% 0 
Number of  Months = 4 0 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 0 0 
Number of  Months = 3 1 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 1 1 
Number of  Months = 2 2 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 2 2 
Number of  Months = 1 3 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 3 3 
Number of  Months = 0 4 
Number of  Months = 0  &  C-Section Previous Month = 4 4 
Total (A + B + C) 10 
TotRes= Deseasonalized Total Reserve (USD) 
12-monthMA = 12-month Moving Average Total Reserve 
C-Section = Number of Points for Section C 
 
C.3 Political Risk Indicator 
WAR INDICATOR POINTS 
War Score = 5 0 
War Score = 4 1 
War Score = 3 2 
War Score = 2 3 
War Score = 1 4 
War Score = 0 5 
Total 5 
0 = No Conflicts  ;  1 = Riots  ;  2  = Social Conflicts  ;  3 = Civil War  ;   
4 = Serious Civil War or War against a Foreign State outside Country Territory  ;  
5 = Civil War with the involvement of a Foreign State or War with a Foreign State on 
a Country Territory 
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POLITICAL RISK INDICATOR POINTS 
20 ≤ SFI ≤ 25 0 
16 ≤ SFI ≤ 19 2 
12 ≤ SFI ≤ 15 4 
8 ≤ SFI ≤ 11 6 
4 ≤ SFI ≤ 7 8 
SFI ≤ 3 10 
Total (A + B) 15 
SFI = State Fragility Index 
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Appendix D 
D.1 Approximate and Actual Turnover 
The weights are the first relevant information for strategy comparison. Simply looking at 
their evolution over time, we can compute an approximate turnover. Portfolio turnover is the 
half of the sum of absolute weight deviations over two point in time. Eq.(D.1) presents the 
general formula, with n the number of assets included in the portfolio: 
𝜏 =
1
2
|𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1|𝟏 =
1
2
∑|𝑤𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1|
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
         𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛          (D. 1) 
However, this turnover is an approximation. In fact, the weights assigned to a specific asset 
class at the beginning of a period (e.g., month) t are not the same weights that we observe at 
the end of this period, just before implementing the optimal allocation for the following one 
(i.e., t + 1). This depends on the fact that the asset class have, in general, a non-null return. 
Given the vector of weights for period t (i.e., wt) and the wealth at the beginning of period t 
(i.e., Wt-1, the wealth at the end of the previous period), Eq.(D.2) shows the monetary value of 
each of the portfolio components. Given the return of the asset during the period t (i.e., Ri,t), 
Eq.(D.3) presents the monetary value of each position at the end of the period. 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 = 𝑊𝑡−1 × 𝑤𝑖,𝑡                                                              (D. 2) 
𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)                                                            (D. 3) 
Given the Eq.(D.3), we can compute the portfolio overall value at the end of the period and 
the weights of the asset at the end of the period, presented in Eq.(D.4) and Eq.(D.5) respec-
tively. The weights changed between the beginning and the end of the period because of the 
returns on each asset. From the weights at the end of the period, we can compute the real con-
tribution of each asset to the portfolio turnover and, finally, the actual turnover. Eq.(D.6) con-
tains the formula of the actual turnover (i.e., the turnover that takes in to account the changes 
in weights due to trading activity plus the contribution of asset returns). 
𝑊𝑡 =∑𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑒
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                            (D. 4) 
?̅?𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑏 (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑊𝑡
                                                      (D. 5) 
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𝜏𝑎𝑐 =
1
2
|?̅?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1|𝟏 =
1
2
∑|?̅?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1|
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
         𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛          (D. 6) 
D.2 Performance Measures 
There are several performance measures in order to compare different investment opportu-
nities. It is not enough to focus only on the expected return, but we have to take into account 
also the risk associated to these opportunities. A correct evaluation process analyzes the re-
turns, considering the underlying risk that the investor has to bear. In this way it is also possi-
ble to analyze different investment class. For this purpose, several risk-adjusted performance 
measures were developed in the past. The common characteristic of these measures is that 
they are a ratio between a return and a risk measure. In some cases, we consider non-extreme 
risk measure (e.g., volatility), in the others we consider extreme risk measure (e.g., value at 
risk). In this thesis I considered two performance measures with non-extreme risk and four 
performance measures with extreme risk. In general, higher ratios correspond to better re-
wards per unit of risk considered (non-extreme and extreme). Thus, the investor should select 
the asset or the portfolios that provide the highest values of performance measures. 
D.2.1 Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe Ratio is the most diffused performance measure in financial markets practice. 
Sharpe (1966) presented this ratio as the reward-to-variability ratio. The last version was for-
mulated by Sharpe (1994). It is the ratio between the asset expected excess return with respect 
to the risk-free rate (i.e., return measure) and the volatility of the returns (i.e., risk measure). 
Eq.(D.7) shows the formula: 
𝑆ℎ =
E[𝑟𝑖] − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑖
                                                                (D. 7) 
The base assumption, and the main limit, is the normality of the return distribution. The as-
sumption of normality explained why the index focuses on the first two moments of the dis-
tribution. The main advantage is the easy computation and interpretation for each type of asset 
and return time series.  
D.2.2 Sortino Ratio (or Index) 
The Sortino Ratio, or Index, uses a non-extreme risk measure. It is similar to the Sharpe 
Ratio, but it substitutes the volatility with the downside risk, i.e. the volatility of the negative 
returns only. It is the ratio between the asset expected excess return with respect to the risk-
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free rate (i.e., return measure) and the downside risk (i.e., risk measure). Eq.(D.8) presents the 
formula of the Sortino Index: 
𝑆𝑜 =
E[𝑟𝑖] − 𝑟𝑓
𝜎𝑖(𝐷)
                                                                (D. 8) 
𝜎𝑖(𝐷) = √𝜎2(𝑟𝑖 | 𝑟𝑖 < 0)                                               (D. 9) 
Behind the formulation proposed by Sortino (2001), there is the idea that investors are not 
concerned about price movements in general. They cares but about the volatility (i.e., the risk) 
only when they are realizing returns on their investment below their minimum required return. 
D.2.3 Return-VaR Ratio 
The most diffused measure of extreme risk is the value at risk (VaR). Eq.(D.10) presents 
the ratio, while Eq.(D.11) presents the general formulation of the VaR, for a given confidence 
level α and time horizon: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
E[𝑟𝑖]
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝛼)
                                                    (D. 10) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝛼) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑙 ∈ ℝ ∶ 𝑃(𝐿 > 𝑙) ≤ 1 − 𝛼}                               (D. 11) 
Given a certain time horizon, the VaR of a portfolio at the confidence level α is given by 
the smallest number (threshold) l such that the probability that the loss L exceeds this thresh-
old is at most (1- α). The main limit of the VaR is the lack of the sub-additivity property of a 
risk measure (i.e., the VaR of a portfolio should be smaller than the combination of the VaR 
of the underlying assets). This is also the main limit of using VaR as extreme risk measure. 
D.2.4 Return-ES Ratio 
The second extreme risk measure that I considered is the Expected Shortfall (ES). It was 
proposed to overcome the above-mentioned limit of the VaR. Simplifying, the ES is a condi-
tional expectation that equals the mean of returns below the VaR. Eq.(D.12) presents the ratio, 
while Eq.(D.13) presents the general formulation of the ES, for a given confidence level α: 
 
𝐸𝑆𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
E[𝑟𝑖]
|𝐸𝑆(𝛼)|
                                                         (D. 10) 
𝐸𝑆(𝑅𝑡, 𝛼) = 𝐸[𝑅𝑡 | 𝑅𝑡 < 𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝛼)]                                            (D. 11) 
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D.2.5 Drawdown-based Performance Measures: Calmar and Sterling Ratio 
The Drawdown sequence monitors the losses. At a given starting point (t = 1), the Draw-
down is set at zero (i.e., D1 = 0). Then, the evaluation follows Eq.(D.12): 
𝐷𝑡 = min(0 , (1 + 𝐷𝑡−1)(1 + 𝑅𝑡) − 1)                                   (D. 12) 
The Drawdown sequence is graphically analyzed to identify the largest losses and the time 
to recover from losses. In general, a better strategy has smaller losses and a quick recovery 
from the minimums. The ratios based on the Drawdown sequence are two. Eq.(D.13) presents 
the Calmar Ratio and it uses as risk measure the absolute value of the maximum Drawdown. 
Eq.(D.14) shows the Sterling Ratio and it uses as risk measure the absolute value of the aver-
age of the Drawdowns. Given the Drawdown sequence (DD) for a given time period: 
𝐶𝑎𝑙 =
E[𝑟𝑖]
|𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐷𝐷)|
                                                           (D. 13) 
𝑆𝑡𝑟 =
E[𝑟𝑖]
|𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐷𝐷)|
                                                          (D. 14) 
In financial markets practice, the Calmar Ratio is computed on a monthly basis (using a 
36-month rolling window), while the Sterling Ratio is computed on an yearly basis. 
D.3 Tracking Error Analysis 
The previous measures are absolute measures, since they consider the returns of a given 
asset or strategy. In some cases, we need to perform a comparison between the performance 
of an asset or a strategy and a benchmark. To perform this comparison, we can implement the 
Tracking Error Analysis. In this analysis, the core aspects considered are the deviations of the 
asset or strategy returns from the ones of the benchmark. These deviations are called Tracking 
Errors. Eq. (D.15) and Eq.(D.16) present the computations of Average Tracking Error (TE) 
and Tracking Error Volatility (TEV), respectively: 
𝑇𝐸 = E[𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐵]                                                          (D. 15) 
𝑇𝐸𝑉 = √𝜎2(𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐵)                                                     (D. 16) 
The ratio between TE and TEV is also known as Information Ratio (IR). It is equivalent to 
a Sharpe Ratio computed on Tracking Errors, without the risk free. In financial markets prac-
tice is used to evaluate the performance of a portfolio with respect to the benchmark. It is also 
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frequently used as the base for the computation of management fees or asset managers’ bo-
nuses, especially in hedge funds industry. As for the Sharpe Ratio, the TEV can be computed 
only on downside deviations. Using the Semi-TEV, we can compute the Semi-IR, that is 
equivalent to the Sortino Index. Eq.(D.17), Eq.(D.18) and Eq.(D.19) show the computation of 
the IR, the Semi-IR and the Semi-TEV, respectively. 
𝐼𝑅 =
𝑇𝐸
𝑇𝐸𝑉
                                                              (D. 17) 
𝐼𝑅 =
𝑇𝐸
𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑇𝐸𝑉
                                                        (D. 18) 
𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑇𝐸𝑉 = √𝜎2(𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐵 | 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐵 < 0)                                 (D. 19) 
 
